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'Open Skies' Conference Ends in Budapest

LD1005213490 Moscow TASS in English 1954 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Ivanov]

[Text] Budapest May 10 TASS—The second stage of an international conference on "Open Skies", which brought together delegates from 23 member-countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, ended here today.

Work at this phase of the conference aimed to elaborate a treaty to establish the "Open Skies" regime, which will enable the participating state to make observation flights by unarmed aircraft over each other's territory and definite areas outside national territories in the interests of the relaxation of world tensions and confidence building.

Delegates extensively discussed a range of the "Open Skies" ideas and succeeded in getting agreement on several provisions that will form the basis of the future treaty.

The Soviet delegation tabled its own proposals, which take into account the interests of all potential participants in the regime, and pronounced in support of the right of the non-aligned and neutral states in Europe to become its fully-fledged participants.

Deputies voiced ideas concerning a broad exchange of information, which each country should receive in full so as to dispell concern with minimum effort.

For different reasons, not all issues of the "Open Skies" regime were resolved at the Budapest conference. Mindful of the general interest in it, it was recognised as necessary to follow up on the conference. The date for its next stage will be agreed upon later.

Zholkver Cited on UN Disarmament Meetings

LD1005165590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Sessions of the UN Disarmament Commission and Committee of Nongovernmental Organizations on the same issue have begun at the UN headquarters in New York. Our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver is at the microphone with the latest news commentary:

[Zholkver] The simultaneous discussion of disarmament problems in the two UN bodies, governmental and nongovernmental, seems to me very noteworthy. The times when disarmament, or armament, issues were decided behind tightly closed doors by a small group of diplomats and military men are receding into the past. We have recently been speaking increasingly of people's diplomacy; and its object is increasingly the question of reducing the mountains of armaments accumulated by the military—not, unfortunately, without the participation of professional diplomats, who in the recent past saw it as their job not so much to seek ways to achieve disarmament, but rather to justify the arms race. Now that the new concept not of military confrontation but of joint security is gaining ground, it is becoming increasingly obvious that in order to survive mankind must united and disarm. People's diplomacy is working for just that.

Recall the brave British women who for long months picketed Greenham Common and other U.S. missile bases. The withdrawal of the U.S. Pershings from Britain was in part due to them. I remember, too, the mass meetings and demonstrations in many cities of the FRG against the siting of U.S. chemical weapons there; and in the end Washington was forced to announce that they were about to be removed. And surely one cannot forget, either, the actions by the Americans themselves against nuclear tests in Nevada. In our own country, in Kazakhstan, I have witnessed the active nonacceptance by public opinion of the nuclear explosions at the testing ground at Semipalatinsk. It is truly remarkable that this month, in Alma-Ata, an international congress is to be held entitled: "Voters of the World Against Nuclear Weapons."

Of special value, in my view, is the active participation in the peace movement of scientsts, who are drawing up effective projects for disarmament and conversion of military industry. Let us hope that such proejcts will also emerge from the present sessions at UN headquarters.

Last but not least, there is another circumstance which lends special significance to these sessions: They have begun at a time when the 45th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe is being celebrated. In these days, in Moscow and Paris, in Berlin and in many other European capitals, the call has been heard that we must learn the lessons of history and not let another war happen. These are also the aims of people's democracy, which is becoming an ever more important factor of our time.

Military Inspectors Complete Work in Italy

LD1005140490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] On 9 May, a group of Soviet military inspectors completed inspection of a stated area on the territory of Italy. The inspection was carried out on the basis of the relevant clauses of the document of the Stockholm Conference on measures to enhance trust, security, and disarmament in Europe.

Gerasimov 10 May Briefing on World Issues

5 May Pogroms Unfounded 'Rumors'

LD1005140290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1300 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 10 May (TASS) Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, refuted at a briefing today the recent reports in the western press concerning "Jewish pogroms in Moscow" allegedly planned for 5 May this year.

"The Western press, especially the U.S. press, carried reports claiming that on 5 May (in the USSR—TASS note) there would be Jewish pogroms, almost a version of the Nazi 'Kristallnacht'," Gennadiy Gerasimov said. "Since fears had been stirred, at the beginning of May 98 rabbis from the western coast of the United States appealed to the Soviet ambassador in Washington—and this was printed in THE WASHINGTON POST—expressing profound concern in connection with the growth of anti-Semitism in our country and the pogroms expected on 5 May.

"On 4 May," the Foreign Ministry spokesman continued, "the Government of Israel conveyed to us through the head of the Israeli consular group in Moscow an official statement on this same subject.

"We have been informed at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs," Gennadiy Gerasimov announced, "that the rumors of allegedly planned Jewish pogroms in Moscow are devoid of any foundation. No incidents of this kind were noted on 5 May nor earlier nor later. So, the rumor was invented from the very beginning.

"We raise the question, who stands to gain from this?" the Soviet diplomat said in conclusion, addressing journalists. "Those who want a growth of emigration to Israel, who frighten people with pogroms, inciting them to leave, and you know who wants that."

'Open Skies' Agreement Urged

LD1005145590 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—"Elaborating an agreement on the 'Open Skies' regime will be a major step in boosting openness in military activity and in confidence building," Soviet Foreign Minister spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

Commenting on the second stage of an international conference on the "Open Skies," drawing to an end in Budapest today, Gerasimov noted that progress was achieved at the forum on some issues.

"However, the parties' positions on several key issues have yet to be harmonised," Gerasimov went on. "For instance, Western partners balk at including in the number of facilities subject for verification military bases outside their national territories, which considerably limits the zone of the 'Open Skies' regime application," Gerasimov said.

"The parties' positions also differ on which aircraft should be used for verification flights and what monitoring and measuring devices should be installed in these aircraft. Agreement has also not been reached on the utilisation of information gathered during the flights," Gerasimov said.

"Despite remaining differences, we think that an agreement on the 'Open Skies' can be reached within a short time," Gerasimov said. "This agreement will be a tangible addition to national means to verify arms reduction agreements," Gerasimov emphasized.

First Session of Soviet-EC Joint Commission Held

Shevardnadze Makes Opening Remarks

LD1005134790 Moscow TASS in English 1332 GMT 10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Georg Mikhailin]

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Frans Andriessen, foreign affairs commissioner of the European Communities (EC), opened the first session of a Soviet-EC joint commission for trade, commercial and economic cooperation here today.

In his opening remarks, Shevardnadze described the Moscow session as a "significant and major event", emphasising that the Soviet Union attaches much importance to cooperation with the communities.

He voiced hope that the session will give a substantial impetus to establishing cooperation between the two sides under specific programmes.

The Soviet foreign minister pointed out that Soviet-EC economic cooperation is lagging behind "the already established and progressing political dialgoue between them."

Having pointed to the urgent need for progress towards building a common European home and overcoming the division of Europe, Shevardnadze emphasised that there should be no discrimination from political motives in approaches to cooperation with various countries.

Having described German unification as being central to current European affairs, Shevardnadze urged the leading bodies of the EC to take due account of the economic relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in view of the forthcoming inclusion of East Germany in the EC sphere.

Andriessen referred to the joint commission's first session as a historic event. He pointed to the existence of an immense potential for the expansion of trade betwen the USSR and the EC.

The liberalisation of their mutual trade, Andriessen believes, will create new opportunities for Soviet exports and improve conditions for EC businessman's activity in the Soviet Union.

Andriessen praised progress in the two sides' accords on cooperation in the fields of the nuclear power industry, environmental protection and the training of managerial personnel.

Following the opening remarks by Shevardnadze and Andriessen, the Soviet and EC delegations began to discuss bilateral cooperation.

Andriessen Gives Briefing

LD1005153790 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—"The agreement between the Soviet Union and the European Communities (EC) on trade, commercial and economic cooperation, signed in Brussels in December last year, is an important element of the remaking of Europe," Frans Andriessen, vice president of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC), told a news conference here today.

He is currently in Moscow in connection with the first session of the Soviet-EC joint commission set up to implement the agreement.

During a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today, there was a frank and fruitful discussion of matters aimed at elaborating the future "architecture of Europe," he said.

Andreissen drew attention to the understanding, shown by the Soviet side, of the thesis that integration within the EC is compatible with integration processes taking place in the whole of Europe, including German unification. These processes, he said, serve as a stablizing factor on the continent.

Touching upon Soviet-EC relations, the spokesman pointed out that the Common Market attaches much importance not only to the commercial aspect of the agreement signed but also to the possibility of developing cooperation in vocational training, establishment of joint ventures, private capital investments, environmental protection, transport, nuclear power industry, and scientific and technological cooperation.

The European Communities together with the member states of the Europea Free Trade Association [EFTA] are now discussing second-generation agreements in which central and East European countries could participate, Andriessen said.

The point is to move from commercial and economic cooperation to higher forms of integration, including economic one, he added.

A continuation of reforms in East European countries and switchover of their economies to a market basis should become a condition for the implementation of such plans, Andriessen emphasised.

In answer to a question about the influence of Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] rules on the development of relations with East European countries, Andriessen said that the Common Market welcomed the readiness of the United States and other Western countries to change rules for the circulation of commodities, since the existing restrictions may create problems for the EC.

Having expressed concern over the introduction of economic sanctions with regard to Lithuania, the CEC spokesman stressed that "speculations" about possible EC measures in the event of application of similar sanctions with regard to Latvia and Estonia were inappropriate.

Sitaryan Receives Andriessen

LD1005172890 Moscow TASS in English 1652 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan today received Frans Andriessen, vice president of the Commission of the European Communities.

It was emphasised during the meeting that the work of the Soviet-EC joint commission, set up in accordance with the agreement between the Soviet Union and the European Communities on trade, commercial and economic cooperation, signed in December last year, will serve to broaden trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and EC member-states.

Shevardnadze, Andriessen Hold Talks

LD1005201590 Moscow TASS in English 1933 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—The first session of a Soviet-European Communities (EC) joint commission began here today. The commission was set up in accordance with the Soviet-EC agreement on trade, commercial and economic cooperation.

When opening the session, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze emphasised that this is a significant event, the first large-scale activity aiming to consider practical measures towards establishing and developing versatile cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European Communities.

One can see a serious headway being made recently in all-European cooperation in its military-and-political field and humanitarian dimension, he said.

The CSCE economic conference in Bonn adopted decisions aimed at broadening cooperation in the economic field. From this point of view this session enables the Soviet Union and the European Communities to provide an example of practical implementation of accords reached at the Bonn forum, Shevardnadze said.

He expressed satisfaction that the two sides in the joint commission consider it as priorities for mutual cooperation such really topical fields as environmental protection, science and technology, power industry, including nuclear power industry and nuclear safety matters, and the training of personnel.

Shevardnadze specially pointed out the urgent need to make consistent headway towards the building of a common European home, overcoming the division of the European continent and further deepening all-European process on the basis of new political thinking.

In this connection one can only welcome that political prerequisites favoring all-round and unimpeded development of East-West cooperation in the fields of the economy, science, technology, and environmental protection have been improving of late, he said.

These are good signs. Everyone can benefit from this, and no one will lose anything," [no opening quotation marks as received] he added.

The Soviet side is convinced that tangible results of the session's work would be a specific contribution not only to cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European Communities but also to further development of the all-European process, Shevardnadze said.

In his opening remarks, Frans Andriessen, vice president of the Commission of European Communities (CEC), pointed out that the EC attach much importance to developing cooperation with the Soviet Union not only as their major economic partner but also as a country that plays an active role in shaping the destiny of Europe.

He emphasised that the EC see the immense potentialities for broadening trade with the Soviet Union and deepening economic relations with it on a mutually beneficial basis.

The implementation of the provisions of the agreement between them and the exercise of the principles endorsed by the Bonn economic forum will promote the attainment of the goals of reorganising the Soviet economy and integrating it into the world economic system, he said.

For its part, the CEC is prepared to act towards lifting ahead of time or suspending a number of quantitative restrictions applied to Soviet export to EC markets and developing cooperation in a broad spectrum of economic sectors Andriessen said.

On the same day Shevardnadze and Andriessen had a talk. They discussed a wide range of matters connected with the political and economic future of Europe within the context of world development.

They pointed out in particular that it was possible to bring East and West Europe closer together only through a mutual adaptation of their economic and political structures and the founding of new all-European institutions.

It was emphasised that acceleration of the economic reform and success of perestroyka in the Soviet Union as a whole are of decisive importance for the destiny of the all-European process.

Kohl, Genscher, Vogel Cited on European Policy

LD1005180590 Moscow TASS in English 1739 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS Correspondent Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn May 10 TASS—"The first meeting of the foreign ministers of the two German states and four victor powers under the "Two Plus Four" formula held in Bonn, like the earlier Dublin extraordinary session of the European Council of the communities at the level of the heads of state and government, set the beginning to a new, decisive stage in harmonising the building of German and European unity," West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said in a government statement today.

The statement opened one-day debates in the Bundestag on external and internal aspects of German unification.

Kohl said the parties succeeded in making considerable headway both in settling the external aspects of German unification and at the talks with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). He said German unification was a "catalyst" for European integration.

Kohl favoured creating an economic, currency and political union among the European Community member-countries. In his view, the building of this union should be completed before 1993.

On internal aspects of German unification, Kohl expressed confidence that a currency, economic and social union between West Germany and the GDR would be formed by July 2, 1990.

He said the central issue at the talks with the GDR would be the balance between spending on social needs and economic prospects. Kohl thinks that labour productivity and personal initiative will be crucial here.

Speaking in the Bonn parliament, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher made another government statement devoted to the outcome of the Bonn six-nation meeting and the Council of NATO session at the foreign minister level.

He reiterated Bonn's striving to prepare the results of the follow-up "Two Plus Four" talks for submission to the top-level conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) this autumn.

Genscher emphasised that the West German Government was interested in taking into account the security interests of the Soviet Union in settling the external aspects of German unification.

The West should not derive unilateral advantages from the developments in East Europe [words indistinct] said

the USSR should play an important and constructive role in the future Europe as well.

"Soviet-German relations will become still more dynamic after two Germany's have merged into a single state. We are interested in seeing President Gorbachev's policy crowned with success," Genscher said.

Genscher reiterated that Bonn favoured a united Germany's membership in NATO. "The North Atlantic Alliance needs, however, to adapt itself to current dramatic changes in Europe, where cooperative security systems should be created. Both alliances should increasingly fulfill political tasks," Genscher stressed. He also spoke out for extending and deepening the CSCE process.

Opposition Social Democratic Party of Germany Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, who spoke during the debates, emphasised that the success of the "Two Plus Four" [word indistinct] ultimately depend on two preconditions: first, on the unconditional recognition of the final nature of Poland's Western borders and, second, on substantial changes in the nature and strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Vogel hailed the United States' renunciation of land-based short-range missiles, but sharply criticised U.S. plans to build up air-launched nuclear-tipped missiles.

Saying that "the hour of German unification" should become "the hour of disarmament", Vogel called upon the government to give up the project to build an European fighter for the 1990s, stop military aircraft low-altitude flights and sizeably reduce the Bundeswehr staff.

Pointing out that the external and internal aspects of building German unity can hardly be settled concurrently, Vogel expressed the view that in the transitional period after unification, the four victor powers could, as agreed, preserve their positions in Germany, including militarily.

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets in Kananaskis

Military Strategy To Be Discussed

LD1005100190 Moscow TASS in English 0942 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Ottawa May 10 TASS—A regular session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which opened at the Kananaskis military base in Canada on Wednesday, will discuss the modification of the alliance's military strategy.

The defence ministers of the 14 member-states are participating in its work. The session is not being attended by the defence ministers of France and Iceland, which are not part of the NATO's military structure.

The debate began behind closed doors, and no agenda was announced. However, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner told journalists before the session that he intended to ask the group to review NATO strategy in the run-up to a NATO summit meeting in London, due in early July.

THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper writes today that the ministers have reached a preliminary understanding that in the near future the NATO strategy would be based on the U.S. military presence in Europe and the partial maintenance of its nuclear weapons on the continent.

At the same time they welcomed a decision by President Bush to abandon plans to modernise short-range lance nuclear missiles.

Session participants called on the United States and the USSR to begin talks this year to destroy land-based tactical missiles in Europe.

Representatives of some countries, including West Germany and The Netherlands, suggested that the United States go further by unilaterally withdrawing its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

THE WASHINGTON POST notes however that this idea met a restrained response from other session participants. U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney stressed that the United States did not have an official position on this issue.

Adherence to Nuclear Weapons Affirmed

LD1105083190 Moscow TASS in English 0722 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Ottawa May 11 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valentin Vasilets:

A two-day meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has ended in Kananaskis, near the Canadian town of Calgary, with a final communique confirming the bloc's adherence to nuclear weapons.

Although the defence ministers of the 14 NATO countries appreciated the radical changes in the USSR and in East Europe and "warmly greeted the reforms and efforts to promote democratic values and institutions in those countries," they again declared that the task of "preventing war will require the existence of nuclear weapons in the future, too."

The communique also stresses that in the new conditions prestrategic nuclear systems, known for their great flexibility and long range, are bound to become even more important.

The communique confounded predictions that the session would cut nuclear arsenals in Europe and renounced all short-distance nuclear weapons in particular.

The communique merely calls on the Soviet Union to reduce its short-distance nuclear forces.

Solton Comments on Conference

LD1005134890 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 10 May 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] NATO's nuclear planning group has concluded [word indisinct] session in Canada at a resort town near Calgary. The defense ministers of NATO countries are discussing the possible altering of their nuclear plans in the light of changes occurring in Europe. Yuriy Solton comments, and this is what he writes:

The present gathering of defense ministers opens a series of conferences designed to define a new strategy for NATO. We shall also learn what the NATO leaders intend to do about the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. As a matter of fact, NATO keeps on the continent 35 to 40 hundred units of such weaponry. So far, there is no unity among the NATO countries in regard to this issue and the first contacts between defense ministers in Calgary proved this. [sentence as heard]

For instance, the statement of President Bush that the United States will refrain from modernizing the Lance missile and nuclear artillery shells has been welcomed. However, Washington's intention to deploy new air-to-ground tactical nuclear missiles in West Europe drew differing reactions, as his proposal to start this very year negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union did. According to reports from Calgary, Britain's representative opposed this proposal.

In my view, writes Yuriy Solton, the call for removing all nuclear artillery shells from Europe merits attention. It has been supported by the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Some said that such removal could be carried out unilaterally, and that the Soviet Union could be urged to follow suit. As a matter of fact, the USSR has already begun to withdraw unilaterally from East European countries 500 ammunition units of its tactical nuclear forces. Besides, the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies stand for a total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. They've called for starting talks on this problem for a long time.

Unfortunately, so far I've not seen fundamental changes in NATO's nuclear strategy, writes Yuriy Solton. On the eve of the conference in Calgary both NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney unambiguously spoke in favor of maintaining tactical nuclear arms in Europe indefinitely. The chief of the Pentagon found it necessary to declare publicly that NATO should not give up its concept of flexible reaction, which provides for being the first to use nuclear arms.

What is this all about? This involves plans to retain tactical nuclear weapons in Europe from where only outdated nuclear systems will be removed and replaced by air-based nuclear missiles. Isn't that an obstacle on the road of disarmament, on the road of building new European security structures? Nevertheless, let's hope that the NATO leaders have not said their last word yet. An answer to the challenge of our times will be given.

TASS Analyst Cited on German Unification, NATO

LD1005180190 Moscow TASS in English 1742 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS political news analyst Aleksandr Antsiferov]

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—According to negotiators at the "Two Plus Four" meeting, German unification is designed to draw a line under the Second World War and help overcome the division of Europe.

However, the search for ways and a framework within which to achieve German unity is a highly contradictory and extremely complex process requiring consideration of the interests of not only the negotiating countries but also those of the international community as a whole.

The proposal, put forward by President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on May 8 and addressed to "the Six," to discuss concluding a German peace treaty is acquiring exceptional importance in this connection.

Without infringing on the right of the two German states to unite and without detracting from the national dignity of Germans, such a treaty would determine the military status of a reunited Germany and its role in the emerging all-European security system. It would also provide reliable guarantees that a war would never again originate from German soil.

The implementation of the Soviet peace initiative would serve to strengthen strategic stability on our continent and in the world. By virtue of its universality, it presupposes the maintenance of the established balance of forces and interests.

An attractive aspect of Gorbachev's proposal is that the elaboration and conclusion of a peace treaty could resolve the stalemate over Germany's affiliation with the military and political alliances now existing in Europe.

In this context Moscow's new initiative can be viewed as a compromise alternative to the a priori inclusion of a reunited Germany in NATO, which, as the Soviet leadership repeatedly emphasised, would be totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

It seems clear that NATO's basic strategy—which is directed against the Soviet Union and its allies and envisages in particular the possibility of a first nuclear strike—will remain unchanged, although there are now voices that support the idea of reorganising the bloc in view of changes taking place in the world.

The Soviet Union, showing both goodwill and constructiveness, has come forward with the new initiative. The ball is now in the other court.

General States Pact Guarantees European Stability

LD1105082590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0626 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)—"The main result of the Warsaw Pact's (WTO) activities over the 35 years of its existence is that the tragic cycle was broken: war—short peaceful breathing space—war. This is a result of the fact that the WTO member states have consistently and actively conducted coordinated peaceable defense and security policies and in so doing have prevented war," Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, declared. He gave an interview today to TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy in connection with the 35th anniversary of the WTO on 14 May.

Speaking of the complex processes taking place in East Europe, General Lushev noted that these events influenced considerably the state of affairs within the WTO. According to Petr Lushev, this caused certain Western politicians to assert that the WTO was in "decline" or even "collapse," that it has lost its positions, and that its influence on international events has declined. Many are of the opinion, asserts Lushev, that now that East European states are establishing various ties with Western countries, WTO membership is an impediment for them.

"I regard such conclusions as untenable" said the WTO commander in chief. He added that currently there did not exist, nor could there exist in East Europe, another alternative mechanism capable of exerting a more effective influence than the WTO on securing stability in Europe. "The whole disarmament process and the ideas of constructing a "pan-European home" sprang from the recognition of the balance of forces and parity between NATO and the WTO stressed the general.

Any changes within the NATO and WTO structures will, in the final analysis, thinks Petr Lushev, influence the process of relaxation of international tension. That is why the Soviet Union opposes the united Germany being a NATO member, since a realignment of this kind may substantially affect the balance and disposition of forces in Europe and destabilize international relations. "This ought to be understood by all who are interested in constructing the pan- European home," the final outcome of which ought to be a simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the WTO if a collective security system is created said General Lushev.

The WTO commander in chief states that the processes taking place in East Europe are geared not toward division, but toward further cohesion within the WTO framework. The objective and continuing identity [obshchnost] of the allied countries, determined by their geopolitical situation, security interests, and considerable mutual economic interdependence, facilitates this. "Membership in the WTO represents a reliable guarantee of overcoming internal probems, of the WTO implementing its goals and tasks that guarantee stability in Europe" said General Lushev in conclusion.

Tarasov Remarks on Middle East Conflict

LD1005175290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1048 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Stockholm, 10 May (TASS)—The role of the European states in settling the Middle East conflict, the place of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the political, economic, and cultural life of the Palestinian people, the importance of the palestinians' popular uprising on the occupied territories—these and other questions are in the center of attention of the UN European regional seminar on the question of Palestine. The forum is continuing its work in the House of the People in the Swedish capital. Taking part are experts from the majority of European states, including the USSR and also representatives of the United States, China, Israel, and Palestine, international and nongovernmental organizations.

G.P. Tarasov, adviser to the USSR foreign minister, special representative on Middle Eastern affairs, pointed out in his speech the urgent need for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The preparation and convening under UN aegis of a peace conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the interested sides, including the PLO and Israel, he stressed, is the optimal mechanism for seeking mutually acceptable solutions. The Soviet representative also called the attention of those assembled to the USSR's proposal to organize a dialogue between Israel and the PLO on Soviet territory.

United States & Canada

Bessmertnykh Meets U.S. Envoy, TV Executive

LD1005183890 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—United States Ambassador in the USSR Jack Matlock was received at his request by First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today.

Some military-political problems were discussed. They also touched upon Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armaments.

Bessmertnykh today also received Vice-President of the NBC Television Company Gordon Manning. Some possible projects for Soviet-American television cooperation were discussed.

Cheney's Opposition to NATO Shift Questioned

LD1005190490 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS military news analyast Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—U.S. Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney, in remarks made in the Canadian city of Calgary where he arrived to attend NATO defence ministers' meeting, made a statement which can hardly be viewed as corresponding to present-day realities.

Cheney said that he did not see any need to change the basic, fundamental strategy of the alliance, under which NATO reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an overpowering attack by an enemy using non-nuclear arms.

To begin with, I would like to draw attention that, notwithstanding the substantially changed military and strategic situation in Europe, the U.S. defence secretary prefers thinking in old categories by mentioning an "enemy attack" and, besides, an "overpowering" one.

This is the more strange as quite recently Cheney himself, when speaking in Colorado Springs, regarded as significant changes in the world the unilateral cut in the Soviet armed forces announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1988, the accords to withdraw Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and a cut in Soviet Defence expenditures.

The thesis about a "threat of a suprise attack" on the past of the Soviet Union was deflated in Washington at official level.

According to the thesis, hostilities would be launched by the Soviet Union without an additional deployment of forces in advance while an attack warning time was expected to be at least two weeks.

A report, recently made public by U.S. intelligence agencies, draws the conclusion that a warning is sure to be obtained within one to three months.

Quite specific was the opinion of the delegation of the U.S. Congress Armed Services Committee, led by Les Aspin, who visited the Soviet Union and the Group of Soviet Forces on the territory of the German Democratic Republic in August last year.

A report submitted by the delegation clearly states that cuts being effected in the number of Soviet troops and armaments would considerably reduce the forward-based forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and would make an attack an "inadmissibly risky" affair from the Soviet Union's point of view.

So, even without mentioning serious political changes in East European countries and the Soviet Union, one can draw a conclusion about substantial changes in the military field and about the unacceptability of the U.S. and NATO former views about the "defence" of Western Europe.

Contrary to Cheney's opinion, a radical revision of the basic elements of NATO's military strategy has long been ripe.

It seems to me that a United States and NATO pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is one of the most important issues requiring a well-considered and detailed discussion.

The Soviet Union made such a pledge several years ago. This provision is recorded in the Soviet military doctrine.

Further on Senate Hearings, Akhromeyev Address

PM1105105190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Constructive Dialogue Essential"]

[Text] Washington, 10 May— "The dramatic transformations taking place in the world create a historic opportunity for achieving progress in all aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, including the sphere of arms control," Edward Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Projection Forces and Regional Defense Subcommittee, has stated. Hearings began today in the subcommittee he heads on a wide spectrum of arms control issues.

According to the senator, in the course of the forthcoming hearings subcommittee members intend to examine the most important arms control questions on the agenda of Soviet-U.S. relations and and also "the possibility of holding talks regarding naval forces limitations, mainly with respect to sea-based nuclear weapons."

With regard to the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit, Kennedy expressed the hope that substantial progress will be achieved at it in relations between our countries

in many spheres of cooperation which have substantial significance for both countries.

USSR presidential adviser Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev addressed the senators. He set forth the Soviet position on arms control issues and answered numerous questions from the U.S. senators. One person who spoke during the ensuing discussion was S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who talked of his high regard for the constructive dialogue in which the senior military representatives of the USSR and the United States are engaged and which is facilitating a consolidation of trust between our countries.

Despite a definite difference in their approaches to questions of naval arms reduction, the senators who attended the hearings expressed the joint opinion that the positive tendencies in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations not only meet the national interests of our countries but also considerably facilitate the preservation of international peace and stability.

U.S. Congressman Cited on Nationalism in USSR

LD1005070190 Moscow TASS in English 0606 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] New York May 10 TASS—Separatism in the Soviet Union may jeopardize Soviet reforms and progress in arms control, said Lee Hamilton, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

The United States is interested in the success of President Gorbachev and his policy of perestroyka and glasnost, the congressman stressed in an article published by THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR newspaper on Wednesday.

The United States seeks to conclude new agreements on arms control and to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union in settling regional disputes.

However, growing nationalism in the USSR may threaten these goals, he noted.

U.S. Paper Cited on Problems of Joint Ventures

PM1005114590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the rubric "Their Views on Us": How To Frighten a Businessman, or What Is Slowing Down Business Cooperation Between Enterprises in the USSR and the United States"]

[Text] New York, 9 May—Many joint ventures in the USSR are suffering large losses and are often unprofitable because of the host of bureaucratic obstacles, a failure to meet contractual commitments by Soviet partners, and increasingly frequent instances of theft. This is the conclusion of the influential U.S. business newspaper the WALL STREET JOURNAL, which cites research by U.S. economists.

At present over 150 U.S. companies have set up joint ventures with Soviet partners. The potential for business cooperation between the two countries is enormous. However, the deeply entrenched old economic management methods are a powerful obstacle to the development of Soviet-U.S. business cooperation. According to the WALL STREET JOURNAL's figures, it takes at least one year of touring ministries and departments just to register a joint venture. After signing contracts many Soviet enterprises consistently fail to fulfill them, blaming unforeseen difficulties. "This practice is unacceptable to U.S. business," the newspaper notes. "If companies invest capital, they expect a definite result. Even the most skilled economic planning experts from the leading U.S. corporations cannot predict how the Soviet side will act." Employees of joint ventures, mainly those producing equipment and food, often steal from them.

It isn't just Americans who are experiencing such problems in the Soviet Union. Since the adoption of the law regulating the activity of Soviet enterprises and organizations with Western partners, more than 10,000 companies from different countries have signed articles of intent with the Soviet side on the creation of joint ventures, the WALL STREET JOURNAL notes. At present only 1,500 have survived the bureaucratic endurance test and managed to register in the Soviet Union, and of those only 140 are operating normally to both sides' benefit.

At a time when an accord in principle is being worked out on a new trade agreement between the two countries, the present situation scares U.S. business, the newspaper notes. According to American assessments, the normalization of economic relations between the two countries would make it possible to increase reciprocal trade turnover to $10-$15 billion a year.

China

PRC Spokesman Cited on Sino-Soviet Relations

LD1005114890 Moscow TASS in English 1145 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Beijing May 10 TASS—"A year has passed since President Mikhail Gorbachev's May 1989 visit to China, which normalized Soviet-Chinese relations. In accordance with the spirit of the joint Soviet-Chinese communique, bilateral relations were further developed during the ensuing period in all areas—political, commercial, economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and in education," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Li Jinghua told a briefing here today in reply to a TASS request for a comment on the approaching anniversary of the Soviet president's official friendly visit to China.

"Premier Li Peng's recent visit to the Soviet Union further helped promote relations between the two countries," Li Jinghua said. "The leaders of the two countries discussed a broad range of problems. Their negotiations paved the way

to further cooperation in technology and economy. The signing of six bilateral documents was an important result of this successful visit," the spokesman noted.

Northeast Asia

Mongolia Adopts Party, Constitutional Legislation

LD1105082190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Last night the Mongolian People's Great Hural session ended. The deputies adopted a law on political parties as well as a law on additions to the country's Constitution. The new law-based acts aim to qualitatively renew the country's political system and to liberate it from the heritage of administrative-command methods of leadership in society and the economy.

Exactly two hours after the law on political parties was adopted, Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, submitted a request to the Supreme Court to register the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party officially, in accordance with the newly adopted law.

Mongolian Parliament Views Political Parties Law

LD1005111890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] The law on political parties is being examined by deputies at the parliament session which has begun in Ulaanbaatar. Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural, is to present a report on the acceleration and deepening of the processes of perestroyka to renew the political system.

MPRP's Ochirbat Previews Moscow Talks

LD1005123490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] In his interview for Soviet and Mongolian journalists, G. Ochirbat, chairman of the MPRP [Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party] Central Committee, has expressed confidence that the forthcoming highest-level talks due to take place in a few days in Moscow will raise Mongolian-Soviet cooperation to a new level of quality. In the center of attention during the talks with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, he said, will be questions of increasing the efficiency of our mutual work directed toward renovating our economic cooperation.

North Korean Greetings on War Victory

SK1005041290 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the great patriotic war, the Central Committee of the Korea-Soviet Friendship Association sent a congratulatory message to the Central Committee of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Association.

The congratulatory message reads:

On the occasion of this significant day, we send very warm congratulations to the fraternal Soviet people. The Soviet people displayed matchless devotion and great bravery in the patriotic war, defeated fascist Germany, and defended the dignity and independence of their fatherland. And, they presented freedom to the people of other East European countries.

TASS Reporter Views Hyundai Workers' Strike

SK0505094590 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Commentst by TASS reporter (Vladimir Somchev) from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Tass reporter (Vladimir Somchev) comments on an event taking place in Ulsan, ROK:

The streets of this port city are filled with the smell of tear gas and [words indistinct]. This is the result of confrontation between striking workers and special police units that have quelled disorderly struggles. This confrontation started early in the morning. Police units composed of approximately 10,000 policemen launched a surprise attack on Hyundai Heavy Industries, a large world-class shipbuilding company, which had been occupied by workers. Approximately 10,000 workers of this company went on strike on Wednesday [28 April], demanding that the detained leaders of their labor union be released.

According to available information, at 0600 in the morning, the police, firing tear gas canisters into the company, began their attack. Breaking barricades which were set up by workers and using bulldozers, the policemen, wearing gas masks and armed with batons and shields, entered the company compound. At the same time, hundreds of other policemen entered this shipbuilding company from the sea. At that time, helicopters hovered over the plant and scattered leaflets that called on (?workers to end their strike). Faced with this attack, the workers threw stones, firebombs, steel bars, and even homemade mortars. However, as a result of the continued police operations, the attackers occupied all the facilities in half an hour. Four workers and two policemen were injured. Approximately 300 workers were arrested. Approximately 100 workers are resisting by staying atop a big 82-meter-high crane. They stored in advance firebombs and food and are resolved to fight as long as possible. They declared that they would jump from that crane to the ground to commit suicide if the police attempted to arrest them.

The ROK Government explained that the current strike, which the authorities declared illegal, would shatter social stability and harm the economy, which is facing serious last-minute difficulties even without such a strike, and thus the government took this harsh measure. However, the attack on the shipbuilding company, the workplace of the striking workers, will only add to the

workers' discontent. This may also escalate labor disputes in the ROK, which had calmed down. Right after the police launched a surprise attack on the shipbuilding company, 10,000 shipbuilding workers joined assembly workers of Hyundai Motors, another affiliate company of the ROK's Hyundai Group, in waging street struggles against the police in Ulsan. As a result, traffic was snarled and at least ten policemen and six workers were injured.

According to authorities, two police buses were burned and approximately five police cars were damaged. After police helicopters sprayed workers with tear gas, approximately 4,000 workers took shelter in the compound of Hyundai Motors. The city has been in constant chaos. Approximately 20 schools were closed, and shops near the shipbuilding company and the motor company were closed.

YONHAP said that this incident may affect other ROK industrial companies. Workers of 18 Hyundai affiliate companies declared that they would go on strike. A federation of 28 labor unions in Masan and Changwon, near Ulsan, declared that 42,000 workers would go on strike in solidarity with the workers of Hyundai.

The opposition Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD] demanded that issues concerning the strike of the workers of Hyundai affiliate companies and the Korean Broadcasting System, the government-run radio and television station, be urgently discussed in the National Assembly. The PPD (?lawmakers) protested the police's surprise attack on the shipbuilding company in Ulsan. A spokesman for the PPD denounced Minister of Home Affairs An Ung-mo for having recklessly mobilized the police forces. A group of lawmakers working to form the Democratic Party is demanding that a special session of the National Assembly be convened. Describing the police's use of force this time as an illegal act designed to disband the labor union of Hyundai Heavy Industries, a spokesman for this party declared that the authorities must release all the detained workers of the Hyundai affiliate companies and must take measures to prevent the current conflicts from spreading to other companies.

Because of a power struggle among its leaders for a (?final showdown), the ruling Democratic Liberal Party has seen its reputation drastically suffer. This was shown in the April public opinion survey by Social Development Institute, said YONHAP today. According to this survey, only 14 percent of the respondents supported the DLP. In the March survey, almost 28 percent supported the DLP. In January, right after the three parties were merged, 43 percent of people supported this party. A major reason why the popularity of the DLP has dropped is a power struggle among leaders of factions in the party. The poor ratings were also affected by rumors that No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam, the party's co-leaders, had secretly agreed that (?their roles would be exchanged) after the 1992 elections.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Ambassador Calls for U.S. Reductions in Asia

HK1105050190 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] The United States should reduce its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This was said by Oleg Sokolov, Soviet ambassador to Manila, in connection with the coming talks between the Philippines and the United States which are due to start on 4 May. Sokolov says that Washington's announcement about reducing its forces in the region during the next three years is merely a symbolic gesture. He said a balanced reduction of forces in the region should be made by the Soviet Union and the United States, in line with calls made by Washington for a meeting dealing with the region's security.

The ambassador said the Soviet Union poses no threat to any country in the region. In line with this statement, the Soviets have been reducing their forces in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Five hundred thousand Soviet soldiers will be pulled out from Asia—2,000 of which have already left. Those remaining will also be sent home.

Prospects for Cambodia 'Peace Dialogue' Viewed

PM1105101190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent B. Vinogradov: "If the StatusQuo Is Recognized"]

[Text] Hanoi—On many occasions in the past the latest statement or diplomatic move by Sihanouk has been met in political circles with dismayed silence or bewilderment. The hush in such cases has lasted exactly as long as people versed in the history of the region and its international affairs have needed to interpret the "unpredicatable prince's" new initiative.

This time Sihanouk's decision that he intends to "retire from martial affairs" and devote the rest of his life to "serving his people on the soil of his beloved Cambodia" has, according to REUTER, produced a "stunned reaction." To be more precise: The other day Sihanouk delivered a "three-point statement" in Beijing in which he in fact asks Hun Sen and his government to allow him to live in the country and move throughout it completely legally and to provide assistance in restoring and developing the economy, culture, heath care...

The prince also promises to use his authority and influence to attract foreign capital and other forms of international aid to the country, as happened during the period of his rule in the forties and fifties.

The statement stresses that the prince's activity in Cambodia at this stage will not be political in character. Having resigned (yet again!) as leader of the opposition and commander in chief of its armed forces, Sihanouk recognizes that the conflict cannot be solved militarily

and appeals to the UN secretary general and the Security Council to support him in his "crusade for peace and consensus in Cambodia." He hopes during his traveling around the country, if it eventuates, to be accompanied by members of the UN Special Commission as well as officials appointed at the discretion of either the opposition administration or the Phnom Penh government, depending on which regions the itinerary traverses.

As of today the Cambodian People's Armed Forces control 94 percent of the country's territory; the rest—primarily small areas and population centers along the northwestern border—is in the hands of opposition formations. Combat operations are continuing, but the correlation of forces seems likely to change very soon. And it is no coincidence that both sides are voicing increasingly often the need to stop and freeze the status quo as the basis for a cease-fire and the start of peace negotiations.

Hun Sen, prime minister of the State of Cambodia, was the first to advance such an idea. It has also been actively discussed recently at consultations held by Australian Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Costello, who was visiting Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Beijing. On meeting with Sihanouk he obtained Sihanouk's agreement to recognize the status quo, the autonomous administration of their territory by each of the two belligerent sides, and future Cambodian neutrality.

Hun Sen's recent visit to Thailand and his talks with Deputy Prime Minister Chawalit Yongchaiyut, during which further steps in the search for a just solution of the Cambodian problem were agreed, is considered in this regard to be an important stage by observers. During the final press conference held by Hun Sen, journalists drew special attention to that part of the statement where he speaks of his agreement in principle to Khmer Rouge participation in the settlement process and also the Supreme National Council. Hun Sen stressed that the participation of Pol Pot and his immediate entourage, who are guilty of killing millions of Cambodians, is out of the question here. The involvement of the Khmer Rouge in the peace settlement in no way signifies abandonment of reliable safeguards against the restoration of the genocidal Pol Pot regime.

Specialists thus consider that the emergent points of contact between the sides are opening up certain opportunities to resume the peace dialogue and make progress in unblocking the difficult situation. Certain hopes here are placed on the next conference of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council scheduled to be held in New York at the end of May.

Prospects for Cambodia Cease-fire, Progress Viewed

PM1005113990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[Petr Tsvetov dispatch under the "Correspondent Comments" rubric: "...Tokyo Next"]

[Text] Vientiane—Last week's meeting between Hun Sen, chairman of the State of Cambodia Council of Ministers, and Thai leaders in the well-known vacation resort of Pattaya inspires hope that movement toward a settlement of the Cambodian problem will resume again.

Its main result can be briefly stated as follows: The hosts of the meeting succeeded in obtaining the agreement of Hun Sen and Sihanouk—leaders of two opposing Cambodian sides—to a meeting in Tokyo in June. The Thai leaders did not hide their satisfaction at the results of the talks in Pattaya. General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the defense minister, not only expressed his confidence that the top-level meeting of the Cambodian sides will take place in Tokyo at the due time but also stated that he believes a Cambodian cease-fire agreement will also be reached there. The head of the State of Cambodia Government was more restrained in his assessment of the prospects. Thus he linked the possibility of his meeting with Sihanouk in the Japanese capital to the results of the preparatory meeting in Bangkok to be held in the very near future.

On the whole, as the Thai press observes, Hun Sen demonstrated readiness during the Pattaya talks to embark on further compromises. In particular, he stated that he considers acceptable the points in Prince Sihanouk's platform concerning a cease-fire with the armed formations maintaining their present positions and the creation of a Supreme National Council and an international monitoring mechanism.

Hun Sen also confirmed his government's stance regarding the Khmer Rouge. He stressed that Phnom Penh does not exclude that grouping from the settlement process but is implacably opposed to the revival of the genocidal Pol Pot regime.

This demand is far from redundant. Reports have been arriving in recent days that the leaders of that genocidal regime—Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan—are again emerging from the political shadows. In their speeches they try on the one hand to whitewash their past while on the other constructing plans for achieving power. According to certain Japanese sources, Pol Pot, who is now in the Cambodian-Thai border region, has drawn up a new strategic plan for gaining control of Cambodia in 15 months. Vigilance regarding these butchers, condemned by their own people and progressive mankind, must not slacken.

Near East & South Asia

Current Situation in Afghanistan Reported

LD1005203790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 10 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Medvedev] Aleksandr Shkirando, our correspondent in Kabul, reports about the situation in Afghanistan following the revocation of the state of emergency.

[Shkirando] [Video shows Shkirando on square against a background of official building flying Afghan state flag] The decree concerning the revocation of the state of emergency was a bold step by the current Afghan leadership, especially since there were few in the country who believed that it generally was possible in the situation that has formed. The civil war is continuing in Afghanistan. [video shows artillery projectile being fired] Moreover, sustained battles are taking place not so far from the Afghan capital itself.

Now, under the new decree, the Supreme Defense Council of the motherland has been disbanded. The parliament has now regained those functions which it lost when the state of emergency was introduced. Nine paragraphs of the Constitution have also been brought back into force. They concern, inter alia, a ban on the expropriation of property; the inviolability of housing, secret correspondence, and telephone conversations; and freedom of speech and conscience. [video shows an assembly engaged in discussion]

[A.H. Mohtat, vice president of the Republic of Afghanistan, identified by screen caption, speaks in vernacular, fading into superimposed Russian translation] [video shows Mohtat being interviewed by Shkirando; both are sitting on a couch] The Afghan leadership decided on such measures, distinctly understanding that the military and political situation in the country remains complex. These steps are necessary, however. They create more favorable conditions for mutual understanding and for interaction by the various forces in society, including interaction with the opposition with a view to the deepening of the intra-Afghan dialogue. Here preference for all-national interests is evident ahead of purely state interests. The convocation of a Loya Jerga, preparation for which already has commenced, is the next step in the direction of national reconciliation.

Afghan President Appoints New Prime Minister

LD0705203790 Moscow TASS in English 1950 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Kabul May 7 TASS—President Najibullah of Afghanistan appointed Fazl Haq Khaliqyar to be prime minister and empowered him to form a new government, which is to be confirmed by the lower chamber of the Afghan parliament.

Earlier, President Najibullah issued a decree to appoint former prime minister Sultan 'Ali Keshtmand first vice president of the republic. According to the Constitution, the decree is to be approved by the Republic's National Council.

'Dogmatism,' Conservatism Threaten Afghan Party

PM0805160390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent V. Plastun report: "Turning Point Ahead; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Prepares for Congress"]

[Text] Kabul, May—The most noticeable feature of political life in Afghan society today is, perhaps, the activity to renew the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA]. The delegates to the second Congress planned for May will have to discuss the paths and forms of the party's switch to the new stage.

No one familiar with Afghan reality can fail to agree that the PDPA—with all its mistakes and errors—is today a real, organized force in the country. In the 25 years since its creation the PDPA has undergone major changes but what is happening now is a qualitative renewal of not only the party's program documents but also the activity of each of its members. As we know, the partywide conference held in October 1987 made a decision on the PDPA's voluntary rejection of its monopoly on power. Since then it has been patiently learning to work jointly with its political allies and opponents.

At the second Congress, which will be taking place more than 25 years after the Constituent Congress, it is proposed not only to examine critically the road the party has traveled, but also to assess the current situation. It is by no means simple. The main and most serious obstacle on the PDPA's path of renewal, in the opinion of the press here, is dogmatism. Its adherents, the PAYAM newspaper, which is the organ of the PDPA Central Committee, writes, are "against any change in the party's program or rules" and are posing as "super revolutionaries" and defenders of "communist" slogans while in fact hindering the national reconciliation process. Interpreting in their own way the armed forces' real successes on the battlefronts against the opposition, the newspaper writes, they claim that there is no need to share power with anyone. Such a dogmatic approach, incidentally, was also the basis for the unsuccessful coup of 6 March this year.

Conservatism is another trend named by the Afghan press as hindering the renewal of the party and society. Its representatives believe that the national reconciliation policy is just a kind of trick, a cunning tactic aimed at disarming the opposing side, and so do not take the policy seriously. As F.A. Mazdak, member of the Politburo and secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, wrote: "The conservatives want to be simultaneously plaintiff and judge and to return home safe and sound."

The PDPA members are paying serious attention to the need to learn lessons from the consequences of the deep-rooted factionalism in the party. It appeared as long ago as the Constituent Congress held 1 January 1965. During the revolution cliquishness expressed itself in a fierce power struggle and inflicted incalculable damage on the party and

the people. On the eve of the convocation of the second party congress its leadership is appealing to people not to forget the bitter consequences of past discord and to resolutely oppose attempts to cobble together "groups" and "wings" on whatever basis.

The future PDPA is being examined in the context of a multiparty system, democracy, and political pluralism in the life of Afghan society. Many political parties, groups, and organizations reflecting the views of various strata of society were formed in Afghanistan and abroad in the decades of war. Without mutual understanding among them, without national reconciliation—even if the government's armed forces stabilize the situation—the Afghan people will remain divided and split in political terms. Therefore, the only way out of the critical situation is to stop the war by reaching nationwide mutual understanding on the basis of a platform acceptable to all parties, organizations, alliances and prominent sociopolitical figures in Afghan society. For this the thinking needs to be switched from the military to the political plane.

So, the PDPA is preparing for an extraordinarily important turning point in its life. A self-critical analysis of the 25-year period of its existence, the 12 years of activity since the revolution, the three years since the implementation of the national reconciliation policy and more than a year of independent combat actions against the opposition is being made before the Congress.

State of Emergency Lifted in Afghanistan

PM0805090690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Roundup prepared by A. Ivanko in Moscow and Yu. Tyssovskiy in Kabul: "Afghanistan: State of Emergency Is Being Lifted"]

[Text] The leading news agencies report that Afghan President Najibullah has issued a decree on the lifting of the state of emergency in the country from 4 May. Radio Kabul reported that this decision was adopted in order to "open the way for achieving national consensus and better mutual understanding and creating opportunities for various political forces to participate in the country's affairs."

D. Barnetson, UPI correspondent in Islamabad, assessed the decision to lift the state of emergency as a manifestation of the Najibullah government's "growing confidence."

The state of emergency was imposed in Afghanistan on the third day after the Soviet troops' withdrawal in February 1989. Substantial restrictions were placed on freedom of speech and movement and the government was given special powers to repeal or amend existing legislation. Subsequently the state of emergency was repeatedly extended because of continuing armed clashes with opposition forces.

This action by the Afghan leadership is seen by political observers in Kabul as another step toward the democratization of Afghan society and the creation of the necessary conditions for the normal functioning of all components of the existing multiparty system.

It is also important that with the lifting of the state of emergency a number of the functions of the Afghan parliament—the National Council—which were transferred to the republic's government under the state of emergency, are now restored to it. The Supreme Council for the Defense of the Motherland is also being abolished. Furthermore the president has appointed a commission which will make preparations for the convocation of a new Loya Jirga—the supreme assembly of peoples of Afghanistan. The commission will be headed by Vice President A. Hatef. In UPI's opinion, the Loya Jirga is being convened in order to support the promised changes in the policy of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] and the government, and also to try to establish links with certain Afghan opposition groupings. A similar attempt was made at the last Loya Jirga in May 1989, when invitations to participate in its activity were conveyed to leading mujahidin field commanders, including Ahmad Shah Masud and Turan Ismail, who, despite all guarantees of their safety, did not come to Kabul. It is hard as yet to predict how the situation will now develop, although it is not ruled out that the best-known opposition figures will again ignore the Loya Jirga.

According to REUTER, the action plan proposed by the PDPA after the lifting of the state of emergency makes it entirely possible to organize free elections in the country in the next four months with the participation of the United Nations or other neutral parties as observers.

This plan, by all appearances, suits the United States and the USSR, THE NEW YORK TIMES reported on 3 May in a front-page reportage. Moscow is ready to agree to free elections on condition that the United States does not object to Najibullah's presenting himself as a candidate for the presidential elections. Initially, however, prior to the election contest, he will have to resign, THE NEW YORK TIMES writes; the paper says that the Soviet Union has agreed not to insist that Najibullah be guaranteed any state post in the future government.

The plan to hold free elections in the next four months was rejected by the opposition as "too late." N. Lafrey [as transliterated], information minister of the government of the "Seven," assessed the Afghan Government's present proposals "as inadequate. The only thing that will suit us is its final departure."

REUTER also reports that the president has agreed to the formation of a new political party in the country—"Hezbollah-e-Afghanistan."

Pogodin Previews Mubarak's Upcoming Visit

LD0705150490 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] It's been announced here that the Egyptian president, Husni Mubarak, will come to the Soviet Union on an official visit in the middle of this month. It's expected that the Soviet-Egyptian talks will be devoted to bilateral relations, the situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian problem, and ways towards a political settlement in the region. May I remind you, writers our commentator Aleksandr Pogodin, that quite recently President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria visited this country. Now Mikhail Gorbachev is to have a meeting with Husni Mubarak. The juxtaposition of those events alone ought to be regarded as another manifestation of the Soviet Union's desire to expand the dialogue with the Arab states and to promote cooperation with them.

The approaches of the USSR and Egypt to the key problems of the Middle East are rather close. The Soviet Union has been steadily favoring recognition of the rights of all the countries in the region, including Israel and the Palestinian states, to secure existence. It's been vigorously campaigning for an international conference with the participation of all of the parties to the Middle East conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as well as the five permanent member-nations of the Security Council. At the same time the USSR treats with understanding other actions that can help reduce tension in the Middle East. For one, Moscow has shown a keen interest in the efforts by Egypt aimed at arranging a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. True, it has to be admitted, that the idea has so far produced no practical results. As Egypt says with full justice, the Israeli authorities are to blame for the failure to have a dialogue since they have refused to look for a feasible way out of the deadlock.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly called for stronger Arab unity and for overcoming the existing difference that objectively only create obstacles in the way of a Middle East political settlement. There was a highly significant meeting recently in this connection between the presidents of Syria and Egypt. The meeting made it possible to largely remove the complex things that accumulated in the relations between the two countries and to outline plans for political cooperation. One can assume that Husni Mubarak will bring to Moscow important ideas for discussion and these ideas will be naturally considered attentively.

Egyptian Ties Reviewed Prior to Visit

LD1005150190 Moscow TASS in English 1425 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—President Husni Mubarak of Egypt left today on his foreign tour, which includes an official visit to the Soviet Union.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt are deep-rooted. Diplomatic relations were established between them in 1943 and have developed dynamically.

The Soviet Union always supported the Egyptian people's just struggle for national independence, for peace and friendship, against oppression and slavery. The Soviet Union rendered political, economic and military assistance to their fight against Israeli aggression.

Economic, commercial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation between the two countries, based on principles of equality and mutual advantage, were developed comprehensively. The Soviet Union rendered Egypt economic and technical assistance during the construction of the Aswan hydro-power complex, the Helwan iron-and-steel mill, the Nag Hammadi aluminium plant and other enterprises. The Soviet Union helped Egypt electrify and irrigate the country and train national personnel.

Relations between the two countries declined in the mid-seventies, but the sides were able to overcome past negative tendencies in recent years. The Soviet-Egyptian relations have become more stable and are entering a phase of active cooperation. Egypt and the Soviet Union are mutually interested in expanding economic relations. A Soviet-Egyptian agreement on economic, commercial, scientific and technical cooperation was signed in 1988. The Soviet Union is rendering Egypt assistance in the construction of a 1,200-megawatt thermal power plant on the Sinai Peninsula.

In light of the tense situation in the Middle East, Egypt's active efforts to find ways to settle the Middle East issue, its desire to forge a common Arab stand on settlement problems and also its role in the Non-aligned Movement are notable.

Husni Mubarak's visit to the Soviet Union is expected to give fresh impetus to the development of Soviet-Egptian relations, to promote deeper political and economic cooperation and closer coordination of efforts to break the Middle East deadlock and to establish a just peace in the region.

Egypt's Ghali on Visit, Relations

LD1005215690 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Cairo May 10 TASS—The forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union by President Husni Mubarak of Egypt will be an important stage of the process of improvement of relations between the two countries in recent years, says a statement for the press made today by Butrus Butrus Ghali, Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs.

Egypt and the Soviet Union, he pointed out, with full understanding and seriousness develop and strengthen bilateral contacts, laying a firm foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields.

President Mubarak's talks in Moscow, the minister of state emphasised, will be connected with the discussion of all aspects of bilateral relations in the spirit of frankness, trust and mutual understanding, which will help open up new prospects for fruitful contacts.

Reestablishment of Iran, IMF Ties Viewed

NC1105085990 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1800 GMT 9 May 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from the "On the Waves of RadioMoscow" feature]

[Text] Dear friends, Iran's Central Bank Governor Mohammad 'Adeli has told correspondents in Washington that Tehran will resume all relations with the IMF and intends to expand its cooperation with this organization.

Iranian officials denied having any relations with the IMF and the World Bank until (?some time) ago. Central Bank Governor Mohammad 'Adeli himself refuted REUTER reports in April on talks between the two sides. Before that, Tehran had repeatedly stated that Iran did not intend to receive official assistance from the IMF.

Now, however, things seem to have changed. Experts believe that Iran is seeking $10 billion in credits from the IMF and the World Bank. Since the beginning of the year, the Iranian Government has signed a number of noteworthy multimillion dollar transactions with Western industrialists, all of which are aimed at reconstructing and revitalizing the Iranian economy. A $13-billion plan and economic agreements with Italy, which were signed in early April and came as a surprise to many people, (?were only the latest) in a large number of joint contracts Iran has signed with FRG, French, South Korean, and Japanese companies.

Meanwhile, it should be noted that Iran's financial situation is not good at all. The deficits in its balance of payments and balance of trade total between $15 and $20 billion. Under such conditions, the government must turn to foreign investment to meet the expenses of its economic projects. One way to do this may be IMF and World Bank credits. However, such credits are dependent on the acceptance of a series of conditions .

According to reports, the IMF has demanded profound changes in Iran's economic system. (?There is talk about) liberalizing foreign trade and bringing it as close as possible to an open-door policy, devaluing the Iranian rial, increasing the private sector's role in economy, ending financial assistance for the purchase of foodstuffs and essential goods, and stabilizing wages. Obviously the acceptance of many of these conditions will be an extremely complicated process for Iran.

The Islamic radicals are in extremely strong positions from where they can inflict pressure on the government and justify this by talking about deviations from Imam Khomeyni's line and the unacceptability of the (?demands) by the World Bank and the IMF. The odd point in all this is that a key role in these organizations is played by Washington, which was once again belittled in public in Tehran recently.

In other words, it is possible that there will be a wide gap between the remarks about the reestablishment of cooperation with the IMF and specific action to reflect this.

Israeli Plans To Purchase Patriot Missiles Viewed

TA0405180090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1500 GMT 4 May 90

[Commentary by Dmitriy Prokofyev]

[Text] The Israeli Defense Ministry has been discussing plans to purchase U.S.-made Patriot missiles. The U.S. Administration has already voiced its willingness to deliver the goods by the end of this year. At the same time, the U.S. President (?has given his approval) to the Israeli Government to accelerate the development of Arrow missiles. Here is what our commentator Dmitriy Prokofyev has to say on the subject:

I cannot say that the talk about new anti-missile missiles arose in a void; definitely not. The Israeli people are worried about Saddam Husayn's threats to use missiles with chemical warheads against Israel, and the failure of President Mubarak's mission in Syria has caused bitter disappointment. What is more, the Arrow project did not begin either yesterday or the day before, and the U.S. Administration has expressed its interest in it on more than one occasion. Nevertheless, this time things are not so simple, primarily because of the special role played by the U.S. Administration.

Plans to purchase Patriot missile batteries were discussed as far back as a year ago, but at that time the Israeli Army's General Staff vehemently objected to it, arguing that the price was too steep, since one battery costs $180 million. Now that it has to cope with mass immigration, Israel has far less resources to invest in such projects.

Out of the blue comes the simultaneous announcement about Israel's willingness to purchase the U.S. missiles and the administration's willingness to sell them. But, why should the administration drag Israel into another round of the arms race when it is clear that Jerusalem will ultimately be forced to ask for additional defense aid from Washington?

If that is the case, the military buildup of the Jewish state will probably lead to a domino effect. In the Middle East, offensive and defensive weapons are one and the same. Whenever one of the parties to the conflict gets a bigger shield, the rival party immediately rushes to buy a bigger sword. That was the case when Syria stationed new missile batteries in the early 1980's. Israel immediately responded by developing a sophisticated system to destroy the enemy's missiles, and in 1982 it dealt a serious blow to Syria's potential for antiaircraft batteries.

A similar development is foreseen now, only with the roles reversed: Israel will acquire defensive weapons, while the Arabs will get offensive arms, most of which, of course, will originate in the United States.

Unfortunately, when the arms race in the Middle East begins rising to new heights, it is almost impossible to stop it. A unique situation is now emerging in the region: Syria is experiencing a serious economic crisis, while Israel must invest money in absorbing the masses of immigrants. For several months there has been no increase in the quantity and quality of weapons. Perhaps it is not worthwhile to breach the fragile balance, all the more so when it will cause all the sides only unnecessary [word indistinct].

Kuwaiti Loan Improves USSR Debt Structure

PM0905113390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[M. Berger report: "Kuwaiti Credit for USSR"]

[Text] An agreement to grant the Soviet Union medium-term financial credit of $300 million (with repayment beginning in seven years) was signed in Moscow 7 May. The agreement was signed by the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity and the Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment company. The latter is one of Kuwait's oldest national investment companies and manages the state's currency reserves, in other words, it performs the function of Kuwait's central bank.

Our country's foreign currency reserves have thus received a large infusion of money with no restrictions on its use, unlike targeted credits which are granted for quite specific purchases. We will probably be able to settle a few "payments difficulties" and resolve other urgent problems connected with foreign currency expenditure. That is the first point. The second is that the very fact of granting our country a large credit on very favorable terms against the background of very anxious discussions about our creditworthiness indicates that the Soviet Union's reputation as a debtor country is not all that bad.

Kuwait is a very important figure in the world credit market and its actions do not go unnoticed—this is its second big loan to us recently. In 1987 seven major Kuwaiti banks lent us $150 million for a period of eight years.

Getting into debt, of course, is not a pleasant thing to do but there are few countries, even among the most developed, which manage to avoid this. Then again, the important thing is not the absolute sum of the foreign itself itself so much as the structure of the debt. The higher the proportion of short-term obligations (three to six months), the more complex the debtor's position is. And conversely, the greater the amount of long-term credits granted the more room there is for maneuver and for repaying the debts without undue "strain." Consequently, the credit under discussion here improves the debt structure even though it increases the sum total of our external indebtedness.

Given the present state of our economy it is not easy to find a loan on favorable terms, but in this case it has been achieved. The resources now obtained should be put to use sensibly to obtain the maximum return.

East Europe

Yazov Hosts Dinner for E. European Guests

PM1005111790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Attending Festivities"]

[Text] A military delegation of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic [CSFR] headed by Army General M. Vacek, CSFR minister of national defense, arrived in Moscow 9 May to attend festivities in honor of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The military delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Republic, the GDR, the Polish Republic, Romania, and the CSFR which are in the Soviet Union in connection with the celebrations of the anniversary of the Great Victory, attended the military parade in Red Square.

In the afternoon Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, gave a dinner for the delegation heads and members.

Military Leaders Presented With Bulgarian Medals

PM1005115190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Awards Presented"]

[Text] A presentation ceremony in which the medal "For Strengthening Fraternity in Arms" was awarded to a group of Soviet generals and officers took place at the Bulgarian Embassy in the USSR on 7 May. The Soviet soldiers were given these awards for their contribution to the development and strengthening of friendship between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Bulgarian People's Army and in connection with the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

G. Pankov, Bulgarian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the USSR, presented the awards on behalf of the Bulgarian Government.

The award recipients—there were 50 in all—included Army Generals M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, and I.M. Tretyak; Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin; and others.

Bulgarian Election Campaign Evaluated

PM0805134390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by A. Kapralov under the rubric "Election Campaign in Bulgaria": "Struggle of Ideas, Not a Bullfight"]

[Text] Sofia—On Sunday on 9 September Square, Christofer Sybev, one of the leaders of the Union of Democratic Forces, a former nuclear physicist and now a priest, held a blessing to mark the day of the great martyr George the Victorious. And then, under the standards of the Christian "Salvation" union, the procession advanced through the streets of Sofia. "Union of Democratic Forces, forward with God!", "God preserve Bulgaria from demons!", the priest dictated the slogans into a megaphone. And from the ranks of the demonstrators came: "Down with the Bulgarian Communist Party!" and "Long live Bulgaria, but without Marxism!"

This demonstration was merely a feeble echo of what had happened in the same place, on 9 September Square, during the May Day meeting of the Union of Democratic Forces, when aggressively minded supporters of the union prevented people from entering the central electoral club of the Bulgarian Socialist Party situated here, hurled abuse at women and children, and snatched red flags and flowers from the hands of infants. I think it was no accident that the next day the Bulgarian Socialist Party newspaper DUMA received many letters beginning with the words "I fear..."

Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party supreme party council, was trebly right when back in early April he warned of the danger that political life in the country would become tougher. "There is a danger," he said, "of a repetition of a political syndrome well known in Bulgaria and in the Balkans: disgracing and slandering one's political opponents... There is a danger of acts of provocation, of the creation of explosive situations. We propose not a political bullfight but a struggle of ideas and platforms..."

The situation in the country shows what a timely and justified ring there was to the appeal from Bulgarian President Petur Mladenov to all political parties not to use violent means and not to violate laws and citizens' rights. As of today 2.2 million Bulgarians have already signed this appeal.

Nonetheless the Bulgarian Socialist Party election clubs are being smashed now here, now there, and communists and their children are being threatened with reprisals and fists are even being used. "There is an alarming increase in the number of crimes," a statement from the ministry of internal affairs says. "They are becoming increasingly impertinent and shameless, turning into a form of political pressure on citizens' consciousness." In this connection the ministry stated that it intends resolutely to halt all encroachments on citizens' freedom and rights which threaten the normal progress of the election struggle.

CSFR Defense Minister on 'Leaner' Army

PM0905121590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Colonel General M. Vacek, CSFR (Czech and Slovak Federative Republic) minister of national defense, by A. Shapovalov, especially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Tomorrow Is the 45th Anniversary of Czechoslovakia's Liberation from Fascism: Loyalty to Alliance Commitments"—date of interview not given, first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Prague—The theme of the interview with Colonel General M. Vacek, CSFR minister of national defense, by a TASS correspondent are the achievements with which the Czechoslovak Army approaches the 45th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's Germany and its outlook for the near future.

[Shapovalov] There is much talk at the moment about the anniversary of the rout of Hitler's Germany being marked differently in Czechoslovakia this year....

[Vacek] Your information is correct. The traditional annual celebrations of the rout of Hitler's Germany, the end of World War II in Europe, our people's antifascist struggle, and the completion of Czechoslovakia's liberation will, as from this year, assume a somewhat different character. We have given up military parades and also the staging of the Czechoslovak Spartakiad. The celebrations will be linked with specific places, citizens, and servicemen of the antifascist coalition. With a feeling of profound gratitude and respect we will commemorate the decisive role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces and the massive casualties sustained by Soviet servicemen during the liberation of our motherland. In view of the fact that information about the contribution of Western allies and the Czechoslovak resistance movement in the West was suppressed in the past, it has been decided to shift the focus of celebrations this year to Plzen, which was liberated by the U.S. Army.

The Czechoslovak Army will take an active part in the celebrations. Military oath-taking ceremonies with be held in the presence of parents, relatives, and representatives of the public, and festive gatherings will be held in units, staffs, and educational establishments and institutions during which the presidential decree and the minister of national defense's order will be read out. We are seeking to achieve an understanding of the historic traditions and their connection with the processes of renewal under way in the Czechoslovak Army in the course of the May festivities.

[Shapovalov] Talking about the reform which has been initiated in the Czechoslovak Army, could you outline its essence, principles, and objectives?

[Vacek] I must clarify that the use of the term "reform" is not entirely appropriate to describe the processes which are under way. It is, above all, a question of the democratization and humanization of army life. On the basis of the amendment of the fundamental law—the

CSFR Constitution—or rather the repeal of the article on the leading role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the state political system is switching to the principles of pluralist democracy. The Czechoslovak Army, as an instrument of the state, safeguards this process and also implements fundamental changes itself, both in the sphere of the theory of military building and in its practical life. To this end I have issued a number of orders which create conditions for the implementation of the new principles in accordance with the changes of the superior legislative power (the constitution, laws, and government and CSFR Federal Assembly decisions.) Another substantial change is the process of standing aloof from the party [nadpartiynosti], and also the implementation of measures to enhance specialist training and the quality of servicemen's knowledge. The objective is the restructuring of the army in order to raise it to a level which will make it possible, in accordance with the state's military doctrine, to join the overall system of European security on an equitable basis.

[Shapovalov] What is the purport of the amendments and additions to the Law on Universal Military Conscription which were adopted recently by the Federal Assembly?

[Vacek] These additions have to be rated positively. They take account of changes in international relations to which our state is contributing by specific steps in the sphere of reducing the numerical strength of armed forces and armaments. Simultaneously the Law on Universal Military Conscription is being brought in line with international treaties, for instance the international pact on civil and political rights and the Treaty No. 29 on forced and compulsory labor.

An objective assessment of the changes in international relations, the need to abide by the international treaty on security and cooperation in Europe, and compliance with citizens' wishes are the main factors which brought about the need to renew the Law on Universal Conscription and the Discharge of Military Service.

The amendments introduced in the new law take account of the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency and combat readiness of Czechoslovakia's Armed Forces.

The reduction of compulsory military service to 18 months ensures the effective training of servicemen doing military service in all military occupational specialties. The withdrawal of the permission to use the Czechoslovak Army to assist the national economy has created conditions for improved training and education of servicemen.

The Czechoslovak Army Command does not believe that the newly established rights and freedoms of servicemen, including the freedom of religion and the amendment of draft regulations applicable to people traveling abroad or emigrating, will adversely affect the country's defense capability or the combat readiness of its armed forces.

This also applies to a certain extent to the introduction of community service as an alternative to military service. Looking at this from the angle of traditional views, this could be described as a violation of the principle of universal military conscription. However, the interest displayed in community service does not bear out these fears.

[Shapovalov] In any transformations, apart from positive aspects, there are also drawbacks. What are the latter in respect of the army reform?

[Vacek] Naturally, every change is connected with problems. However, that is a natural law of human conduct and experience, a manifestation of the law of action and reaction, as it were, in social conditions. They stem above all from subjective approaches to military issues. Our aim is to define the limits permissible in free debate. Naturally, the limiting factor in defining this framework is the necessity to maintain the army's combat readiness.

[Shapovalov] What is your vision of the Czechoslovak Army of the future?

[Vacek] Its development will depend directly on the continuation of the all-European peace process and will take place in accordance with the Czechoslovak military doctrine so as to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the state on the basis of the principle of defense sufficiency.

In the near future we are planning substantial cuts in the numerical strength of personnel and combat hardware. The higher quality of the Czechoslovak Army will be achieved by means of a gradual transition to the voluntary principle of manning, and in the technical sphere by means of modernization. In this way conditions will be created for a further probable reduction of the length of compulsory military service. In the future Czechoslovak Army we intend to strengthen the social standing of servicemen and enhance their prestige.

We want to have a considerably leaner Czechoslovak Army than at present, an army which would, however, from the viewpoint of military qualities be on a par with the armies of the European states which have taken part in the talks on the new security system.

[Shapovalov] Could you say a few words about the Czechoslovak Army and the Warsaw Pact?

[Vacek] The Warsaw Pact was founded in specific historical conditions to counterbalance another military bloc already in existence in Europe. At present Czechoslovak foreign policy advocates the need to change bloc thinking and to switch to a bloc-free collective system of European security.

Czechoslovakia intends to remain within the system of European security. Consequently, if the bloc principle is retained, it will remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. It is necessary, within the framework of the talks which are underway in the top organs of this pact, to bring the text of the statutes in line with the changes in the political systems of its member states and to boost the political activities of the bloc at the expense of the military

activities. In my view, a unilateral dismantling of the Warsaw Pact while keeping NATO intact would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and put the process of further disarmament in jeopardy.

Eppelmann Speaks in Leningrad, Departs for Home

LD1005222390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2030 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Leningrad, 10 May (TASS)—A GDR military delegation led by Rainer Eppelmann, the republic's minister of disarmament and defense, which attended the ceremonies in Moscow devoted to the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, spent today in Leningrad.

At the Piskarevskoye memorial cemetery, the visitors paid tribute to the people of Leningrad and to the servicemen who fell during the years of the siege, and laid a wreath beside the monument to the motherland.

To honor the delegation, Colonel General V. Yermakov, commander of the troops of the Order of Lenin Leningrad military district, gave a lunch, which passed in a friendly atmosphere. Heinz Bauer, GDR consul general in Leningrad, arranged a reception in connection with the delegation's visit to the city.

"I leave Leningrad with inner agitation and full awareness of the guilt that lies on us Germans for what was done during the years of World War II," Rainer Eppelman said in an interview with a TASS correspondent. "But, at the same time, I felt how grateful we are to the Soviet people for extending to us the hand of friendship since the war. I am deeply touched by that. My impressions give me the hope of seeing that there is no such war ever again."

In the evening, the delegation left for home.

Outlook for Soviet-German Ties Examined

PM0905152390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by PRAVDA correspondent S. Baygarov under the general heading "Bright and Dark Aspects of the Festival": "Meetings 45 Years On"]

[Text] Berlin—Victory came when spring was at its height, and this gray, two-story, detached building in Berlin's Karlshorst district is draped in lilac blossom nows, as it was 45 years ago. Prior to 1945 the building housed a military engineering academy canteen. Then events made the building famous, probably all over the world (at any rate, it has been visited by people from all countries). It was in the casino, where future officers spent the time playing games of chance, that Hitler's bloody adventure ended: It was here, as 8 May 1945 drew to a close, that the act of unconditional surrender by the fascist Wehrmacht was signed.

This spring will also go down in history. On 18 March the GDR people voted for unification with the FRG as soon as possible. And the results of the 6 May municipal elections confirmed this choice. Most likely the actual unification of the two German states will take place next year and the split preordained in 1933, on the day when Hitler came to power, will be over.

The tumultuous events which began in the GDR last fall and which continue to this day have also led to a reappraisal of relations between the people of "the former GDR," as Willy Brandt said, and the Soviet Union. Membership of the German-Soviet Friendship Society, which in recent years had been enrolling plant and factory collectives and entire villages like army recruits, has declined dramatically. It was bound to fall apart with that kind of approach. The once popular call of "Gorbachev, help us!" imperceptibly disappeared, and not long before the May liberation day a vociferous campaign about burials on the territory of former "NKVD camps" for internees in Germany suddenly sprang up in the press like a forest fire.

Perhaps it was only the independent weekly DIE ANDERE that attempted to investigate the problem from both sides. In an article entitled "Russian Germans," on the one hand, it cited the stories of a former prisoner about camp life and about the abuses there and, on the other, it cited data to the effect that on the site of the "Five Oaks" NKVD camp, where the skulls were found, there had been during the war a camp containing 60,000 people, 22,000 of whom did not survive to see Victory Day and were buried there. So do we measure the skulls with calipers to find out whether they belonged to "true Aryans" or to "subhumans"—Russians, French, British?..

Recently the future of our relations, not only in the sphere of so-called grand politics but also in the purely human dimension, has become increasingly worrying. What will vanish and what will we have left in common with the citizens of the future united Germany?

GDR's Bergmann-Pohl on Liberation Anniversary

LD0805223690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 8 May 90

[Excerpts] Today the GDR is celebrating the day of liberation from fascism. Our special correspondents Viktor Levin and Anatoliy Stepkin report from Berlin:

[Correspondent] I have had occasion to be in Berlin at previous festivals. [passage omitted] But what will it be like this time? At 0900 the supreme leadership of the GDR Sabine Bergmann-Pohl, interim head of state and president of the People's Chamber; Lothar de Maiziere, chairman of the government; and other officials—laid a wreath at the memorial to Soviet servicemen in Treptow Park. Following the ceremony, which obviously made a deep impression on her, Sabine Bergmann-Pohl told Soviet radio correspondents: I deeply mourn those people who fell in the struggle against the bearers of senseless ideas. We will forever will feel a sense of guilt.

We must remember the past and be able to draw the appropriate conclusions from it, for without a correct understanding of the lessons in history there is no future, the interim head of the GDR stressed.

Results of 'Solidarity' Congress Evaluated

PM0905085790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Toporkov: "'Solidarity' After the Congress"]

[Text] Warsaw—The viewpoint of the supporters of a "pure" trade union was widely propagandized at the congress. They want "Solidarity" to cease being a "ruling trade union" and to revert to its original role: protector of working people's rights and dignity. Supporters of this stance sought to demonstrate that "Solidarity" is obsolete as a broad public movement, a kind of opposition party: The main enemy—the communists—is no more. Nevertheless "Solidarity," having tasted the sweet fruit of power, did not dare depart from its previous course. While declaring that it would not set up its own party, it decided at the congress that it did not rule out the formation of a trade union representative body in parliament and in local self-government organs. That is, it will effectively operate as a political organization.

It was probably no accident when Lech Walesa, newly elected chairman of "Solidarity," let drop in a speech to delegates a remark that "If 'Solidarity' becomes a 'pure' trade union we would have to declare a general strike right now in this hall."

Extreme confrontational appeals were unsuccessful at the congress. For example, a proposal by delegate Z. Inger, who in all seriousness put forward a resolution that everyone who has ever been in the Polish United Workers Party should be regarded as an enemy, a traitor to the state and that... the USSR authorities should be asked to authorize their deportation to Siberia with their families, but without any property, did not get through. "Let the red star of the Kremlin light their way," the speaker said. The delegates also rejected another extremist plant to condemn President W. Jaruzelski for laying flowers at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum when he was in Moscow.

Pluralism of opinions was undoubtedly present in the Gdansk "Oliwia" sports hall where the congress was being held. But the interesting thing is that it was a pluralism against the background of which someone was playing a very skillful solo part. This "someone" was undoubtedly Lech Walesa, who passed whatever decisions he wanted. We have no choice, Walesa said, we must occasionally turn a blind eye to unpopular government decisions in order to change the existing economic system. When L. Balcerowicz, vice premier and minister of finance, explained his national economic recovery program at the congress he was applauded on and applauded off. "'Solidarity' directs, the government governs."

However, the majority of delegates were clearly worried by the problems of declining production in the country and a declining living standard, of unemployment and the disastrous housing construction situation.

Assessing the congress results, L. Walesa said: "The congress is like Poland. Many unknown quantities, much debate, few decisions." But the most diverse documents were adopted in Gdansk—from the statement of "Solidarity's" negative attitude toward abortions to approval of early parliamentary and presidential elections in spring 1991.

Causes of Bucharest Demonstration Viewed

PM0805153190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by APN own correspondent V. Samoshkin: "Whoever Sows the Wind.... Antigovernment Demonstration Has Been Continuing in Bucharest for Two Weeks"]

[Text] Bucharest—The anticommunist trickle that was hardly noticeable in the mighty wave of the people's revolution of 22 December, and that would either disappear temporarily from view or splash up tempestuously during the demonstrations of 12 and 28 January and 18 February or, later, in the demonstrations in support of the Timisoara Proclamation, today aspires to the role of the chief flow of the Romanian revolution and is trying to win the sympathies of the whole nation—in which it is clearly failing.

Over the past four months this trickle has been nurtured and replenished in every possible way by the "historical" parties, its channel has been constantly "deepened" by Radio Free Europe and its broadcasts and by "native" independent newspapers and their articles, and its banks have been busily reinforced by emissaries from the West—former Romanian citizens. And this is the result—the only anticommunist and antigovernment demonstration of its kind in University Square, in the very heart of Bucharest, which has now been going on for two weeks. Here the trickle has burst its banks and formed a backwater.

Organized by several "nonpolitical" associations and fenced off from the surrounding city by a symbolic barricade and by rope, the square has been named by the participants the "first communism-free zone." These words are inscribed on a huge white banner spread across the square.

What are the inhabitants of this "zone" demanding? The resignation of the "communist" government and of I. Iliescu, chairman of the Provisional Council for National Accord; the inclusion in the Law on Elections of Point 8 of the Timisoara Proclamation, which bans former representatives of the nomenklatura and the "Securitate" from participating in elections as candidates for three terms; the repeal of the decree according

to which television is a government organ; the postponement of elections until next fall. The democrats have declared that they will not leave the square until their demands have been met.

It is clear to everyone that Point 8 of the Timisoara Proclamation is aimed, above all, at excluding from the election campaign I. Iliescu—who is now the most popular presidential candidate among the people—as a former secretary of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee. The fact that Iliescu was the first person in this country to "rise up" openly against Ceausescu as long ago as 1971 is totally ignored here. And then many people are asking the question: How is it possible to change the Law on Elections seeing that it was adopted, with just one vote against, by the Provisional Council for National Salvation [as published], on which all the country's political parties are represented?

Who has gathered in the square? Some of the young people—and young people make up the majority of the demonstrators—sincerely believe that they are the true bearers of the revolution's ideals and its continuers. They naively identify the government and the National Salvation Front with the former "communist structures." They go too far in their revolutionary idealism and even fanaticism, and fail to notice that they are becoming a plaything in the hands of the parties opposed to the front—the historical parties, above all. Representatives of these parties fear defeat in the upcoming elections and are trying to get them postponed at any price, as they have advocated, incidentally, since they very first appeared in the political arena. So the demonstration in University Square is simply a godsend for them. A godsend or a well-planned, preplanned action?—many people are asking this question. How "accidental"—as Ion Ratiu, presidential candidate for the National Peasants Party, claimed—was his appearance among the demonstrators in the square, for example, and also his "few words" addressed to them?

How accidental is the change in the "geography" of anticommunist demonstrations? Whereas they used to follow a route from the headquarters of the "historical parties" to the government building in Victory Square and to Romanian Television, now their participants have become "settled" and have pitched camp precisely in University Square, in the immediate vicinity of the Intercontinental Hotel. Is this not because this is actually the location of the representatives of the United Nations and of other Western governmental and nongovernmental organizations invited to observe the Romanian elections on 20 May? A Romanian colleague of mine even joked that this demonstration is destined for export....

Yet, how representative is the demonstration in University Square, and how far does it reflect public opinion? Although it is continuous, the number of participants varies between several hundred and several thousand, while on the evening of 1 May there might have been as many as 30,000. But if you take a "bird's eye view" of this demonstration—even from the said Intercontinental Hotel—it is probably still of a local nature, because the attempts to absolutize the anticommunist nature of the revolution are not fruitful and do not elicit nationwide support.

The National Salvation Front and its representative I. Iliescu, who have the biggest chance in the elections, have repeatedly urged workers not to succumb to provocations and to refrain from confrontation with those who are demonstrating in the square. All these possible disturbances in the city and the countryside would only play into the hands of the "historical parties."

Whoever sows the wind will reap the whirlwind.... Will young Romanian democracy really take the path of escalating social tension and confrontation, or will common sense and dialogue triumph, as has happened before at critical moments for the new Romania...?

West Europe

Prunskiene Sympathetic to Gorbachev's Position

AU1105074190 Paris AFP in English 2345 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Paris, May 11 (AFP)—Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene on Thursday called for Western public opinion to put pressure on governments to back the Baltic republic's drive for independence. Speaking at a press conference at the close of a one-day visit to France, Mrs. Prunskiene said public pressure could "correct the attitude of a number of governments."

Mrs. Prunskiene, seeking to rally international support, has visited Scandinavian countries, the United States, Britain and France, but is confronted with reluctance by Western leaders who do not want to jeopardize the leadership of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. She did not name specific governments but said that they were acting under constraints and could be moved by public opinion.

Earlier, speaking to the press after a meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand, she expressed gratitude for a French-German intiative to open a dialogue between Moscow and Lithuania and said she hoped it would prove fruitful.

Mr. Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl last month urged Lithuania to suspend its declaration of independence temporarily and seek early negotiations with Moscow.

Mr. Mitterrand in talks with Mrs. Prunskiene Thursday said he saw "no other solution than the opening of a true dialogue," according to his spokesman, Hubert Vedrine.

The Lithuanian leader expressed sympathy for Mr. Gorbachev's position, telling a press conference here that she believed that "as an intelligent politician, he saw no problem with the fact that the Baltic states would become independent." But she said he was faced with

political forces within the Soviet Union which were opposed to Baltic independence. He "believes it is more important for him to maintain a balance between the different political forces which are pulling at this very great power," she said.

But she added: "If he chose to lean on those political forces which favor reforms and democracy in the Soviet Union, his position could become much stronger."

Mrs. Prunskiene met the Soviet leader in February, before Lithuania declared its break from Moscow.

Mrs. Prunskiene arrived here from London, where she warned that the economy of the breakaway republic would grind to a standstill by May 25 if economic sanctions imposed by Moscow were not lifted or eased.

Mrs. Prunskiene's diplomatic initiative has included talks with President George Bush in Washington last week and a meeting on Wednesday with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. It continues with a trip to Bonn on Friday.

Prunskiene Cited on Lithuanian Independence

LD1005152790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Stocks of energy resources in Lithuania are considered to be secret information there. However, it has come through in the latest reports in the press that they will be exhausted approximately between 15 to 20 May. What next? Prunskiene, if one is to believe the reports on Lithuanian television, stated at a press conference in Britain that Lithuania's independence may be attained in the course of a year.

Reportage of Prunskiene's Trip to UK

Visit to London Ends

LD1005132490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0930 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] London, 19 May (TASS)—K. Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers has ended a visit to London, where she held talks with British Prime Minister M. Thatcher and met leaders of the country's main political parties. This trip took place within the framework of her tour of a number of Western countries, during which she has been seeking concrete support from Western governments for the policy of the present Lithuanian leadership.

As stated by an official spokesperson of the office of the British prime minister at the end of the talks, M. Thatcher expressed support for the processes taking place in Lithuania and "expressed optimism" about the possibility of a settlement of the conflict between Vilnius and Moscow. The spokesperson of number 10 Downing Street said: "A practical resolution of the matter of Lithuanian independence should be found with the proviso of preserving the successes achieved in the sphere of relations between the East and West.... This resolution should be found by way of talks and should satisfy the interests both of the USSR and of Lithuania."

Speaking to journalists on the conclusion of her meeting, K. Prunskiene for her part noted that Vilnius is "striving to reach a compromise" and is willing inter alia to suspend a number of recent laws adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Here she pointed out that any problem may be the subject of talks between Vilnius and Moscow, with the exception of the very issue of Lithuanian independence, the revoking of which, in her words, "is simply impossible."

At the same time, K. Prunskiene conceded that currently the economy of Lithuania is on the brink of paralysis. "By 25 May, we will be in a crisis situation inasmuch as the last oil reserves will be exhausted," she announced. "The shortage of fuel will lead to the closedown of enterprises of light industry, transport, and other branches of the economy." Responding to questions from journalists as to whether she had succeeded in securing concrete gurantees of aid to Lithuania from Western governments, K. Prunskiene was forced to state: "The West is not rushing to help us."

This was also confirmed by W. Waldegrave, the British minister of state for foreign affairs. He commented on the results of the meeting between Prunskiene and Thatcher to MPs in the House of Commons of the British parliament and stated: "It would be the height of irresponsibility to inspire in Lithuanians the hope that the West is capable of providing them with aid which is in fact unrealistic."

Fails To Get Recognition, Aid

PM1005154790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Prunskiene Visit"]

[Text] Unofficial talks have taken place in London between Thatcher and Lithuanian Council of Ministers Chairman Prunskiene, who is in London. The British Government head's official spokesman announced that the meeting had lasted around 80 minutes—longer than was planned—and that the discussion was "very friendly."

According to the spokesman, the sides arrived at the view that "a practical solution must be found for the question of Lithuanian independence, while preserving what has been achieved in East-West relations."

British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Waldegrave said in the House of Commons that Thatcher and Prunskiene have an identical view of the solution of problems connected with Lithuania. "They both view the future with optimism, noting that the achievement of progress is directly linked to diplomatic efforts and talks." At the same time, the minister of state said that it would be extremely irresponsible to give Lithuanians the hope that the West was capable of giving them assistance, which is, in fact, unrealistic.

According to the BBC, "Prunskiene failed to achieve official recognition of Lithuania's independence or secure a promise of any concrete assistance." "To all appearances, Thatcher was able to offer little to the Lithuanian Government head. She confined herself to advising that a solution to the problem should be reached through talks with Moscow," the television company reported.

Brazauskas Leaves for FRG, Switzerland

LD0905224390 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] The Lithuanian deputy prime minister, Algirdas Brazauskas, has left for West Germany and Switzerland.

The trip, which will last 10 days, had not been announced beforehand. Mr. Brazauskas heads the governmental commission on regulating the economic situation here in Lithuania under the conditions of a blockade. The commission had noted at its meeting today that Lithuania had managed to hold out the first blow of the economic embargo aimed at (?enfeebling) its political and economic situation.

Further holding out (?needs) strategic development of Lithuanian economy to be worked out and a new economic structure to be set up.

PRAVDA Cites Genscher on German-Soviet Ties

PM0905133790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "H.-D. Genscher's Statement"]

[Text] Bonn, 8 May—As a result of the unification of the two German states the opportunities created by the 1970 Moscow Treaty and the 1989 Joint Soviet-West German Statement will be expanded. It will be possible to use the increased political, economic, scientific, and cultural potential for the benefit of the peoples of both countries in the interests of the policy of reforms in the Soviet Union, and also to create an all-European peaceful order. This was stated in Bonn by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG foreign minister.

The success of the perestroyka initiated by President Gorbachev, he went on, is also in keeping with our interests. The future united Germany will contribute to the development of cooperation and the strengthening of good-neighborly ties and stability in Europe. We respect the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union in both the security and the economic sphere. This also applies to the fulfillment of the commitments accepted by the GDR in respect of the USSR. The joint will of the governments of both German states to ensure the fulfillment of these commitments and furthermore to expand Soviet-German cooperation will be confirmed already during the creation of the economic, currency, and social union of the FRG and the GDR.

Emphasizing further the necessity of the creation of all-European security and cooperation structures on the basis of the further development of the CSCE process, the leader of the West German foreign policy department noted that the idea of a peaceful all-European order will gradually acquire realistic outlines. As early as this year, he said, after the conclusion of the first stage of the Vienna talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe the "Helsinki" conference may take decisive steps on the road towards new all-European cooperative security structures.

FRG's Genscher Praises Bonn 2 Plus 4 Outcome

LD0905214590 Moscow TASS in English 2104 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] Bonn May 9 TASS—"The Bonn meeting of the foreign ministers of the two German states and four victor powers under the 'Two Plus Four' formula can rightly be called historic," said West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

"It became clear during this meeting that no one intends to counteract Germans' striving for unification," Genscher stressed in his speech to the Free Democratic Party group in the Bundestag.

"The settlement of the external political aspects of German unity should serve to strengthen the security of all countries in Europe and fully meet the lawful interests of the Soviet Union," Genscher said.

"After German unificatiion, too, its relations with the USSR will be of particular importance to it. Therefore, all available opportunities should be used to develop them in all directions. Germany and the Soviet Union can give a lot to each other, their comprehensive interaction will be of immense importance to the entire continent," Genscher said.

"At the six-nation meeting, the parties unanimously emphasised the need to deepen the CSCE process, which would bring about a situation of stability and lasting peace in Europe.

"The success of the disarmament talks and the establishment of new relations between the military-political alliances is an important pre-condition for this. Transition should be made from confrontation to cooperation and creation of new security structures."

Genscher welcomed the accords, reached at the meeting, to follow up on the "Two Plus Four" conferences.

"Great efforts are required from all participants for the external aspects of building German unity to be settled by the autumn conference of the heads of state and government of the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

"This forum should provide an additional impetus to the Helsinki process and enable it to reach a qualitatively new level," Genscher said.

Sergey Sayenko on British Military Expenditures

LD1005211590 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Speaking at a meeting held in the parliament building, the chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [ND], Bruce Kent, said that it is time for Britain to curtail its military spending, or at least heed the call of the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff [title as heard] Colin Powell, for 25 percent cuts in defense allocations in the next five years. Sergey Sayenko comments.

With their meeting at Westminster, members of the CND sort of summed up the lobbying of legislators conducted early this week. Speaking with lawmakers, peace activists pointed out that MP's should do all they could to prevent the implementation of NATO's plans to modernize nuclear arms and achieve cuts in military expenditure. As a matter of fact if Britain's military spending is reduced to about three percent of the gross national product that will make it possible to save at least five billion pounds sterling annually. These funds could be used on social programs, in particular on the needs of health service and education.

However, the Defense Ministry obviously has no intention of heeding the voice of the public; witness the recent statement of the Defense secretary, Tom King, at the Defense Committee of the House of Commons in which he ruled out the possibility of considerable cuts in Britain's military budget in the near future. The Defense Ministry even described as speculative the EVENING STANDARD's report that the Treasury wanted to cut the defense budget by one billion pounds in response to the easing of East-West tensions.

Moreover, it is disquieting that NATO is planning to deploy as early as next year new tactical nuclear air to ground missiles on British soil despite the assurances of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Defense Secretary Tom King that Britain might revise its military policy, particularly its approach to modernising NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe, in the light of political changes in eastern Europe. In the meantime, facts indicate that the words of the British Government and its deeds are often at variance.

Latin America & Caribbean

Reportagge on Supreme Soviet Visit to Cuba

Baklanov Addresses Meeting

PM1005111390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 May 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under general heading: "USSR-Cuba: Time-tested Cooperation"]

[Text] Havana, 9 May—A ceremonial meeting devoted to the 30th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Cuba has been held here. "Our ties are built on principles of equality and mutual respect and are marked by an understanding of each other's actual possibilities and a feeling of international mutual assistance. A key element of the relations between our countries is the fraternal collaboration between the CPSU and the Cuban Communist Party." This was stated at the meeting by O.D. Baklanov, USSR people's deputy and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who heads a visiting USSR Supreme Soviet here.

He pointed out that the task of enhancing the effectiveness of Soviet-Cuban cooperation is now assuming pride of place. The main guarantee of forward movement is that our peoples are united by sincere mutual sympathies and genuine human interest in each other's work and concerns.

In transforming the image of Soviet society we are trying impart to socialism the features of a truly humane democratic system. We are not seeking to impose our models on anyone. We closely follow reforms in other countries, including the process of the rectification of mistakes and elimination of negative tendencies which is under way in Cuba.

Certain countries' attempts to teach others their style of "democracy" evoke our condemnation, the head of the Soviet delegation said. We believe that the United States should demonstrate a genuinely democratic approach to other countries, and Cuba in particular. The normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations would be an appreciable contribution to the process of the improvement of the atmosphere in the region and the world as a whole. The Soviet Union is prepared to assist the development of such a dialogue.

Soviet people follow with friendly concern the building of a socialist society in Cuba. No matter what tasks we have to resolve, we will continue to strengthen Soviet-Cuban friendship and deepen bilateral cooperation, O.D. Baklanov stressed.

The ceremonial meeting was attended by Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and president of the Councils of State and of Ministers.

TASS Summarizes Visit

LD1005123290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0755 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Havana, 10 May (TASS)—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, headed by O.D. Baklanov, USSR people's deputy and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has been on an official visit to Cuba 3-9 May at the invitation of the National Assembly of people's power.

The delegation was received by Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, chairman of the republican State Council and of the Council of Ministers, to whom greetings and good wishes were conveyed from M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Meetings were held with J. Escalona, chairman of the Cuban National Assembly of the People's Government, and other party and state figures of the country. During an exchange of opinions, which was held in a friendly atmosphere, much that was common in the sides' appraisals and approaches regarding the processes occurring in both countries and also on questions of an international nature was revealed.

Satisfaction was expressed at the high level and diverse nature of ties in all spheres which have been achieved during the years of Soviet-Cuban cooperation, the thirtieth anniversary of which is now being marked.

The Soviet parliamentarians provided detailed information about the progress of the processes of perestroyka in the USSR, about the changes in the structure of the political and economic system, and the decisions of the extraordinary third congress of USSR people's deputies and their significance for the strengthening of the lawmaking activity of the Supreme Soviet and interparliamentary cooperation.

The Cuban participants in the talks set out their appraisals of the country's political and socioeconomic situation, and the steps being taken to overcome existing difficulties.

The parliamentarians noted the identity and closeness of the two states' positions on a broad range of international problems, especially on questions of restricting the arms race, preventing a nuclear war, and settling regional situations of conflict by political means. They spoke in favor of broadening cooperation between peoples and parliamentarians in order to solve global problems of the present day.

The head of the Soviet delegation met with representatives of Soviet collectives working in Cuba. He spoke about particular features of the present stage of perestroyka and about the progress of preparations for the 28th CPSU congress and answered many questions.

Soviet-Cuban Military Cooperation Lauded

PM1005110590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Division General Julio Casas Regueiro, first vice minister of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, by TASS correspondent Nikolay Paska specially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the general headline: "Cuba—USSR: Time-tested Cooperation"—date of interview not given]

[Text] Havana—The restoration 30 years ago of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Cuba marked the beginning of cooperation between the two countries' armies. Throughout this entire period the bonds of friendship between the Soviet Army and the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces have strengthened, Division General Julio Casas Regueiro, first vice minister of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, said in an interview to a TASS correspondent. They have passed through common danger and victories and, contrary to imperialism's calculations, turned into a firm symbol of combat comradeship.

Cubans will never forget that the Soviet Union was one of the first states which recognized the new government only a few days after the victory of the revolution on the island in January 1959. It extended a hand of friendship to us and began to provide free moral and material support and assistance which were so necessary for economic and social development and the strengthening of the country's defense capability.

For Cuba, the defense of the socialist motherland is the main objective of the party, the government, and the people who have mastered well the Leninist principle that a revolution is worth its salt only if it is capable of defending itself. In all our victories, be it during the rout of the mercenaries at Playa Giron, during the struggle against the counterrevolution, or when rendering international assistance in Ethiopia and Angola, and also in all the spheres of socialist building in Cuba the results of cooperation with the Soviet Union, which plays a decisive role in the survival and the development of the revolution, have always been present.

This solidarity and support takes different forms, including free deliveries of the most varied modern hardware and arms and assistance in the training of our cadres, in the passing on of knowledge by expert Soviet specialists, and in fruitful exchanges which have taken place over the past three decades. All this has enabled us to create our mighty armed forces capable, together with the entire people, of resisting aggressive actions of imperialism like those currently conducted in the immediate vicinity of our national territory.

Cuba has received from the Soviet Union the most modern combat hardware and arms which are distinguished by great firepower and maneuverability to enable us to rebut and conquer enemies, J. Casas Regueiro said. Our commanders have received the training necessary for the organization and leadership of modern combat operations at various Soviet military academies. They have mastered the most modern concepts of military art and strategy for various theaters of operations, taking account of the likelihood of war being unleashed against Cuba. The USSR has taken part not only in the training of command staff but also in the constant enhancement of the military skills of officers and the provision of material assistance to military educational establishments in Cuba. An example of this is the No. 12 Soviet Training Center located in Havana. It is a model of cooperation and friendship between the Armed Forces of Cuba and the USSR. The assistance we have received from the USSR also includes the material and technical base necessary for the repair of hardware and arms.

In the course of all these years hundreds of Soviet military specialists have worked selflessly with us,

passing on their knowledge and valuable experience. They have set us an example as regards discipline, diligence, and a sense of civic duty.

It is possible to claim boldly that the path of Soviet-Cuban combat comradeship which we have traveled has been rich and useful. All the Cubans who have had the fortune to work with Soviet servicemen always recall this with a feeling of respect and gratitude, Division General J. Casas Regueiro, first vice minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, stressed.

Nicaragua's Violetta de Chamorro Interviewed

90UF0085A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Nicaraguan President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro by PRAVDA special correspondent V. Listov in Managua; first three paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction; date not specified: "V. Chamorro: 'I Want To See a Plowman Without a Rifle'"]

[Text] On 25 April a ceremony of transfer of power will take place in Nicaragua. Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, owner of the right-wing newspaper LA PRENSA and widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a prominent political figure from the days of the Somosa dictatorship killed in 1975 by hirelings of the tyrant, will replace Daniel Ortega as the country's president. She headed the National Opposition Union [UNO] during elections held on 25 February. Our special correspondent met with V. Chamorro.

...Managua. A square called Park Palm. Yet another plot of magnificent blossoming trees and bushes in the evergreen Nicaraguan capital. The square is surrounded with high stone enclosures, hiding rich mansions from the eyes of passers-by. Off to one side is a white wall on which is written in large pale blue letters: "Violeta = UNO = Victory." Behind this is a thickset, single-story mansion with spacious verandas and hallways and the traditional Spanish courtyard "patio" reminiscent of botanical gardens. This is the private home of the Nicaraguan president-elect, the name with which the local press now honors Violeta Barrios de Chamorro prior to her taking office.

Here in a study filled with bookshelves and a great many photographs on the walls is where our conversation took place. Unfortunately, Dona Violeta broke her leg during the election campaign. Although this did not prevent her from winning the election, it has forced her to be on crutches to this day. Putting her leg, which was in a cast, onto a special support, she directed toward me an attentive, inquiring look:

[Chamorro] Well, I am at your service...

(I asked my first question:)

[Listov] How do you feel in your new role as head of state?

[Chamorro] Comfortable. I have some experience, albeit not very much. Following the overthrow of the Somosa dictatorship, I spent nine months as a member of the first governmental junta. I did not cooperate further with the Sandinistas, as it turns out, but my conscience is clear. People are awaiting changes today, expecting that the situation will turn for the better. Of course, everyone understands these changes in his own way. My grandson, for example, asks whether Coca-Cola will drop in price. I do not have a magic wand for solving all our problems at once. But I have the firm intention of being president of all Nicaraguans.

[Listov] Certain Latin American commentators are asking what you will be: "a Nicaraguan Thatcher or Aquino." What do you think about this?

[Chamorro] With all the respect I have for both of them, I will be neither. I have been and will remain a Nicaraguan, or, more accurately, the Nicaraguan Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.

[Listov] Looking back, how would you now characterize the chief factors involved in your victory—not in defeating Daniel Ortega, but in your victory itself?

[Chamorro] I am a woman, and women have a special intuition. I was always confident that the opposition would be victorious. The majority of Nicaraguans wanted changes, and confidence in the fact that I correctly perceived and understood their moods guided me during the election campaign. There were moments when doubters even exerted pressure on me to withdraw from the struggle. But I did not give in. I never lost my faith in victory. And, as you can see, the elections presented everyone with a great surprise.

[Listov] Judging by the statements of certain UNO leaders, there is within the "bloc of victors" an intention to "take revenge" which, as we know from history, at no time and in no place ever led to anything good. How do you relate to the fact that some leaders of this political alliance believe it is necessary to "settle accounts," "chop heads," or in the best case "not recognize" the Sandinistas?

[Chamorro] Perhaps my reply may seem "feminine," but I do not watch television—there is no time—and I have not heard about any such moods. And if they do exist, they are nothing more than the personal opinions of certain leaders. I do not share these views. I believe we must learn to forgive; we must be able to forget the past. Of 3.5 million Nicaraguans, 1 million recently have emigrated and now live abroad. This alone shows that it is simply necessary to abide by the old rule, "Draw a line and start the accounting over again."

[Listov] With transfer of power to the new government, will UNO as an electoral coalition terminate its existence? On what parties, on what forces does your government intend to find its support?

[Chamorro] I am not a professional politician, and it is difficult for me to say how relationships will develop within UNO. But I should note that the bloc of 14 political parties was formed on the conceptual basis of

unity of opposition forces, and it would be good if all 14 parties remained in the bloc, in other words, if it were preserved as a unified political organization. At the same time, I understand that various political leaders have their own—various—points of view. Naturally, I cannot force them to unite into a single whole. My job is to create a better government.

[Listov] It is evident that refusal "in principle" to cooperate with the Sandinista National Liberation Front—and such voices are also being heard in UNO—can hardly bring about genuine national reconciliation. I am not in any way referring to creation of a coalition government. But in certain spheres, in some form, or on certain issues, will cooperation with the Sandinistas as a major force of future opposition be possible?

[Chamorro] I think it is possible. But those who desire to work with us will have to renounce the front's ideology. There are many fine experts in today's state institutions. The most important thing right now is to get to work. And then we will see, as they say.

The Contras—I will call them that with your permission, as the name appears in all the world press—can create and are already creating problems for the future government. There arises a real threat, in my view, of a new conflict with unforetold consequences. How can this be avoided? How can we resolve the "Contras problem" which has dragged on so long?

[Chamorro] I will say one thing: It must be resolved calmly. They are Nicaraguans like all the rest.

[Listov] After the Supreme Election Tribunal acknowledged your election victory and President Ortega congratulated you, you delivered your first address to the nation—this was on 28 February—and spoke about the need to fully implement the agreements reached by the five presidents of the Central American countries, including the one reached in the Honduran city of Tela, on the urgent demobilization and repatriation of the Contras. What can you say today on this subject?

[Chamorro] I can only repeat that they are Nicaraguans, the same kind of Nicaraguans as all the rest, and they must have the same right to live in their native land under conditions of freedom and democracy.

[Listov] Fine, we will abandon the Contras theme. In your opinion, what will be the first steps the new government takes?

[Chamorro] The repeal of compulsory military service, something Daniel Ortega could have done but did not, and the granting of a general amnesty. These measures should consolidate peace in the country and open up the way for a broader national reconciliation, for economic reconstruction. I believe the new government will be able to achieve these aims.

[Listov] Could you clarify what you meant when you promoted the slogan "Nicaragua will again be a republic" during the election campaign?

[Chamorro] That was the motto of my deceased husband. He fought to bring freedom, democracy, and social justice to reign in Nicaragua. I am hopeful that 12 years after his death his ideals will be embodied in reality.

[Listov] It is generally known that the Sandinista revolution gave a lot to simple Nicaraguans: free education, public health care, legal protection of workers' social rights, etc. Will these achievements, indisputably progressive in nature, be preserved?

[Chamorro] They will. But some of them will be improved: public health care, for example. Today polyclinics show preferential treatment of Sandinistas over non-Sandinistas—in providing medicines, for example. We want health care to be equitable for all. We want social justice to be genuine, that is, the same for everyone.

[Listov] What do you not like in the policies of the Sandinista regime?

[Chamorro] Militarism. Nicaragua is literally stuffed with weapons. They are diverse and come from diverse sources. But one way or another they are weapons, and not agricultural implements.

[Listov] Does this mean that you share the ideas stated by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze during his visit to Managua in October of last year concerning the need for disarmament and demilitarization of the Central American countries to the level required for their defense? In such an event, Nicaragua could become a more significant factor than it is today in establishing a stable peace in the region, could it not?

[Chamorro] The very concept of disarmament with the aim of consolidating peace is a noble one, an idea which merits implementation. Demilitarization of the countries of our region is indeed an immediate necessity. The peoples of Central America are tired of war. They want to live in peace and tranquility.

[Listov] PRAVDA readers are interested, of course, in how relations between our countries will take shape...

[Chamorro] I attach great significance to the friendly relations which exist between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union. I value your President Gorbachev very highly, as well as his efforts to implement policy based on the principles of a new political thinking. I would like to see mutually beneficial relations between our countries continue to be preserved, on an equal basis, without interference in one another's internal affairs.

I will state quite bluntly: We are counting on cooperation and support on the part of the Soviet Union. We Nicaraguans remember the generous assistance provided by the Soviet people following the catastrophic earthquake of 1972. And we value the aid, not profit-motivated, presently rendered to the Sandinista regime. We need Soviet assistance and hope that President Gorbachev will properly understand this. We hope our cooperation will develop successfully, especially in state-to-state relations.

[Listov] In what spheres, in your view, might friendly official and business contacts established between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua continue and perhaps undergo further development?

[Chamorro] In all spheres. We might develop parliament-to-parliament relations, cultural and scientific ties. We could develop trade. Nicaragua could sell meat, for example—quite recently it was the largest meat producer in the region and used this to feed all of Central America. But first it is necessary to reestablish our livestock breeding and renew the economy. For this reason we cannot but welcome cooperation with the Soviet Union and other European countries: Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example. But under one condition: that this cooperation be directed not toward attempting to change our ideology, but rather toward genuinely assisting us to overcome economic crisis and rebuild our economy.

[Listov] One final question—if for just one minute we might digress from the grim realities of your country today and imagine—what kind of Nicaragua would you like to see?

[Chamorro] I would like to see it free and democratic, an equal among equals. I would like to see it overcome economic crisis, be a place where the plowman tills his field without a rifle on his back and where there is enough food on every Nicaraguan table. I would like to see it develop good-neighborly relations will all countries in the region and live in peace, prosperity, and friendship with all peoples.

Supreme Soviet Session

Lukyanov Opens Third Session of Supreme Soviet

LD1105084690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Half an hour ago, after a two-week break in the third USSR Supreme Soviet session, work resumed. Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov opened it by summarizing the results of the last part of the third session. He said that 20 fundamental laws had been adopted, including laws on land, property, local self-government, a block of legal acts concerning national and state construction, and other laws. This makes it possible to draw the conclusion that the parliament's work has become more effective. A considerable number of bills are due to be discussed in the slightly more than two remaining weeks. Foremost among them is a bill on the provision of pensions for USSR citizens. In addition, laws on the right of state tax inspections, citizenship, socialist enterprises, the status of USSR people's deputies, the media, and on the procedures for leaving and joining the USSR will be adopted. The chairman paid special attention to the consideration of the package of documents on the practical implementation of the government program on radical economic reforms.

Deputies To Reconsider Pensions, Employment

PM1105121590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Second Edition p1

[Interview with Professor A.G. Zhuravlev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union deputies' subcommission on prices, by S. Karkhanin under the rubric "Debates in the Kremlin"; date and place unspecified; first paragraph is introduction: "We Must Look Before We Leap"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet session will resume work in the Kremlin on 11 May and continue the debate on the draft Law on Pensions. Does this document—which is intended to become an element in the system of social protection for the needy—take account of the changes connected with the switch to a regulated market economy? Just how well founded are the fears of readers who express concern in their letters that the transition to a market economy has not been sufficiently thought through? Professor A.G. Zhuravlev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union deputies' subcommission on prices, shared his thoughts on the matter:

"It is planned to discuss the draft law on the second reading on 11 and 12 May and wrap the whole thing up. But I feel it is too early to do this. The document is long, consisting of several dozen pages, because we have tried not to forget anyone, so to speak. It is often the case, though, that when you try to encompass something so immense the most important aspects get overlooked.... So, in my view, the more unfortunate members of our society could suffer if the draft is adopted now, in its present form.

"The fact is that, with the increased minimum wage that is virtually inevitable with the transition to a market economy, there will be a sharp increase in the number of people receiving the minimum pension. That system of accounting is incorporated in the draft. Leveling is just one step away from injustice, and an increasing number of pensioners—particularly those who retired for a well-earned rest in previous years, when the average wage was comparatively low—will find themselves below the poverty line.

"It is planned to start enforcing the law on 1 October for people who took part in the war: They will receive an increase of R17.50. Although, clearly, with the transition to a market economy, this amount will in fact depreciate.

"Furthermore, the draft envisages the introduction of indexation in the period 1993-1995. But I believe that this instrument for compensating for losses connected with the depreciation of the ruble should—again, because of the switch to a market economy—be introduced immediately. In its present form, the draft envisages an increase of R5 for people who retired five years ago, R10 for those who retired 10 years ago.... But what do these R5 and R10 mean when considered from the standpoint of the future market economy? That is why I am convinced that the law must be submitted for a third reading and adopted only after fundamental decisions concerning the switch to a market economy have been made.

"On approximately 14-15 May the Supreme Soviet will hear a government report on this transition. As a group of economists among the USSR people's deputies we recently took part in a meeting with N.I. Ryzhkov, L.I. Abalkin, and Finance Minister V. Pavlov. We had a frank, in-depth discussion and, in my view, both sides showed understanding of the future changes in the economy. I was encouraged by N.I. Ryzhkov's idea that awareness of the seriousness of the consequences that could await our country if some error were made will restrain us from leaping before we look. It is certainly true that we must look before we leap in everything concerning the market economy.

"The period 1991-1992 will be concerned with stabilizing the consumer market. That is just the 'foundations'—the 'edifice' itself will take several five-year periods to build. We only need to look at the experience of Hungary, Poland, and Austria to see that it will take time. I predict that stabilization will mean average price increases of 200-300 percent. The average wage will rise accordingly.

"Reform of the monetary system, which I wrote about in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in the articles 'The Parallel Ruble' and 'Temporary Freeze,' really comes down to protecting the savings of those people who have worked honestly; otherwise the poor will become even poorer.

"The stages of free price formation are another important feature. There must be categories of goods for which we maintain regulated price formation—possibly even for a long time. Nevertheless, I must be frank and say that another danger of a market economy is unemployment. A person will not be guaranteed his wage even if he

fulfills the production plan: His wage will not be determined by commodity output, but by the demand for that commodity. That is why at his meeting with us N.I. Ryzhkov emphasized the idea of a phased transition to a market economy. The government proposes to send sample procedures for this transition to labor collectives in advance so that they can visualize themselves in a market economy.

"Our deputies' commission now considers that the main aspect of its work is that connected with social protection mechanisms. There is an alarming factor: the 'brain drain' abroad is often mentioned, but a 'brawn drain' could soon begin as well. Skilled workers are starting to leave the country if life here does not suit them. This means that we will need a Law on Employment, unemployment benefit, and updated employment services. Incidentally, I feel that one element of the social protection system could be abolition of the passport system: A person will have the right to look for work wherever he feels it necessary."

Supreme Soviet Executes New Federation Law

PM0905094390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

["USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Bringing into Force the USSR Law 'On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Federation's Components'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves that:

1. Guided by the 19 December 1989 Resolution of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies "On Instructions to the USSR Supreme Soviet and Constitutional Commissions on Certain Constitutional Matters," the present law is to be brought into force from the moment of its publication.

2. The provisions of the USSR Law "On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Federation's Components" are to be regarded as the basis for overhauling treaty relations between the USSR and the federation's components.

3. It is specified that, until USSR and union and autonomous republic legislation is brought into line with the USSR Law "On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Federation's Components," existing legislative acts will apply, as long as they do not contradict this Law.

4. USSR Supreme Soviet committees amd chamber standing commissions will submit for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on amending existing USSR legislation in accordance with the USSR Law "On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Federation's Components."

5. The provisions of the USSR Law "On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Federation's Components" and proposals on the relevant amendments to the USSR Constitution are to be submitted for ratification by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

6. Union and autonomous republics' Supreme Soviets are instructed to bring union and autonomous republics' legislation into line with the USSR Law "On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Federation's Components."

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
The Kremlin, Moscow, 26 April.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Attends Higher Education Meeting

LD1105072590 Moscow TASS in English 0709 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Rectors of Soviet higher educational establishments are discusing issues of education at a meeting which opened in Moscow today. President Mikhail Gorbachev is participating in the meeting.

Georgiy Arbatov on Gorbachev's Problems, Lithuania

PM1005135090 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 9 May 90

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, in London, and with Senator Richard Lugar in Washington by news presenter Donald MacCormick live on BBC 2 "Newsnight" program, following a video report on alleged tension between Gorbachev and the Soviet Army]

[Text] [MacCormick] Well, joining me now to discuss Mr. Gorbachev's future options is Senator Richard Lugar, who's in Washington, and who's a leading Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and with me here is Dr. Georgiy Arbatov, a senior policy adviser to Gorbachev. First of all, Dr. Arbatov, how much strength is there in all the speculation about tension between the Army and Mr. Gorbachev?

[Arbatov] Well, you know, I think that Gorbachev shows remarkable strength and character. He has a lot of problems. Who behaves like a nervous teenager is the Western media. What I saw here, it's... Would I believe it, I would immediately pack my luggage and go directly back to Moscow, but you know, it's just... I don't know, it's maybe... I don't want to look for the motives, I don't think there are motives, I think it's just an attempt to find some weak points.

[MacCormick] But at the Victory Day parade in Moscow today, the defense minister himself, Marshal Yazov, was emphasizing how much the Army was in support of Mr. Gorbachev's policies. If there was not some serious division in the Army, why was it necessary for him to say that?

[Arbatov] Well, you know, there are some opponents of perestroyka and Gorbachev, and there are many among civilians, as well; among some professors like Nina Andreyeva, and some ambassadors like Brovikov, and some others; and there are some generals, as well. But it is not Army against Gorbachev. In the Army there is a tremendous support of Gorbachev and military reform and all of it among the officers, so it's simply wrongly read. And what Yazov made today—he has just shown that he doesn't want really to create an impression that because they made a very bad show with this, you know, Victory in Europe gathering of veterans—I think that all of it was done by the political department of the Army. I was on my way here—by the way, it was awful—and after it they got some strong words from Gorbachev yesterday.

[MacCormick] Let us ask—we'll come back to you in just a moment—let me ask Senator Lugar in Washington, Senator, how you regard, first of all, Mr. Gorbachev's position vis-a-vis the Armed Forces?

[Lugar] Well, we were very interested in Marshal Akhromeyev's testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate yesterday, in which it's obvious that there are difficulties now posed for the Start II Treaty, and particularly for discussion about it at the summit on May 30. It appears to us that the Soviets have either backtracked on certain concessions made earlier or they are adding additional difficulties, such as discussion of the sea-launch cruise missiles and the fact that that situation has to be taken care of as well as the discussion of general sea power and the deterrence that comes from that. Now these are issues that have been out there, but they have not been raised, in our judgment, in a way thus far that would block progress, and so we see what appears to be a little tightening of the chain by the military on Mr. Gorbachev and on Mr. Shevardnadze, particularly as they came through here for the ministerial meeting, and now with Marshal Akhromeyev's direct testimony.

[MacCormick] Dr. Arbatov, without getting bogged down in any of the details about arms negotiation, what Senator Lugar talks about is a tightening of the military chain on President Gorbachev.

[Arabatov] It's wrong. Akhromeyev is a marshal, but he's not in military: He is an adviser to Gorbachev. And you know, I think all of it is a product of misunderstanding, because while Baker was in Moscow some of the questions were not discussed; they had no time to discuss them. And Americans—maybe it is a negotiating tactics—understood it as if this problem were resolved already, and therefore this... you know, this version about backtracking of Soviet Union, as far as I know, it is not true, and there were the sea-based cruise missiles what was an obstacle for the treaty all the time.

[MacCormick] What about President Gorbachev's relationship with the civilian population? We heard a moment or two ago, Sir Bryan Cartledge, a former British ambassador to Moscow, saying that the May Day demonstrations against the leadership may have suggested...

[Arbatov interrupts] It was, it was...

[MacCormick] Mr. Gorbachev doesn't have the authority to go...

[Arbatov interrupts] No...

[MacCormick] with his powerful position.

[Arbatov] You know, it was not again the leadership. The May Day demonstration was in favor of leadership, but there was a group at the end of the demonstration who jeered, and aren't there British who jeer against Mrs. Thatcher or Americans who jeer and do such things?

[MacCormick] Yes, but this was un... we're used to that: This was unprecedented in Moscow.

[Arbatov] Well, this is democracy. You have to understand: This is democracy. There are some new phenomenas, and we have to take it, and you have to accept it that way at real value, not to ascribe to it something. The latest poll I have seen, it shows that Gorbachev has support as the best leader of the country by 60 percent of the population, and the next after him, you know, Ryzhkov... Ryzhkov lost a lot of credit. He was shown here by very poor performance with his economic programs and all of it.

[MacCormick] He's not waiting in the wings, not waiting in the wings?

[Arbatov] You know, I don't know what he's waiting for. I don't think he is so ambitious that he tries to unseat Gorbachev or something like this, but it's not really a figure which has become more popular because he is the boss for the economy: He is responsible for the program which failed, for new proposals which were not accepted, so he has his troubles. I don't want to blame him for it. He has really difficult problems before him.

[MacCormick] Turning finally to the issue of Lithuania, let me ask Senator Lugar—because, first of all, because we know that in the United States, Senator Lugar, there are people in the Congress and elsewhere who think that the United States should be taking a much tougher line with President Gorbachev on Lithuania—Do you think it should, or do you think it shouldn't, because that might simply add to all the troubles he's facing?

[Lugar] Well, I don't think that our position ought to be based upon troubles facing Gorbachev. It seems to me that our nation ought to affirm two things: namely, that we believe that Lithuania has a legal position of independence, that it was illegally taken over by the Soviets to begin with—and we believe the Soviets have said this. Now, secondly, we think that there are possibilities for negotiations between Lithuania and the Soviets and that, obviously, is the best way for resolution of the problem. So we are for the Soviets' working the problem out, and we want to be helpful in that respect, but clearly we

believe the Lithuanians and their independence is very important, and we recognize that point.

[MacCormick] Do you think that President Gorbachev, first of all, wants in the end to let Lithuania and the other Baltics escape—to put it that way—if they want to; and secondly, do you think he can deliver that, if that's what he wants?

[Lugar] Well, I'm not certain that he wants this. It appears to me that President Gorbachev will probably work out pragmatic circumstances in which a program of negotiation about the military, the economic ties, and circumstances can be worked out with the three Baltic States. It appears all three are determined to have independence, and the question is the program and the ways of getting to that, and certainly the United States, Great Britain, clearly France and Germany in their initiative, are trying to be very helpful in facilitating that.

[MacCormick] Thank you. Dr. Arbatov, finally to you on this Lithuanian question: Will they go or won't they?

[Arbatov] Well, you know, it goes down to one very simple question: If the perestroyka is successful, nobody will want to leave a successful and prosperous federation; if perestroyka is not successful, everybody will leave, including the Russians. But I hope that perestroyka will successful, and I am pretty much sure about it, and there are quite a number of great successes which are not noticed by the press: They are not so spectacular as jeering or something like this...

[MacCormick interrupts] But surely the point about Lithuanians is: They don't simply want economic success, they want freedom.

[Arbatov] You know, you don't generalize about Lithuanians: You have a couple of leaders, you have others. They were not ready to put it to a referendum: They are cautious to do it, they are afraid to do it, the leaders; and they have different opinions, the Lithuanians. We don't have the real opinion of them, and then, you know, what we... they have constitutional right to leave, and Gorbachev doesn't deny it to them. By constitution, they have the right, and he repeats it again and again: After the negotiations when... if you decide that you want to leave, please leave. But before it, we have to straighten out our economic accounts, we have to straighten out the fate of 20 percent of Lithuanians who are ethnically non-Lithuanians: What will they do; will they return to Russia; who will build housing for them; who will provide them with jobs, etcetera? We have a lot of problems to decide, so this is very simple: Nobody here denies them freedom. We build a new federation of, you know, of sovereign republics, and completely on their will—not against their will.

Gorbachev, Military Not in Conflict

PM1005151090 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 9 May 90

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, by news presenter Jon Snow in London 9 May on Channel 4 "News" program—recorded]

[Text] [Snow] Earlier this afternoon I spoke to Georgiy Arbatov, a Central Committee member and a key foreign policy adviser to Mr. Gorbachev. I began by asking him whether the military is now putting pressure on the president to adopt a harder line.

[Arbatov] The whole story which is circulated now—militarists versus Gorbachev: It is not true. You have some militarists who are in opposition to perestroyka, like you have some civilians; some university professors like Nina Andreyeva, who are against perestroyka; some party workers who are against perestroyka. You have them, some militarists as well. But it is not so. And you have a lot of militarists who are for military reform; for changes; for us having smaller but more efficient and less expensive army. And Gorbachev reminded the militarists yesterday that they have to move quicker with the reform and perestroyka in the Army, so I think here is a normal situation which you have: I don't expect any coups d'etat in the Soviet Union.

[Snow] Well, now, Defense Minister Yazov yesterday talked of pledging once again the Army's loyalty to the Communist Party.

[Arbatov] Ah, you see, not to Communist Party only—to the president as well.

[Snow] What about the multiparty system?

[Arbatov] Well, he will have to change the language after it exists, and you know, he is a Communist, and Communist Party is not simply one of the parties: It is a party with which a lot is connected—our past revolution and all of it—so it is the usual formulation, as such.

[Snow] You don't think that it implies a reluctance to embrace a multiparty structure?

[Arbatov] I don't know his personal views on it, but he will take it. He didn't protest at the Central Committee meeting when it was declared that the party puts away the monopoly of power and party will initiate cancelling out the Article Six from the Constitution and is ready for a multiparty system. So Yazov didn't protest. I was at this meeting of Central Committee, so he must be for.

[Snow] What did you make of the NATO reports—that came out from NATO last week—that there had been a movement by the military back in February that might have threatened Mr. Gorbachev's position?

[Arbatov] I am practically sure that nothing could have been done without consent of political leadership, and if there were some movements, it was just in case to sustain law and order or something like this. I don't know the details, but I am absolutely sure that they couldn't do anything without consent of political leadership.

President Passes AIDS-Prevention Law

LD1005093790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 10 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast: TASS-attributed report]

[Text] A law on preventing AIDS has been passed by the USSR president, according to which USSR citizens as well as foreign and stateless citizens living or residing on the territory of the USSR are provided with rights of medical certification, including anonymously, to reveal infection with the human immunodeficiency virus of the AIDS illness.

Health bodies and institutions are obliged to insure the security of such certifiction, both for the persons being examined and also for medical personnel. The law notes that in the event of failure to report for certification and preventive observation without proper reason, citizens will be delivered, by sanction of the procurator, to a health institution by staff of these institutions, with the assistance of militia bodies where necessary, according to where these citizens live and reside.

In the event of their evading certification or preventive observation, foreign citizens and stateless persons may be expelled from the USSR.

The AIDS prevention law is being published in the press.

In connection with the adoption of the USSR law on preventing AIDS, the USSR Supreme Soviet has decided to instruct the USSR Council of Ministers to form a government commission to combat AIDS in the USSR. It will be headed by a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, placing upon him the responsibility to organize and implement measures to combat AIDS in the USSR and to make the present law effective as of 1 January 1991.

Customs Laws Restricting Exports Enacted

LD1005192990 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—Amendments to USSR customs regulations, severely restricting the export of miscellaneous consumer goods and food from the Soviet Union, entered into force today.

Valeriy Draganov, deputy head of the USSR Council of Ministers' Main State Customs Control Board, told TASS that, under the new regulations, citizens, permanently residing in the USSR and crossing the border for private business, cannot export from the USSR a range of commodities.

These include, in part, car accessories and spare parts, electric cable and wire, erection and bench tool, building materials, furs and fur garments, fabrics of all kinds, carpets, tablecloths and linen, household freezers and refrigerators, bicycles, cameras, household electric appliances, vacuum cleaners, washing, sewing and knitting machines and consumer electronics.

Soviet and foreign tourists and persons going abroad on private business are prohibited to export virtually all food products from the USSR.

At the same time, regulations allow USSR citizens leaving to Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on private business, on tourist trips, for rest and treatment to take abroad foodstuffs, with the exception of those banned for export, worth five roubles per person. This provision is applied also to citizens permanently residing abroad.

Persons, travelling abroad for pemanent settlement, are allowed to export up to 5,000 roubles worth of jewelery and other household goods made of precious metals and stones per person irrespective of age. This category of citizens is prohibited from exporting foreign made furniture.

Manufactured goods, food, combustible and lubricant materials purchased in the USSR with foreign currency may be exported without restrictions.

Speaking about the reasons behind such tight customs regulations, Draganov noted that the measures are meant to protect the Soviet consumer market. The export from the USSR of manufactured goods and food products, which are in short supply in the country, including for purposes of profiteering, has drastically increased recently, further destabilising the weak domestic market.

Some 9,000 T.V. sets, 16,000 sewing machines, 12,000 washing machines, 170,000 alcoholic beverages, 25 tonnes of butter and 30 tonnes of sugar were seized at the Mastmska customs post on the Soviet-Polish border alone during the first quarter of 1990.

Goods are not confiscated and are returned to their owners upon the latters' return to the USSR. Therefore, a decision was adopted about the length of time goods seized from foreign citizens can be kept on the border. It is limited to 48 hours. After this term expires, goods are transferred to a trade outlet for sale.

"However, the measures are temporary and will be revised as the state of the Soviet consumer market improves," Draganov stressed.

Emergency Medical Service Created for Disasters

PM1105091490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with V. Kalinin, head of the USSR Ministry of Health Main Administration for the Organization of Medical Aid, by I. Kolesnikova under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Rapid Response Medicine"—date, place of interview not specified; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decision on creating an emergency service in the country to provide medical aid in emergency situations.

At IZVESTIYA's request, V. Kalinin, head of the USSR Ministry of Health Main Administration for the Organization of Medical Aid, comments on this document:

[Kalinin] The new service, which will be attached to health care establishments, is intended to provide medical aid and health care in major accidents, catastrophes, natural disasters, and mass illnesses. It goes without saying that services operating in emergency situations existed in the Ministry of Health even before this, but experience has shown that their effectiveness was not very great.

[Kolesnikova] What form will this service take?

[Kalinin] The program coordinator will be the All-Union Scientific and Practical Center for Emergency Medical Aid under the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences A.V. Vishnevskiy Scientific Research Institute of Surgery. In addition, a specialized center will be set up in Moscow in case of radiation contamination. Four regional centers are being organized—in Kiev, Novosibirsk, Tashkent, and Khabarovsk. The control center of the All-Union Health Aviation Station is being set up at the Ministry of Health itself. Similar centers will be organized in each oblast under the auspices of first aid departments and at hospitals. Specialized medical "standby teams" will operate at the emergency medical aid centers. Every team member will stay at home out of working hours, in the evening and at night, according to a fixed schedule, to be on standby for operational callouts. Team members will be paid up to 50 percent on top of their salaries for these duty periods.

[Kolesnikova] How will these centers and duty teams be equipped?

[Kalinin] The main center based at the Vishnevskiy Institute is to be fully computerized. We will store information in the computer memories about all the risk zones in our country—seismologically and ecologically dangerous regions, nuclear power stations, warehouses containing explosives or toxic substances, and so forth. The All-Union Health Aviation Station Control Center will be linked by satellite to the regional stations. Planes and helicopters are being assigned to our service for transporting equipment and medicines, conveying medical staff to the emergency area, and transporting the injured. Specially equipped helicopters will be assigned to each regional center. The cabins of these helicopters are fitted with imported equipment allowing complex surgical operations to be performed. In addition, they will have the necessary resuscitation equipment.

Our service will also receive 280 pneumatic-framework modules [pnevmokarkasnyye moduli]. This term denotes an invention that we badly need—a portable hospital. It can be "built" literally in two to three hours. The material from which this huge tent is made enables us to maintain the air temperature at plus 20 degrees even in the extreme north. These modules were designed in case it became necessary to rescue cosmonauts. They were tested in an emergency situation in Ufa.

In the areas around Moscow's airports, storerooms will be built to hold equipment and drugs. Here the standby teams will be able to get everything they need. And of course every team member will have his or her own full medical pack and special clothing.

According to our rough estimates, a total of 3,500 people will be recruited in the emergency service for medical aid in emergency situations.

[Kolesnikova] How much time and how many resources are required for the emergency medical aid service to be ready to help people in trouble at any moment?

[Kalinin] The sum of R430 million has been released for the implementation of the program, and provision has also been made for currency funding. However, the difficulty lies in the fact that there are not enough drugs even for the country's ordinary medical service. And the special requirements of our service mean that a large amount of drug preparations must be kept in reserve. I also foresee great difficulties in providing the centers with communications.

It is planned to complete the whole program in five years. But our joint work has already had concrete results. Two more buildings have been allocated to the All-Union Science and Practice Center's subdepartments. The aircraft which will transport medical staff and essential supplies to an emergency area at the critical moment are being held in reserve. An automated control system for the emergency medical aid service in Moscow is being installed on the premises of the city's first aid station. In the next few months the duty teams will be ready to go into action at any moment. Doctors in some specialities are now going through the necessary retraining for this.

Trade Union Chief Yanayev Interviewed

PM1005154190 Moscow NEW TIMES in English no. 18, 1-7 May 90 pp 8-9

[Interview with Gennadiy Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, by Irina Lagunina: "End of a Convenient Partnership;" date, place unspecified]

[Text] The Soviet trade unions pledged to protect working people from the hardships of the transition to a market economy. The new trade union leader Gennadiy Yanayev is interviewed by NEW TIMES.

NEW TIMES: You have been elected as the new trade union leader at a difficult time: on the one hand, perestroyka has finally started transforming the economic structures of society, which has resulted in a host of new problems; on the other hand, as was demonstrated by the miners' strikes, people have little confidence in the trade unions. How are you going to start your work in the office?

Gennadiy Yanayev: The trade unions were built into the system and then etatized. Actually, they were dealing

with any problems but those they should have handled, that is, they did not protect the rights and interests of the working people. The miners' strikes proved this. The situation which developed after the summer of 1989 forced us to convene the fourth plenum of the all-union central council of the trade unions [AUCCTU] at which we started reassessing the role of the trade union movement in this country. First, the trade unions declared they would no longer be engaged in problems which do not concern them. We realized that if we were to become able, active and efficient, especially during the transition to a market economy, we must concentrate our efforts on the protection of the socio-economic rights of the working people.

Second, the trade unions emerged as an independent and autonomous social force, particularly in their relations with the party and the state. We can no longer afford the luxury of being just a convenient partner of the government. The most appropriate form of our relationship to the government appears to be that of a constructive opponent: we will publicly and sincerely declare our disagreement when government decisions are not in the interests of working people. There have been several cases when trade unions declared their disagreement and forced the government to review unpopular decisions, for instance, those concerning an increase in prices on energy-carriers, or selling high-demand auctions.

N.T.: You are speaking about the trade unions place during the transition to a market economy. How do you see this place?

G.Y.: The world experience demonstrates that the transitional period to a market economy if it is not well planned, may bring about a dramatic growth of prices and massive unemployment. These are accompanying effects of the appearance of a stable and saturated conusmer market. But we are used to the fact that there is no unemployment in the U.S.S.R. (although employment is highly ineffective—where we employ four workers, the West employs one). I can imagine the reaction of the people to unemployment. Already during the very onset of economic reforms, over three million people were dismissed from work. Many of them have been fortunate enough to find new jobs, but it is no secret that hundreds of thousands remain unemployed. Especially alarming is the fact that young people are often forced to start their lives by searching for a job. Certainly, the people had given the mandate of confidence to perestroyka, believing that it would bring about better life and prosperity. Now we have to admit that at a certain stage perestroyka will have to be carried out at the expense of the people, at the expense of their interests....

N.T.: At the expense of the socio-economic rights which are known to be the professed goals of socialism?

G.Y.: That's right. Taking into account our psychology, the difficulties of our rather deformed economy, one can assume that there will be a social explosion if people are unprepared for/or unadapted to new market relations. That is why the trade unions, while advocating market relations which are necessary for radical economic reform, demand that the transition to such relations be thoroughly prepared. In practice this means that the government must be fair with the people and tell them honestly that prices will increase several times over and inflation will develop into hyperinflation. This was the case in Poland, where inflation is at 650 per cent, prices are 1,000 per cent higher than they used to be and massive unemployment has appeared. Moreover, I am convinced that this decision cannot be made without a counsel with the people. The people must make their own choice and intelligently decide whether they want a change of the country's economic system.

Before moving to market relations, it is necessary to take a number of measures and work out legal, economic and labour guarantees. We must build certain social stabilizers into our economic mechanism. First of all, I mean the special Employment Law which would specify that the state is responsible for giving jobs to people willing to work at state-run enterprises. In addition, there must be a system of social security for the unemployed. Third, it is necessary to work out a state programme of employment, retraining and geographic resettlement of people from the areas with a surplus work force to the areas where the work force is in chronically short supply. Besides, there must be special social programmes which would allow employment of unskilled labour, for instance, a housing construction programme, a programme of construction of highways, an ecological programme where unskilled labour can be used. There also must be anti-inflation laws. The AUCCTU has already prepared draft anti-inflation and employment laws. The government has also presented its own drafts. At present we are trying to draw our positions closer together. If we fail to achieve agreement, we will submit alternative bills before the Supreme Soviet and will try to have them passed. In any case, we believe that there must be a system of indexes today which could align the growth of prices and the growth of wages and pensions.... This practice is used in all civilized countries. It is impossible to move towards market relations without such a mechanism.

N.T.: Are there any problems in the relations between the trade unions and the government? Have you been consulted on the proposed plan of economic reforms?

G.Y.: Even husbands and wives have problems sometimes. And the trade unions are not married to the government. That is why we do have differences. But I must note that our experts take part in working out all new economic projects. The stand of the trade unions is sometimes ignored, however. Any ill-considered decision results in a conflict, but we do not want such conflicts to result in strikes. Strikes are a legal weapon of the working people, but they backfire and damage the working people's own economic and social interests.

As for the package of economic reforms which is being considered by the Supreme Soviet, I must say that we disagree with it on a number of counts. When the Supreme Soviet discussed the government anti-crisis

platform, delegates from the trade unions voted in support of it. We had to support the government because we believed that its programme was optimal in the critical conditions of our economy. However, quite frankly, the trade unions have not yet been consulted about the ways of implementing the market relations which are now discussed. I was satisfied to hear the president say at the latest stage of this discussion that this step may not be taken without an exchange of opinions with the people and social guarantees to the people. I hope this statement was more than just words, and as the new AUCCTU chairman, I will demand that our opinion be heard and considered—we do not want condescension.

N.T.: A decision has been made to cut off the supplies of oil and gas to Lithuania. Naturally, this decision will affect the interests and rights of the working people. What's the reaction of the trade unions?

G.Y.: The decision adopted and published by the President and the Prime Minister was a painful one. As the trade union leader, I should have said that this decision injures the interests of the working people. This move puts both Lithuanians and ethnic Russians in a very complex situation. But the fact is that this decision would not have been taken had the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania not violated the constitution of the U.S.S.R.... For my part, I regret the fact that such strong measures have to be taken.

Shostakovskiy Notes Prospect of CPSU Split

PM0905101690 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 6 May 90 p 10

[Interview with 'Democratic Platform' representative and CPSU Higher Party School Rector Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy by Sergio Sergi; date, place not given]

[Text] [Sergi] Gorbachev recently stated that the aim is to punish not dissidents, but only splittists. Are you one of the latter?

[Shostakovskiy] Absolutely not. The fact is that there are a number of currents within the party. One of them wants to carry out a split. I am referring to the "initiative congress" held in Leningrad 21 April with the aim of founding the Russian communist party. They are supporters of a certain current that does not intend to compromise on any principles and that would like to reestablish a monolithic party with iron discipline and proud troops willing to do the new leader's will.

[Sergi] What about the other currents?

[Shostakovskiy] There are currents that could be described as of liberal-centrist orientation that include people who are fighting for the party's renewal—but on the basis of maintaining its integrity. There is also the democratic current, which is not homogeneous: I definitely cannot say that the "Democratic Platform" has rallied all the democratic forces within the CPSU. We are proposing a combination of party reform measures that are directed toward a thorough renewal and that could form the basis for surmounting a profound crisis.

[Sergi] If you are not splittists, then what are you?

[Shostakovskiy] With regard to the split that Gorbachev is talking about, I would prefer to refer to it by the term "differentiation" ["distinzione."] The CPSU has not been a union of "people who think the same way" for a long time.

[Sergi] Some party representatives are calling for the splittists to be hit right away, before the congress.

[Shostakovskiy] Some organizations have already drawn their so-called "organizational conclusions;" they have been hasty. Aleksandr Yakovlev, however, who has spoken out against a "party of expellees," has adopted a moderate stance with respect to the "Democratic Platform."

[Sergi] Nevertheless Gorbachev has already stated his opposition to the Leningrad meeting....

[Shostakovskiy] True, but in my opinion it is an illusion. I do not know whether Gorbachev's stance will be shared. In Leningrad they have decided to proceed to the second stage of their initiative, and they have made a date to meet 9-10 June and will then—this is their intention—hold their constituent congress 19 June: the very date set by the Central Committee for the proceedings of the "all-Russian conference."

[Sergi] Why do you think the Central Committee does not issue an "open letter" against the organizers of the Russian Party, as it did against your platform?

[Shostakovskiy] This is the very essence of the problem. In Gorbachev's view, the "open letter" is addressed to all party currents, but the meaning is fairly clear. The aim is to get rid of us.

[Sergi] How did this platform originate?

[Shostakovskiy] Following the 19th CPSU Conference in June 1988 clubs began to emerge—circles that rallied communists who were dissatisfied with the way internal reform was progressing. A month after the congress we observed that the Central Committee and its apparatus were reluctant to implement the ideas of the conference. Last October there was a coordination meeting of representatives of the clubs—which exist in 162 cities—at the end of which it was decided to hold the January conference that created the "Democratic Platform within the CPSU."

[Sergi] What is your aim?

[Shostakovskiy] We plan to hold in mid-June—probably 16-17 June—our second conference at which to discuss the documents for the 28th congress and to decide on tactics. In mid-June we will know how many delegates we will have, which will determine our line of action and whether or not we will be able to influence the course of the congress.

[Sergi] Why will you be meeting in mid-June?

[Shostakovskiy] For one thing, because the new parliament of the Russian Republic meets 16 June and we would like to take account of what happens. We are by no means unaware of Russia's significance in the debate throughout the union. But there is also another reason: Since the country's political situation is very unstable, by that date many events could make it advisable for us to change our stance and objectives.

[Sergi] What could happen that would be such an upheaval?

[Shostakovskiy] For instance, we cannot entirely rule out the emergence of a "workers party." An independent, Solidarity-type trade union could emerge. Other things could also happen. Social tension is very high.

[Sergi] How do you view the CPSU's future?

[Shostakovskiy] I believe that the congress will have a centrist character, with a significant proportion of delegates reluctant to accept the ideas of party renewal. This orientation will have several consequences. The greatest will be a mass exodus from the CPSU, a flood. Then several parties will emerge—the Russian communist party, genuine Marxist-Leninists; the party that will stem from the "Democratic Platform" and the maintenance of the CPSU as a result of a compromise at the center.

[Sergi] So you envisage two splits....

[Shostakovskiy] I believe that this will happen, but I do not rule out an entirely unexpected alternative, either: The country's situation will develop in such a way that there will be a need for the unity of all democratic forces, the centrist forces, and perhaps some of the sensible conservative forces.

[Sergi] Will that include you, too?

[Shostakovskiy] Of course. I do not exclude the possibility that we will have to deal with social explosions that will necessitate such unity for a while. But we cannot omit to consider yet another alternative: a state of emergency, with the suspension of all political activity.

[Sergi] You say that with a smile. Could it really come to that?

[Shostakovskiy] Mine is a sad smile. No, I would not rule out such an outcome. It could result from the economic situation, from what steps the radicalization of the economy takes [as published]; it could be the result of a campaign of strikes. The decisions being forecast would need society's consensus, and I believe that this consensus does not exist at present. The government is in a difficult situation; there is no confidence.

[Sergi] It is argued that if you had behaved differently Gorbachev would have appointed one of you to the presidential council, too.

[Shostakovskiy] We have never seen an outstretched hand. Real bows were made to the conservatives. It could even happen that the left decides to support the president if the situation so demands.

[Sergi] Why? Is Gorbachev now the prisoner of the conservative right?

[Shostakovskiy] It does seem so to me. If we are talking about Gorbachev as CPSU general secretary, he is an an extremely difficult situation, because he is exposed to fire from the most diverse sectors. The Central Committee plenum criticizes him, the majority actually hate him. And Gorbachev takes account of our society's conservatism, its huge conservative inertia.

[Sergi] So where is perestroyka going?

[Shostakovskiy] I believe that the greatest threat to perestroyka stems from the very real possibility of a consolidation of the Russian federation, from the creation of a bloc composed of the "united workers front," the national-patriotic forces, the Russian Communist Party, and the "Marxist Platform." It will be a very cohesive and disciplined bloc that will exploit market economy ideas and the deterioration of the economic situation and of citizens' conditions.

[Sergi] Will Gorbachev remain both president and secretary for long?

[Shostakovskiy] There should have been a clear distinction: The party post should have been relinquished. Because, like it or not, this way encourages party monolithism in the political system, which exists despite the new draft of Article 6 of the Constitution. The fact is that the party still retains its former monopoly position. The shift in power from the Politburo to the presidency is sketchy: Many of the decisions taken in Staraya Ploshchad, the headquarters of the cultural committee [as published], still have an enormous influence on the Kremlin and parliament. And the parties emerging now are still so small that they cannot have any influence on the process. It is still too soon.

[Sergi] You seem pessimistic about everything. And yet the rector of the higher party school is also a representative of the platform identified as the CPSU's enemy. At one time this would have been inconceivable.

[Shostakovskiy] I am amazed that I still hold my post. I know that there have been attempts to deprive me of the job in accordance with the Central Committee's decision, but the final signature is lacking.

[Sergi] How long do you intend to keep your CPSU membership card? Until the congress?

[Shostakovskiy] I have been a member for almost 30 years and it will be a very difficult decision. I will do it if the congress enters a blind alley, if it espouses the ideas of those who met in Leningrad.

[Sergi] Is Gorbachev not aware of this danger?

[Shostakovskiy] Neither Gorbachev nor the rest are aware of the real situation within the party. He definitely has detailed information, but these reports are still drawn up by the apparatus. The danger of substantial intellectuals forces' leaving the CPSU is definitely underestimated.

[Sergi] What would it take to stop you from leaving the CPSU?

[Shostakovskiy] A new party, not a so-called vanguard party. A parliamentary party with a high level of independence for the grassroots organizations; within which a real spirit of comradeship, respect for dignity, and pluralism prevail; and without democratic centralism. This is the absolute minimum.

Journalist on Law of Press, Public Opinion

90US0863A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 17, 28 Apr-4 May 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy M. Poltoranin, board chairman of the Moscow City Organization of the Union of Journalists, and Novosti political observer, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent I. Kabak: "The Fourth Power?"; date and place not specified]

[Text] *All activity in a rule-of-law state is directed by four powers—legislative, executive, judicial, and the power of public opinion as expressed by the independent mass media.*

For us the power of public opinion is just being generated. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent I. Kabak discusses how this process is proceeding with M. Poltoranin, USSR people's deputy, board chairman of the Moscow City Organization of the Union of Journalists, and Novosti Press Agency political observer.

[Kabak] Mikhail Nikiforovich, while we may speak about "four powers," in reality there exists only one....

[Poltoranin] Today when democratic forces have emerged victorious in elections in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and other cities, we see how the partocracy has become roused up which just yesterday was saying: "We are prepared to hand over power! And there is no one to take it!" But now that the democrats have arrived, the partocracy is striving to do everything it can to avoid handing over this power. An example can be seen in the events in Leningrad connected with transfer of the Leningrad State Publishing Agency over to the CPSU Central Committee, and of local television to Central Broadcasting. Permanently established structures are being destroyed so that the democrats will be unable to use them. And that's the way it will be in other places.

This is why we must democratize our society. The Supreme Soviet we have still reminds us of that rubber-stamping which underwent decades of fine-tuning. We see some flashes, we see some proposals from above which do not pass through, but, as a rule, measures are rammed through. Judicial power is in an entirely rudimentary state. Lawyers were underlings of the bureaucracy, like dogs to be set upon undesirables. Today the presidential authority—executive and administrative—looms like a mountain over these rather weak powers, and in its hands are organs of repression and military force. And if the fate of democracy and of the country is dear to us, if we are learning anything from history, then today we must begin to assemble the fourth power, at whatever cost, the power of public opinion expressed through independent, de-monopolized mass media.

Let us say that the Law on the Press comes out shortly and each citizen is able to publish a newspaper. If—according to law—censorship and the monopoly on the mass media disappear, any group will thus be deprived of the opportunity to manipulate public opinion. But the law must be bolstered by a material-technical base. Otherwise it will just hang in mid-air. We must establish the base on which the fourth power will rise. The Law on the Press merely gives a legal foundation to glasnost. We need a law on social organizations and creative unions which will afford them the right to be independent. The Union of Journalists must become one of the linchpins of the new structure.

[Kabak] In its present form the Union of Journalists is neither a trade union nor a creative organization. It affords nothing to the ordinary journalist. Will there be a restructuring of the Union itself?

[Poltoranin] The fourth power will not be created on the foundation of today's Union of Journalists. Like the party, the union is going through a very severe crisis. This should not be surprising—our union copied the entirety of party structure and organizational framework. It is no accident that of 90,000 union members today, only 7,000 are under 30 years of age. Our youth do not believe in this union, which is unable to protect them materially, morally, or politically. For this reason we established working groups at a Union of Journalists plenum. I head one of these which, by August, by the time of the congress, will present a new concept of the union.

The union must first of all be de-ideologized. Within the framework of the multi-party system, it will comprise Communists, Christians, and liberals. Professional interests must unite people.

[Kabak] Can the Union of Journalists protect its members from political reprisals—let us say if the editor of an oblast newspaper heads the oblast organization, and he is also a member of the obkom [oblast party committee] bureau? As a union leader he is obliged to fight for his people, but as a member of the bureau he cannot do this, insofar as he fears for his main job. The Noginsk story is an example of this.

[Poltoranin] Yes, the Moscow Oblast organization did not help the Noginsk newspaper. But the situation is different today, and the oblast organization of journalists is headed not by the editor of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, but by that very same Noginsk editor, Puchkov. He was elected at an

oblast conference of journalists but the obkom did not like it. The obkom found a catch—the absence of a quorum was alleged. They decided in the obkom ideology section to torpedo the conference decision, got "brown-nosers" from the rayon newspapers together and created an "action committee" to convene a new conference. Obkom functionaries convened it and conducted it in traditional style—you are to do this, and you must do that. I had to stand up and state—look out the window dear comrades, look at our world today! Why are you again permitting a dictatorship of those who ruled over us for years, set us one upon the other, and went about their business while we fought? Look—let us solve our problems ourselves, without outside assistance. That is how the matter was settled.

[Kabak] But doesn't the union first have to set things straight with the publisher—at least "free up" some of the money we are earning? N. Kruchina states in a PRAVDA interview—"we invested funds in the development of a printing establishment...." Whose funds?

[Poltoranin] They invested it, no doubt about it. But only after expropriating all the printing capacity established by the government based on taxpayer funds. Today when I hear—"We are investing party money," I say—"Nothing of the kind." You see, all the more or less powerful publications—PRAVDA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, and others are outfitted with equipment from foreign firms. But where did the party get the currency? After all, we pay our dues with "wooden" rubles. This money again was taken from the state budget. Everything which was earned by the journalists went into a heap under the name of party cash. The chief task of all soviets, therefore—the Russian and local soviets—is to hand the printing equipment over to the Soviet authority. The Law on the Press must be accompanied by other documents—a listing of state and military secrets that would lie on the desk of every judge and every editor, and a resolution according to which party publishing houses return to the government. Then these publishing houses will be able to conclude agreements with all parties and social organizations. Of course, a portion of the funds would go into the treasury—taxes, and a portion into the Union of Journalists fund.

[Kabak] It is not clear to journalists on what basis the publisher dictates to us where and how to spend the money we have earned. On what basis are salary scales established? The editorial office is a government enterprise and most likely has the right to independently dispose of at least its part of the profit. Incidentally, the most recent salary scale increase to workers in party publications has widened even further the gap between editorial "work horses" and the nomenklatura, who are confirmed by the publisher.

[Poltoranin] I see two signs of trouble in this increase. The first is the direct bribery of leading journalists. We say—look, here we are giving you a decent salary, so be so kind as to serve the apparatus faithfully, be a political waiter. The second disturbing point lies in the fact that they have thrown this bone on the eve of scheduled discussion in the Supreme Soviet of the Law on the Press—so that grateful journalists will not demand immediate adoption of this law. Then the law may be shelved indefinitely.

[Kabak] You have an unequivocal attitude towards the apparatus. Tell us, did you leave your position as editor of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, or did they "leave" you?

[Poltoranin] In principle it was by mutual consent. A new first secretary arrived at the gorkom [city party committee] and we were unable to work with him. I know L. Zaykov—he did not come in order to do something for Moscow. He is a typical leader with no specialization, one of those who command ideology today and agriculture tomorrow. They throw him into the textile or garment industry and have him take charge of it.

We have diametrically opposed views of democracy. I thought—if I do as he wishes—which I cannot according to my conscience—then the newspaper will fall and I as editor will fall in the eyes of the community; if I do not do as he directs, the tanks will roll over me.

[Kabak] What is meant by de-ideologization of the union?

[Poltoranin] With respect to de-ideologization of our profession, we have to get away from the stereotype—where a journalist is a CPSU member, the creative union is headed by a CPSU member, and any more or less responsible position in the editorial office is held only by a CPSU member. All the more so with respect to the board. It seems to me that under today's conditions we should have non-party people at the head of the creative unions, so that the "party line" is not weighing on them, so that they defend professional—and not party—interests. The same should apply to TASS, Novosti Press Agency, and Gosteleradio [State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting]—so that the mass media serve not the interests of some party, but rather the interests of all of society, so that they do not carry out someone's directives but act within the framework of the law.

[Kabak] The Novosti party organization nominated you as a candidate for delegate to the 28th Congress. We understand you withdrew your candidacy?

[Poltoranin] Voting took place prior to the elections as to what would be the platform of our party organization. The majority favored the CPSU Platform. Personally I do not support many of the provisions and goals in this platform. We travel along one road in actuality, and the platform shows other roads which have already led us into a dead end. The CPSU Platform is based on the three pillars of Bolshevism—dictatorship of the proletariat, one-party monopoly on power, and monopoly of state ownership.

Logically reasoning this out, I should be attending the congress to wage battle with conservatives along with fellow adherents, to save the party.

But in view of the situation today in our country, I am convinced that conservatives will again comprise a majority of the congress and they will fight hard for their principles. I do not wish to be among the delegates to this congress who make unacceptable decisions and provoke deterioration of the situation in the country. I cannot be a participant in our country's further collapse.

[Kabak] Can everything be that hopeless?

[Poltoranin] What makes you say that? Measures presently planned can help. Like always, of course, they are late—taking the state out of the economy and introducing market relations. Had these measures been taken two years ago we would not have dropped to our current level. It will be difficult for us, of course, but this is our only possibility for coming out of the dive. The government made an attempt through ANT to sell hundreds of billions worth of products that had accumulated in military warehouses, as well as raw materials, to purchase consumer goods with this money in order to somehow revive the market. I was involved with this issue in the Supreme Soviet and I know that it is not the machinations of cooperatives, as some would try to depict. This is a sincere, albeit clumsy, act of the government, which preferred to act through a "front." Our orders were already placed in the West for $35 billion of consumer goods. But forces interested in seeing perestroyka choke waited for the proper moment and contrived a provocative sensation. This is what I believe happened. But I am convinced such provocations will continue until such time as our methods of working with personnel change, until people are placed in key positions by virtue of their intellect and skills, and not because of their worth to the apparatus—people concerned more about their own well-being than anything else, and who are prepared to do anything to advance it.

[Kabak] What do you propose?

[Poltoranin] Less emotion, more common sense, and more action.

Bovin Answers Questions on 'View' Program

LD0905215690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1825 GMT 4 May 90

[Studio question and answer session with Yegor Yakovlev, editor in chief of MOSCOW NEWS; Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer; and Eduard Sagalayev, editor in chief of Central Television's Main Information Department—from the "View" program]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] ["View" host] and now, to continue our talk show, questions for Aleksandr Yevgenievich Bovin, please.

[First unidentified man] The Russian Christian Democratic Movement. The question is this. In 1981, in the philosophical encyclopedia, your article on socialism says that Marxism-Leninism will exert an increasing influence on social practice throughout the world. Now, in the epoch of the collapse of the communist system how do you regard your prediction?

[Bovin] Yes, evidently, it has to be reviewed now. Because the time in which we are living seems to be an epoch of crisis for Marxism and crisis for socialism and indeed for the civilization in which we live as a whole. But what will there be after this? For example, after the crisis of physics at the start of the 20th Century, classical physics (?was followed by) non classical physics. So perhaps it will be a case of creating a nonclassical Marxism of which we do not yet know. Perhaps the question may be put like that, or perhaps not. I just don't know this now. But if a new stage of history is resulting—it is very interesting. That's a fact.

["View" host] Another question.

[Second unidentified man] In connection with the discernible turnabout in our relations with Israel, the Arab world is accusing many international affairs journalists of this, including, in my view, yourself. Is there an element of truth in this?

[Bovin] Accusing us of what please?

[Second unidentified man] That this turnabout in our relations has been prepared by some international journalists.

[Bovin] That's true, but if this is the accusation then I am ready to admit my guilt. [laughter] From the very beginning I opposed breaking diplomatic relations with Israel, and from the very beginning I have opposed the non objective coverage of Israeli policies in our press and the bias toward the Arabs. Naturally, in my own materials, I sought to write what I regard as correct. And in this sense, they have reason to take offense at me, which, incidentally they actively do.

["View" host] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, there is a question for you here.

[Third unidentified man] I have a question which, as they say follows hot on the heels of this. Tell us please, Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, with regard to what you have said, what was and is the reaction of the diplomats and representatives of Arab countries to what appears to them to be the pro-Israel tone in your articles in particular?

[Bovin] Well, you see, in varius ways. Some write me angry letters, very angry. Others write less angry letters to other press organs and to their own and articles which criticize me. Others make various representations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—very politely by the way... well, in different forms.

But perhaps the most active ones, of course, are from our homegrown pamyat guys, who are already impaling me, hanging me, and shooting me—they write a lot of that there. But that is the normal political side of this matter.

[Unidentified woman] When Talleyrand was asked what he did during the epoch of the Jacobin dictatorship, he replied: I lived. What did you do during the epoch of stagnation?

[Bovin] I worked. [laughter]

["View" host] Your question.

[Fourth unidentified man] There is euphoria reigning in the country with regard to the work of the current Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shevardnadze and his team. Do you share this conviction? Have they not made major miscalculations of late?

[Bovin] Well, with regard to euphoria, I have not heard that euphoria is reigning.

[Fourth unidentified man] ...on the unanimous elections of Shevardnadze.

[Bovin] well, comrades, the fact that Shevardnadze was elected unanimously is not euphoria. He really has proven to be an exceptional person, and runs the ministry well, and in general, I would have voted for him, too. But this is not euphoria. Compared with the mask of Gromyko especially, Shevardnadze of course, the mask of Shevardnadze is much more sympathetic. As far as business is concerned, then, what... [changes thought] in my view, this enormous change which is taking place in foreign policy is proceeding successfully on the whole, but it seems to me that there are a few things—and this is my point of view—where adjustment is necessary for example, the same near East. It seems to me that we are lagging behind here. At the start, we broke off relations with Israel and almost everyone followed us, and now everyone has restored relations and we find ourselves bringing up the rear.

Take the problem of the unification of the GDR with the FRG and our position on the neutrality of Germany. This also seems to me to be an unthought-out stance. Here, too, as they say, we have reserves for various things and one can select a whole number of things. But, in general there cannot be such a thing as an ideal policy.

Your question proceeds from the assumption that there is necessarily some sort of ideal which you introduce and it works and there are no... [changes thought] This simply is not possible.

[Fourth unidentified man] Not at all, the point is that all the miscalculations and mistakes are as a rule discovered later and are then criticized. But you as a specialist....

[Bovin, interrupting] For example, I wrote about the Near East and the GDR and, by the way, about Li Peng's visit in critical terms when all of that was happening and I do not wait for it to end. Every journalist should put forward his demands, evidently.

["View" host] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, here is another question.

[Fifth unidentified man] The question is on the same theme. How do you account for the support given by the Soviet official mass media for the official Chinese version of the shooting of the students in Tiananmen Square?

[Bovin] This is very simple. My point of departure is the same as the official one. I consider that for Soviet Foeign policy there is no more important problem than good Soviet-Chinese relations. This is even more important for us than Soviet-U.S. relations. That is my point of departure.

But moving on from there I go, so to say, perhaps not in exactly the same direction. I consider that the point of departure should not make us keep our mouths shut and force us to keep silent on the subject of things which we, perhaps, consider wrong. And I try to say something. But the official position is more consistent, if you like, than mine and one may consider that if Soviet-Chinese relations are really so important for us, then why should we annoy the Chinese more over this. That is the logic of the official position. I understand it but I cannot go along with it as a man, as a communist.

["View" host] Another question.

[Sixth unidentified man] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, I have a question. There is Swedish socialism, Chinese socialism, judging by everything a Polish version is being created and a big future is being forecast for Islamic socialism. What is your view?

[Bovin] You know, when the father of cybernetics was asked once whether a machine can think, he replied that everything depends on your definition. Here, too, what is socialism? Evidently one can have some sort of very expanded definition of socialism in order to include Islamic socialism or Ethiopian socialism or Angolan socialism or, god forbid, Mozambican socialism. By the way, Cambodia also had socialism, if you put things in that way, or even communism. So, let us not expand the definitions to infinity here, but try to get to the objective scientific basis for them if such a thing exists. But we get carried away at times; when we are praised that is nice for us and we say that socialism exists there. Somalia praised us and socialism existed there; it ceased to praise us, quarrelled with the Ethiopians and socialism ceased to exist there. Such an approach has categorically nothing to do with the real state of affairs, of course. [passage omitted]

Leader Cites Rationale for Marxist Platform

PM0905160790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview on "Discussion Page No. 30" with Dr. of Economic Sciences A.V. Buzgalin, member of the Coordinating Council of the "Marxist Platform" supporters movement, by V. Naumov under the rubric "Pertinent Question": "How Many Platforms Do Marxists Need?"; date, place not given; first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Addressing an oral edition of the "Discussion Page," Moscow State University docent A. Kolganov rebuked journalists, saying: You have organized almost an information blockade of the "Marxist Platform in the CPSU." Is this so? PRAVDA published the document itself, and individual points of that platform have also been touched on in

a number of articles on the "Discussion Pages." As for the responses, they have already begun to reach the editorial office, and we are reckoning on familiarizing readers with them. But for now we will try to talk about the platform with the help of an interview.

Our interlocutor is Dr. of Economic Sciences A.V. Buzgalin, member of the Coordinating Council of the "Marxist Platform" supporters movement.

[Naumov] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, a few words about how the "Marxist Platform in the CPSU" came into being and who its supporters are.

[Buzgalin] The draft platform was prepared by a number of party clubs dissatisfied with the social democratic orientation of the "Democratic Platform's" leaders. A conference of supporters of the "Marxist Platform" was held in the settlement of Bykovo near Moscow 14-15 April and adopted the definitive version of the document, as well as a statement and a resolution on an open letter to the CPSU Central Committee. More than 300 people participated in the conference, representing communists from 54 cities in the USSR, 22 cities and population centers in Moscow Oblast, and Moscow. Many people are now coming to us at 15 Suvorovskiy Avenue and inquiring about our plans. It is also possible to telephone us on 222-32-98 and 444-53-93.

[Naumov] On which sections of society and which political forces can the party rely, in your opinion, in adopting this draft?

[Buzgalin] I will at once make the proviso that my opinion might reflect only approximately the opinion of the majority of its supporters. As distinct from the draft Central Committee Platform, which proclaims the CPSU essentially the party of the whole people, we understand that far from everyone will support the party today. Therefore, we seek to restore confidence in the party, above all, on the part of that section of the working class for which the possibility of working freely and collectively and being masters rather than hired workers is one of the chief assets. We will probably find support also among the democratically minded intelligentsia which is not in the grip of the idea of the full or partial restoration of capitalism. I realize that today, maybe, such a social base does not yet make the platform a dominant force. It is geared to the long term. But today it can already become one of the centers for uniting movements with a socialist orientation.

[Naumov] What might the purposes of such unification be?

[Buzgalin] First, the final and irrevocable dismantling of the totalitarian-bureaucratic system that still exists on the basis, in particular, of developing self-management in all spheres and turning public organizations and movements into one of the decisive forces in the management of the economy and society. Second, the reorientation of the economy toward the person's priority over narrow economic goals. This task will not be resolved by a market, and what is needed is a firm social and state policy in the economic sphere. Third, the policy of the population's social protection, of preserving free education and medical services, and of creating equal starting opportunities for young people. Finally, in the political sphere we favor consistent democratization and advocate not just realizing traditional bourgeois freedoms, but also directly involving in politics self-management organs in production and at places of residence.

[Naumov] As far as I understand it, this is an exposition of a program for improving the health of all of society. But what measures are proposed specifically in the economic sphere?

[Buzgalin] In the immediate future it is necessary to complete the dismantling of departmental monopolism but, at the same time, not arrive at an Asian-mafia market. We have to develop a democratically regulated market. What do I mean? Prices and the quality of goods are controlled by consumers' unions. The state and trade unions ensure guaranteed flexible employment, while specially created public institutes ensure mass control and accounting in the economic sphere. We also need a plan—democratically formed statewide programs for the structural perestroyka of the economy with strong economic incentives for their fulfillment. We favor the denationalization of public property by means of developing self-management in the public sector and progress in the collective and cooperative forms. We are in favor of public ownership's economically demonstrating its advantages over private ownership, but we oppose freedom to flush out the billions stolen from the people by corrupt officialdom and smart operators in the shadow economy. The chief thing here, as you see, is emphasis on specific mechanisms of self-management and self-organization, with whose assistance the people themselves will be able to provide themselves with food, clothes, and shoes.

[Naumov] Does your program for reorganizing the party coincide practically with the Democratic Platform?

[Buzgalin] Basically, yes. With the possible exception of those aspects that are not included in the Democratic Platform but are periodically proclaimed by its leaders in spoken statements. They believe that all who support its guidelines can be members of the party. What does this mean? Freedom for party members? No, a free hand for a group of professional politicians devoid of control from below. The party is turned into an organization in support of parliamentary leaders. Such a role for the party does not suit us. Supporters of the "Marxist Platform" see it as their task to consolidate CPSU members who advocate breaking the power of the party apparatus, most consistently realizing all democratic freedoms and human rights, and, on this basis, moving along the path of the socialist choice.

But only the congress can finally decide what the party should be like, what platform will triumph, and whether a split, the formation of factions, etc. are inevitable. To

decide the party's future in advance right now means striking a blow at democracy. Let the party members and their representatives—the 28th CPSU Congress delegates—have the last word.

Party Committee Leadership Role Viewed

90UN1638A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 2

[TASS report: "In the Struggle for Political Leadership"]

[Text] Any political party in society sets the struggle for power as its main mission. It is merely the forms and methods of this struggle which differ. What will they be under multiparty conditions?

An all-Union "round table" on the subject "The Party Committee in the Struggle for Political Leadership" held in the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences was devoted to the above and other questions.

The participants discussed problems of the party's transition to political forms of leadership. Particular attention was paid to the principle of democratic centralism, the interaction of political and administrative authority in production, and the criteria to which the present-day party worker should correspond.

"The party's struggle for leadership should be based on the social assertiveness of the working people," S. Rogachev, director of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences "Opyt" Research Institute, told a TASS correspondent. "For this it is necessary that people have faith in the capacity of the party organizations for tackling urgent questions of the economy and the social sphere. Only then can the communists struggle for seats in parliament, and the CPSU, lay claim to the role of society's vanguard."

Cooperatives' Officials on 'Illegal' Attacks

LD1005215390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1545 GMT on 10 May carries a 36-minute video report concerning the situation of the cooperatives. Two officials of the Union of United Cooperatives of the USSR, its president, USSR Peoples Deputy V.A. Tikhonov, and Vice President A.M. Tarasov, are interviewed concerning attacks on the cooperative movement by officials.

Tikhonov and Tarasov begin by describing illegal attacks by local party and soviet officials on the activities of cooperatives in Krasnodar Kray. Tikhonov says, "Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Party Committee, is quite straightforward about it and says quite clearly, 'what does the law matter when we are acting in the interests of the people.' His closest aide, Kondratenko, chairman of the kray executive committee, says that when it is a matter of the interests of the people the laws are irrelevant. That is the essence of their ideology."

A clip is shown of Kondratenko speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies, strongly condemning cooperatives and their link with organized crime. A report from Krasnodar shows how the local authorities falsified a case against a lawyers' cooperative alleging illegal activities by it. Another clip from the Congress of Peoples' Deputies shows Polozkov attacking the law on cooperatives.

A reportage from Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Krasnodar Kray shows members of the rayon soviet admitting they have violated the law on cooperatives in closing down a successful milling enterprise but claiming to be acting in the interests of the people. V.V. Grebennikov, USSR deputy state arbiter, says the law on cooperatives is not being enforced strongly enough by the state. Financial bodies, in particular, are not complying with the law in this respect.

Asked about the exports of tanks, Tarasov replies "Well, in the first place this country has had and still does have a successful trade in tanks. If you are referring to the ANT case, as far as I am aware these were unsaleable tanks that India had refused to accept. The factory needed to urgently fulfil the plan to receive its extra month's pay and bonuses. That was the factory's viewpoint. On the matter of this dirty trick, this machination which was clearly aimed against the government, it is difficult for me to say. Vladimir Aleksandrovich probably knows more about this matter as he has gone into it. Really, I do not see any great criminal matter here, for ANT did not sell tanks. We know this, we have conducted our own investigations. It does not buy tanks. There is nothing in any documents about buying or selling. Moreover, I know ANT was being paid money to disarm these tanks, to take the tanks away to convert them into traction units, to dismantle them." Tikhonov is then asked, "Vladimir Aleksandrovich, to whom was this necessary? Perhaps more is known about this in Supreme Soviet circles?" He replies, "You know, unfortunately, all of this is still veiled in deep secrecy."

Three of the managers of ANT are shown protesting, claiming lies and illegal treatment have been meted out to them by officialdom and virulent slander has been carried by the press.

Tikhonov comments: "What is of interest to me here, and I have not yet been able to find an answer to it, is: Who found it necessary to play such a dirty trick on Ryzhkov, to try to disgrace Ryzhkov, to force him almost to ask foregiveness for actions which he was right to carry out as the country's prime minister? Who found it necessary to play this out in such a way as to create a sensational scandal, to invite journalists to Novorossiysk in advance so the journalists were already in the mood and met this train and made these sensational disclosures?"

Obituary of KGB Staffer B.M. Klen

PM0905101490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 90 First Edition p 6

[Obituary: "B.M. Klen"]

[Excerpts] Major General Boris Matveyevich Klen, honored state security staffer, has died after a serious illness. He devoted all his conscious life to selfless service of the Motherland and the Communist Party, of which he was a member from 1952.

B.M. Klen was born on 28 April 1927 in the village of Aleksandrovka in North Kazakhstan Oblast's Leninskiy Rayon. After graduating from the Moscow Motor Vehicle and Roads Institute in 1949 he was sent to the state security organs on a Komsomol [Communist Youth League] pass, and there he made his way from the position of mechanic at a motor vehicle base for operations vehicles to that of first deputy chief of a USSR KGB subunit. [passage omitted]

[Signed] A group of comrades.

Wartime German Plan for Partition of USSR Outlined

PM0905101290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[L. Koryavin article: "What Fascism Had in Store: Commentary on a 'Third Reich' Map"—article is accompanied by map captioned, in English, "A German Plan for the Partition of the Soviet Union 1941"]

[Excerpts] This is the first time that this map has been published in the Soviet press. Now that we are preparing to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the victory over fascism, it is of undoubted interest. I found in the Library of Congress in Washington a number of sources—American copies, translated into English, of "Third Reich" documents. Among them was a map showing the plan formulated by Alfred Rosenberg, one of the fascist ideologists, for the partition of the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia were not to exist as such. A single entity was formed—the "Baltikum," occupied by German forces and governed by a German Gauleiter and Baltic collaborators. In general A. Rosenberg's "General Plan for the East" envisaged the Germanization of the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians to the tune of 50 percent. The other half—the "inferior population"—was subject to physical annihilation. [passage omitted]

Under A. Rosenberg's plan, there was to be a "wall around Muscovy," including, in the east, the Urals zone, controlled by the Hitlerites, as another important source of raw materials.

That was the "Third Reich's" plan, in effect drawn up by one of its ideologists—Alfred Rosenberg.

And that was the plan that was wrecked by the Soviet soldier who overthrew fascism 45 years ago.

Controls on Photocopying Equipment Relaxed

PM0905085190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[F. Ivanov report: "Photocopiers for All"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution repealing the controls by internal affairs organs on the acquisition, custody, and utilization of duplicating equipment.

This IZVESTIYA correspondent asked Militia Colonel A. Churzin, chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Maintenance of Public Order Main Administration's Authorizations Department, to comment on this decision.

"Hitherto our department, along with corresponding local subunits, has been empowered to issue authorization for the acquisition of duplicating equipment and to monitor its registration, custody, utilization, and sale. However, the recent USSR Council of Ministers decision simplifying the procedure for the acquisition of duplicating equipment has to all intents and purposes made photocopiers equivalent to any other commodity and, consequently, has made monitoring of them unnecessary. Any organizations and even individual citizens can now freely buy and sell them without asking for our consent.

"Unfortunately, we have not avoided some misunderstandings in this area. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree as well as the corresponding articles in the republic codes on statutory offenses—which stipulate administrative responsibility for violating regulations governing the acquisition, sale, utilization, registration, and custody of duplicating equipment—remain in force. This places us in a highly ambiguous position. I think that our legislators should review these obsolete documents."

Call for 'a Little Terror' Rebutted

PM0905141190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

["Political Diary" by Albert Plutnik: "Is It Necessary To Defend the President?"]

[Text] Agitated readers are still telephoning the editorial office—they expound their views on what happened at the May Day demonstration in Moscow and make different assessments of the quite unanimous opinion of the press with regard to that incident. I will not detain your attention on those statements that voice full support for those assessments or the conviction that slogans such as "From Armchair to Bunk," like the threat of "Ceausescu's fate," have nothing to do with a democratic expression of will, freedom of speech, or other norms accepted throughout the civilized world.

I will dwell in detail on the viewpoint whose supporters saw our position as a manifestation of the chronic habit of always rushing "with toadying haste" to the defense of the top leadership, even if essentially nothing threatens

it. Readers rebuke journalists with once again remembering their role as "assistants."

This seems to be the very time to think about the oddities of love and hate publicly expressed.

Something we have always had plenty of is inordinate rapture before the wisdom of our leaders. It is probably no coincidence that we are the ones who hold the world record in this sphere—mankind has not yet known such a cult as the one we once created to "our great Stalin." And all our leaders who have followed him into the highest post, regardless of how long they remained in power, did not simply manage to survive but were virtually doomed to nationwide admiration of their very great contribution to our prosperity. There was no need to measure out rapture in doses—people were always permitted to praise without restriction. We are well trained in this.

Quite frankly, we have rather little skill at saying anything but compliments to a person's face. We have not had such a tradition. Neither under czarism nor since. And now that it is coming into being, in my opinion some people are seeking to say in a fit of temper to Gorbachev everything that has built up genetically in the generations and that our grandfathers and fathers—and, naturally, we ourselves—did not dare to say to Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.

There is no denying that a great deal has changed. As have many, very many people. And so quickly. In a very brief historical period, you might say. Try to recall—within your memory or even earlier has there ever been discussion of the question of whether or not it is permissible during a nationwide festivity in Red Square or in any televised relay, or even at any poorly attended rally, to name the state's leader in a context similar to the one to which we seem to be beginning to get accustomed? Or was everything good then? Even at the time when all freethinking was removed with a red-hot iron, when human dignity was crushed like an earthworm, and when human life was worthless?

We seem to forgive no one the fact that they are the power. And yet we must still think about the way in which the servile human essence is more manifested—in an insatiable thirst to flatter, extol, and glorify leaders or in immense impatience to overthrow and take daring and embittered vengeance for yesterday's rapture.

It really is awkward to defend the strong. Still more so—the powers that be. But you would have to be blind not to notice that the fiercest attacks from both flanks are leveled precisely at those wielders of power who, on acceding to the government of the country, maybe for the first time in many years have not become featureless and not imagined themselves the inanimate tool of some objective will but who have been and still are living people subject to all the joys and misfortunes of life—fatigue, nervous stress, personal likes. But, for all that, they are infinitely devoted to the idea of very profound transformations which would finally permit this huge country to astound the world not only with its tremendous potential and shameful poverty, but also with a life worthy of its citizens.

Of course, I am far from thinking that we should return to the previous situation of the incontestable nature of the top leadership's every word and every step. It also seems to me that the president, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and other top leaders far from always adopt the optimum, opportune decisions and that they sometimes lack consistency and firmness in pursuing the chosen course.

But this is what I would like to draw attention to. Anyone who dislikes something in Gorbachev's policy seems to be ready to treat him as though the president did this alone. Without noticing what simply cannot fail to be noticed—the changed world. The new East Europe. The new attitude to our country, which has been cured of dumbness and awakened from the horror of the atmosphere into which it was plunged for so long, as into gloom. Chernobyl was not Gorbachev's fault. But the world's attitude to Chernobyl is to his credit. The earthquake in Armenia, unprecedented since the start of recorded time, was not Gorbachev's fault, but the world's attitude to that tragedy is to his credit. The war in Afghanistan was not Gorbachev's fault. But the end of our involvement in that carnage is to his credit. I could name a multitude of facts which apparently vanish from the field of view of those who are ready today to take up positions beneath anti-Gorbachev slogans.

Yet even these slogans themselves are to Gorbachev's credit. Previously no one would even have dared to think of such a thing—of new thinking on an everyday level. To say a word against Stalin? To openly reprimand Khrushchev or Brezhnev for their mistakes...? Previously all the best things that were happening were ascribed precisely to the leader. All the achievements, records, and triumphs. They were all achieved supposedly thanks to wise leadership. And all the defects, all the sins were readily explained away with reference to the unscrupulousness, stupidity, or cupidity of those who directly carried them out. In short, the blow was always deflected away from the leader. Now it all seems to be the other way around. People seem to be prepared to ascribe to Gorbachev personally every mistake, every miscalculation, and every false step. Or is this a natural reaction to the fact that in our country very great power is traditionally concentrated in the hands of one man?

Who would object—let different voices be heard, let everyone say what he thinks. But, at the same time, people do think. They compare yesterday with today. They remember, analyze, and evaluate.

No one, I believe, likes boorishness, ignorance, or prejudice. No matter against whom they are perpetrated. No one, I believe, likes threats, blackmail, or calls for violence. So should we disregard them and not react to them? Yet the latest theoreticians have already appeared, seemingly prepared to justify even terror. One

of them is USSR People's Deputy V. Romanov, a constant contributor to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, who, it is true, recognizes violence only within strictly limited bounds, saying that great terror is too much, but a little terror in certain cases is no bad thing. Only, he says, it must not be forgotten that "violence with regard to users of violence is historically just. But methods of terror are totally impermissible as a universal means of resolving contradictions within the revolutionary camp." As a universal means, i.e. fit for all eventualities in life, in the writer's opinion it might not be suitable. But it is no sin, as it were, to resort to it at some time. But who here will calculate faultlessly which eventualities are "right" and which are "wrong?" Who will accurately determine whether a particular eventuality concerns relations in the revolutionary camp or transcends it? Who, finally, can measure out a dose of terror with pharmaceutical precision—so as not to give short weight to anyone, but also not to place a little extra in the pan of the scales? This has already happened repeatedly—you have only to begin....

The USSR people's deputy also writes "about the distinctive nature of the present ideological situation in the country, when the illusory notion of the possibility of nonviolent politics under conditions of the new political thinking has arisen and is strengthening in public sentiments." About the fact that "such notions are a dangerous myth and a harmful fairytale.... All human history—at least, until now—has convincingly and graphically confirmed the immutable truth that the realization of urgent social needs and social progress are inconceivable without revolutionary violence, just as it is impossible to remove a malignant tumor without a surgical operation."

I would like to know what specifically is meant in this instance by a malignant tumor which should be removed. What forces? What views?

I would like to remind all supporters of such sweeping "surgical" actions of the words that Maksim Gorkiy wrote long ago, during the brief period between the two Russian revolutions of 1917—in February and October:

"It is criminal and vile to kill each other now that we all have an excellent right to argue honestly and to disagree honestly with each other. Those who think differently cannot feel and be aware of themselves as free people. Killing and violence are arguments of despotism, they are base arguments—and they are impotent, because to commit violence against another person's will and to kill a person does not mean and never means killing an idea or proving the incorrectness of a thought or the erroneousness of an opinion.

"The great happiness of freedom must not be clouded by crimes against the person, because otherwise we will kill freedom with our own hands."

New PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN Editor Introduced

PM0905135990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "At the PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN Journal"]

[Text] Yesterday Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, introduced N.S. Igrunov, the new chief editor of the PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN journal, to the collective. During a conversation specific questions of increasing the efficiency of the editorial collective's activity and of the perestroyka of the journal's work were also discussed.

Economic

Ministry Officials Explain Taxation of Foreigners

LD1005215590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] [Announcer] Managers of the subdepartment of taxes and tax collections of the USSR Finance Ministry Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Raldogin and Lyudmila Vladimirovna Mamet spoke today at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center. They gave a few explanations regarding taxes levied on foreign citizens in connection with the Law on Income Tax from USSR citizens, Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons.

In her address Lyudmila Vladimirovna Mamet said in particular:

[Begin recording] [Mamet] The new tax will hardly be popular with foreign citizens as in a certain sense it will worsen their situation here. If a foreign citizen resides in the Soviet Union for over 183 days in each calendar year he will be regarded as a person with permanent residence in the USSR for the purpose of taxation. This means that he has unlimited tax liability and is obliged to pay taxes from income, irrespective of where the income originates, that is to say, tax from income received from abroad and in the Soviet Union, from the combined income. If this citizen pays taxes abroad, the amount of tax paid abroad will be taken into consideration when calculating taxes in the Soviet Union. Any taxpayer has a right to chose whether to pay the tax in rubles or in foreign currency. If he receives income from abroad and resides here for less than half a year he is not subject to taxation.

Under Article 34 of the Vienna Convention diplomatic agents are exempt from taxation.

The next article, as far as I remember it is either 37 or 38, proposes that just such a tax immunity is enjoyed also by staff members of diplomatic missions.

[Unidentified speaker in accented Russian] To what extent is your approach to business in accordance with world practice?

[Raldogin] The new legislation is more adapted to international tax practice, although it still differs substantially at present. We expect that at the second stage of the tax reform our tax legislation and, correspondingly, the tax system, will be built virtually on the same principles which exist in most, let's say, developed countries.

[Speaker] CHICAGO TRIBUNE.

[Russian translator] Question from CHICAGO TRIBUNE: While the Soviet Union is trying to increase the volume of international business deals, especially the presence of foreign businessmen in the Soviet Union, do you think that these high levels of taxes will deter businessmen from coming to the Soviet Union?

[Mamet] I think that a certain rise of taxes in the Soviet Union will have some unfavorable effect on the income of foreign citizens. For a very long time the Soviet Union has been a kind of tax heaven for foreigners. We are too late in adopting the system which, generally speaking, all countries of the West have passed through. [end recording]

'Small Increase' in Industrial Production in Apr

LD1005152390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] According to operational data at the disposal of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, in April, for the first time since the beginning of the year, there was no general reduction in the volume of industrial output. On the contrary, a small increase was registered—0.40 percent. However, on the whole, the situation has not changed for the better over four months. Less industrial output was produced than in the same period of last year—$2.1 billion worth less industrial output was produced.

Statistics Chief on Transition to Market Economy

LD1005131290 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] The man in charge of statistics in the Soviet Union says the transition to a market economy in the country must be sped up in order to create a powerful system of economic motivation.

In an interview with weekly PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK, or GOVERNMENT HERALD, the chairman of the State Committee for Statistics, Vadim Kirichenko, said the radical restructuring of the economic mechanism has failed so far to solve the key problem of directly linking the incomes of enterprises and working people with actual economic performance.

According to Mr. Kirichenko, not separate breakthroughs, but rather balanced measures to introduce market freedoms and regulated economic counterbalances can lead to success in this sphere.

Soviet Aircraft on Sale at Hanover Exhibition

LD1005203990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 May 90

[Summary] Chuyko, USSR deputy minister of the aviation industry, announced at a press conference in Moscow today that this year for the first time the ministry will be widely represented at the Hanover International Air Show, which opens on 15 May.

On show will be the Il-96-300 and the Tu-204, which cut fuel consumption per passenger-mile by 50 percent, the Tu-155 which flies on liquified gas, the Il-76-L flying laboratory, the MiG-29 fighter-intercepter and the Ka-29 seaborne transport combat helicopter. Engines, equipment, new materials and technologies will also be exhibited.

"The heads of the country's leading design offices taking part in the press conference stressed that their main reason for taking part in the show is to sell their products. The task of satisfying domestic demand for goods can be tackled in various ways, said (Valdenberg), deputy general designer of the Mikoyan design office. One could demand that we convert to production of consumer goods, but one might also buy such goods for hard currency earned from aircraft sales. The latter option seems most sensible to us at the moment."

Gorbachev Adviser Views Economic Problems, Reforms

AU0405182590 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 4 May 90 pp 43-44

[Interview with Gorbachev adviser Nikolay Petrakov, by Maria Huber; place and date not given: "We Must Give Up State Ownership"]

[Text] [Huber] Everybody is waiting for the economic reforms in the Soviet Union to be accelerated. Now it seems that developments have been stopped at the recent presidential and federative councils' joint meeting in Moscow.

[Petrakov] To begin with, the Presidential Council has not made any decision. It is too early to draw any conclusions. The main problem is not acceleration or deceleration, but the question of where to start. At the meeting you mentioned, all speakers talked about the necessity of introducing the market economy. Thus the choice has been made, and we must not hesitate. What we are discussing is not what to do, but how to do it. In this respect, there are two clear positions and a few variants....

[Huber] Which are?

[Petrakov] Let me first point out a third position which continues to exist in our society. Some people do not want to have a market at all. This position is primarily being held by populists, above all by the trade union bosses. Following the miners' strikes last year, our state trade unions have been in a serious crisis and are now trying to present themselves as guardians of the people's interests to score a few points in the political game. They

say that the market will cause the people's situation to deteriorate. In addition, there are the supporters of the administrative methods, who are grieving over the loss of the Stalin-Brezhnev system. However, I do not see any prospects for the positions of these two groups.

But let me discuss the others who are oriented toward the market. Some of them consider a controlled and limited market—which means a 90 degree change. The other variant is the "Polish" model. Its supporters—who are also called recruits of the idea of market economy—are people who in the past always judged the market skeptically, but have now changed 180 degrees. That is a pseudo-radical position based on the idea that once the market has been introduced, everything will be settled overnight. It is the naive belief that everything can be settled by means of free prices and credits.

[Huber] With the transition to the market system, the tasks of the state will also have to be redefined. Who is dealing with this problem? The State Planning Commission?

[Petrakov] That is hard to say now. In any case, it is not only economically, but also politically wrong to hope for a sort of push in tandem with Poland. In Poland there is, first, private ownership in agriculture, and, second, people have been living with inflation for a long time. They are psychologically prepared for it. The prices in Poland increased fourteenfold, before the Mazowiecki Government took office. Therefore, the Poles let the prices rise because they are rising anyway, but they can at least balance supply and demand. So they have made the proper choice....

[Huber] You are talking about the Poles....

[Petrakov] Correct. This choice was made in a social consensus which has rallied between 90 and 95 percent of the people around the Mazowiecki government. On the other hand, we have an entirely different starting point. First, the idea of the market system is strange to us. I do not mean in terms of any ideological cliches, but quite simply our everyday psychology. The people believe that prices should be stable or should even decrease. They are ready to line up. Our opinion polls have shown that about 40 percent are in favor of food ration cards.

Soviet consumers are not yet ready to accept the market economy. We must make it clear to the people time and again that prices have to be flexible, that they do not depend on the government, but on economic laws, on labor productivity, on demand, and on other factors. However, most people believe that the prices are fixed by the state, and therefore, to decrease them, pressure must be brought to bear on the state. That is the result of many years of state control over the prices. The people in our country have learned that when the prices are high the state is bad, when they are low it is good.

[Huber] According to the motto that under Stalin, discipline prevailed, and prices were controlled?

[Petrakov] When Stalin died in 1953, the first action of the new government were drastic price reductions, so as to curry favor with the people. It was an alm in the form of prices, so to speak. Such gifts were continued. All our leaders said that the prices must decrease.

[Huber] Has the theory of alms now been overcome?

[Petrakov] We have become more flexible recently. However, the thesis that the people must not suffer any losses when prices rise continues to exist. Now the idea of compensation is very popular. The discussion on prices is accompanied by the constant echo that social protection is necessary, and that wages must be adjusted to prices. There are suggestions that compensation should be paid for higher meat and bread prices—which would, however, be an additional inflationary injection.

You cannot pay higher wages to allow people to eat meat. You must pay them for their work. We all get too little for our work. You do not have a larger apartment because you have more money, but because you have a large family. You do not spend your vacation in the south because you have more money, but because you are sick and therefore get a leave voucher. We only get between 20 and 30 percent of our salaries in money; the rest are social benefits. So, pursuing the course of compensation would not be the course of market economy.

[Huber] Should only the needy get some compensation?

[Petrakov] We must use compensation very carefully. It can only be introduced for the poorest; however, nobody knows exactly how many there are. According to estimates, there are about 40 million.

When we start introducing free prices, one of the most important tasks will be to control the money of the people, and to persuade them not to spend everything at once. I do not like such terms as "socialist market" or "socialist enterprise." It sounds like socialist sun or socialist sky. However, socialist inflation does exist. It is a deformed variant of inflation, because the state always thought that the best means to prevent inflation were price controls. In fact, this policy leads to rising prices, but not to a rising goods supply.

[Huber] You criticized the Soviet investment policy at the Congress of People's Deputies. What do you intend to do to change it?

[Petrakov] We must urgently introduce a rigorous regimen of thrift in our state budget; in my view, this should already be done in the second half of 1990. However, I do not have the finance minister's support in this respect. We should, for instance, freeze many construction projects without delay. This would not lead to unemployment, because the construction capacities are much smaller than the state's investment requirements. Moreover, the construction times are much too long. An object which in the West is built in two or three years, may take five or six years, according to our norms. Actually, it then takes about ten years before it is

completed. Therefore, we must rigorously stop financing a project if it is not completed within the envisaged timeframe. The construction sector must concentrate on objects that can be used soonest. That is a task that the state should deal with, for instance. Here the entire technology chain must be analyzed. We cannot freeze a coal enterprise in a given region and at the same time build a metallurgical plant in the same region. The State Planning Commission must correct its mistakes—by order of the president. The main problem is that we must stop pumping money into our economy. The second part of our investment policy is that we must start founding small- and medium-sized enterprises. This is the answer to the question as to why free prices cannot be introduced overnight....

[Huber] ... because a large part of the production comes from monopoly enterprises which fix prices deliberately?

[Petrakov] Exactly. An example: In Yerevan, there is a plant, the "Caoutchouc" enterprise, which is to be closed down for ecological reasons. However, being a monopolist enterprise, this plant produces a number of things that we would have to import for hard currency, if it were closed down. This has been discussed for at least three years, without the state and the government having taken steps to create new production facilities. Combating monopolies and creating competition—that is what the state is called upon to do. Our state is known to protect the people's interests. However, the people consist of producers and consumers; every working person is both. However, every working person is only half protected—as a producer. Therefore, I am an opponent of the ministries that are died-in-the-wool godfathers of the producers. The state should protect the consumers, above all by creating competition and by decentralizing enterprises such as Aeroflot and Intourist.

[Huber] These are relatively easy tasks. There are larger monopolists.

[Petrakov] Yes, but we must also fight against the regional monopolists. Enterprises must simply be prohibited from deciding that they supply the Moscow market, for instance, and no one else. The people are surely aware that the state always sides with the producers. Let us take private taxis. The state permitted them—but they disappeared again very soon. Why? Because the state taxi drivers wanted to maintain the supply deficit on the market. They considered the private taxis their competitors, and started cutting their tires and threatening the drivers. The state authorities were watching this without taking action. If private drivers had cut the tires of the state taxis, they would probably have been imprisoned.

Thus, we need an entirely different attitude by the state administration. The state must protect the interests of entrepreneurs and cooperative members and grant them credits.

[Huber] Is there already a concept for founding and supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises?

[Petrakov] There are concepts, and the attitude is changing. However, the main obstacle still is the monopolized investment policy. An example:

Two enterprises have, say, R1 million each for investments. The State Planning Commission, the State Committee for Material Supply, or the ministries may give one of the two enterprises material and equipment for R1 million, but they may refuse to do so in the case of the other one. The money is just blocked. So the center continues to control financial resources which do not formally belong to it.

[Huber] Should not half the ministries be closed down?

[Petrakov] I think all specialized ministries should be liquidated. It is no use only reducing the number of ministries, because they will continue to work as they have done in the past. The basis of their existence is the distribution of resources under the condition of deficits. Therefore, they will always be opposed to the market economy. The market economy must above all do without ministries.

[Huber] Is the state in a position to approve of a plan to liquidate all specialized ministries?

[Petrakov] The state property—or more specifically, the property of the ministries—must be converted into stock-holdings. We are planning to set up a state committee for the management of state property which will have to assess the operating means for their real effectiveness. Then enterprises will be converted into joint stock companies. The stocks of such companies can be issued in various ways. They can also be sold to foreign firms and banks. That will also facilitate the development of joint ventures which are still at the mercy of bureaucracy. If the enterprises become joint stock companies and want to have Western capital, they can sell some of their stocks to Western firms or banks. Whether they will then buy these stocks or not, is another question. If nobody buys the stocks of a given enterprise, that shows that nobody wants to have the products of this enterprise. Investment priorities will then no longer be set by the Planning Commission officials, but by the market. The forming of the market is a natural evolution, I think.

[Huber] Is there not the danger again that a correct concept will fail when the attempt is made to put it into practice? Many sensible projects have been decided which finally did not come about.

[Petrakov] Right. Here, radicalizing the reforms is the only way out. For example, in 1987 we decided to reform the banking system. Some new banks were founded. This measure was based on the idea of creating competition and giving the banks a commercial basis. Actually, they became even larger monopolists, because the institutes are very narrowly specialized. The agricultural bank, for instance, can only finance sovkhozes [state farms] and kolkhozes [collective farms]. Therefore, we need a totally different bank reform. What we need is a central issuing

bank and a system of commercial banks—in other words, a two-stage banking system as in the West. The Central Bank must be absolutely independent of the government. Those who spend money must not print it. Our state works like money forgers. The money consists of lottery coupons—it may or may not bring you luck.

Our main problem is stabilizing the monetary system. Once we have radically changed the role of the banks and the entire credit system, the Planning Commission will be jobless. Transferring power on the level of macroeconomy—that is the meaning of a real bank reform.

[Huber] The Planning Commission will not welcome such prospects.

[Petrakov] Certainly not. However, the market needs to have competition and hard money. It will not function without these two components, because the market is not just the balance of supply and demand. We could achieve such a balance by tomorrow. We know relatively exactly what prices are required, so that goods are in the shops and are sold well, and the lines disappear. However, such a balance does not make a market. What is important is the capital market, meaning the relationship between high profits and high investments. We could introduce balanced prices; however, if all profits continue to go into the state budget, the administrative system will continue to exist.

[Huber] What does the state's investment policy look like in practice?

[Petrakov] Let us take the development of color television. By the end of the sixties, we had the same technical level as the West. We have the Secam system, and we cooperated with France as an equal partner. Today, 40 percent of the television sets we produce are black-and-white. The quality of our television sets is much poorer than that of the French, the Germans, and the Japanese. What happened? Prices for color television sets were high because this was an attractive new product. However, the enterprises were deprived of the profits up to the last kopek. The money was redistributed for defense, space travel, relief for the handicapped—but not for the production of color television sets. The investment opportunities of this promising industry were excessively small. The enterprises still have to work with antiquated technical equipment. Instead of expanding production, reducing prices, and thus stimulating the market, we continue to produce expensive color television sets and inexpensive black-and-white television sets.

[Huber] So the system is advantageous for many, except for the consumers.

[Petrakov] However, we all, including the enterprises, are also consumers. To them, the system is advantageous in a certain respect. The director of a machine-building enterprise is a king when he talks to those who buy his products. He dictates the prices, the terms of the contract, and the times of delivery. However, the same director goes down on his knees before the producers of raw materials and semi-finished products. One and the same person: Now he asks for a certain type of steel which he wants to have delivered in March—and he can call himself lucky to get a different type of steel in July. A radical change will lead to the following scene: This producer will go down on his knees before the consumers and will ask them: "Take my machines!" —"But they are of poor quality!" —"I am going to improve them, but take them, please!" By the same token, he must be allowed to chose his raw material suppliers. Production will never be efficient if the producer does not have an opportunity to make a good choice of raw materials.

[Huber] There have been plans to leave part of wholesale trade to the market. However, the attempt has apparently come to nothing.

[Petrakov] That is a very big problem. We really must get used to the market. Cooperatives, too, will get an opportunity to buy whatever they need on the free market. Regarding the cooperatives, we started at the wrong end. Cafes and restaurants are mushrooming. But where do they get their meat and other foodstuffs? They must ask the state for virtually everything, or they have to join the shadow economy. A cafe buys meat in a state shop where a kilogram costs R2, instead of R12 on the kolkhoz market; they share the profit, cheat the controllers, and in the state shops the shelves are empty. We must create free markets for those who already live in a market economy system. That holds also true for the purchase of raw materials.

Summing it up: We must give up state ownership. In the system of state ownership, there is no relationship between the right to make decisions and responsibility for these decisions. That is the greatest sin of our administrative system. Private property belongs to me and my children, which means that it has a long-term basis. Therefore, those who have private property are always interested in increasing it. In this sense, social property does not have a long-term basis.

[Huber] In what way could you persuade the people to view private property in this way?

[Petrakov] It is hard to overcome habits. We learned for 70 years that private ownership is something very bad and encourages exploitation. We must start from a different position. Man must have the right to work as a wage earner in a state-owned or private enterprise—or to become a free producer of goods. That is what real freedom means in practice.

Minister Lemayev Defends Petrochemical Projects

PM0805090190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[R. Lynev report under the rubric "Viewpoint": "'We Are Burning Off Our Opportunity to Become a Modern Country,' Minister N.V. Lemayev Asserts"]

[Text] At the beginning of last year a question arose in the press, and in IZVESTIYA above all (No. 94: "One More 'Construction Project of the Century'?"). Although a specialized question, it nonetheless affected many people: the head of government, the scientific public, thousands of inhabitants of Tyumen Oblast, practically every one of us.

It was a question, let us recall, of yet another "construction project of the century," more precisely of a project to create five complexes in Tyumen Oblast to process a valuable raw material—casinghead gas, a byproduct of the extraction of oil that is flared off, not without harmful consequences for the environment and people's health. If comprehensive use were made of it, industry would gain new materials and rise to a modern level, the consumer market would acquire a mass of new goods, and these goods could squeeze crude oil in the structure of Soviet exports. It was with due regard for this that the government approved programs for the construction of the five complexes and the level of expenditure, part of which was taken on by foreign firms on the condition that they would be guaranteed part of the profit on sales of the future enterprises' finished products by way of compensation for the credits.

Everything in that project would have been tolerable, as it were, only the cost of the proposed construction work—R41 billion—plunged the group of scientists who sent the aforementioned letter to IZVESTIYA into a state of shock. Worse than that, in their opinion, the project would actually cost not R41 billion but R100 billion—against a state budget deficit of R120 billion. It turned out that the Soviet side—the hosts, to whom would fall the lion's share of the expenditure plus the strain on the environment—would have to bear the brunt of the risk in the upcoming venture, while the foreign partners would take most of the finished products and of the profits on sales of them. This was the belief of the project's opponents, who proposed using the billions of rubles not to construct new enterprises in the north but to modernize old, totally worn-out petrochemical enterprises. To judge from the mail, readers' sympathies inclined more toward this viewpoint.

The year since that publication has passed in arguing, in amplifying the sides' positions, and in checking and correcting calculations. Arguments have taken place at rallies in Surgut, in scientific circles, and at the Council of Ministers. Work has been done which ideally should have preceded the adoption of the government decisions, ensuring their reliability and validity.

What, then, is the result of this work? Have the project's opponents succeeded in burying it, or have its supporters prevailed? To resort to a sporting analogy, the former might believe that the score today is four to one in their favor: Of the five projects—at Uvat, Nizhne-Vartovsk, Novyy Urengoy, Surgut, and Tobolsk—four have been frozen. Only Tobolsk has held out, where the project is essentially a development of the already constructed petrochemical combine, although a number of questions persist with regard to it too.

But the project's supporters feel that they have scored a three-to-two win. They maintain that the remaining questions are not insoluble with regard to Tobolsk, Surgut, and Novyy Urengoy and that it is necessary to resolve these questions more quickly—"time is money"—and to seek a way of bringing the different viewpoints closer together.

To get away from the soccer analogy, let us explain here that all five projects were conceived under the auspices of four different ministries, including ministries that no longer exist: The Uvat complex came into being in the system of the Ministry of the Production of Mineral Fertilizers, the Novyy Urengoy complex in the Ministry of the Gas Industry, and the Nizhne-Vartovsk complex in the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, while only the Tobolsk and Surgut projects were substantiated and elaborated by institutes of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry. You may be surprised, but at the time the government adopted the decision on the five projects and on the expenditure on them the feasibility studies were not ready for all these projects. So it was not for nothing that the scientists were anxious, no matter whom this irritated at the very top.

The boss of two construction projects—at Tobolsk and Surgut—is the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry, a superministry which was able, on the whole, to defend its positions in the argument for the project. But tomorrow, when the combines at Surgut and Tobolsk have been constructed, will this not nonetheless confirm the rightness of those who today continue—like the economist and publicist O. Latsis, for example, in the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA—to warn that foreign firms will extract profits at the expense of the Soviet partners? And this will happen—he is echoed by V. Ivanter, another economist—by virtue of the fact that a Western businessman is better able to count up expenditure and income than our technical manager at either plant or ministry level.

Life teaches us, moreover, that ministers and ministries exist today but not tomorrow. So who can be called to account in five or ten years' time?

When I wished to ask N. Lemayev, the head of the petrochemical superministry, what he thinks about this, he himself began with—you might say—philosophical matters:

"I think about the fact that I had my 60th birthday last year. And I personally need little now. My granddaughter and great-granddaughter are another matter. What will they end up with as a result of our present work? What kind of air will they breathe? What kind of water will they drink? What natural resources, in general, will they be left with? And when I think about this, I ask: Who gave us the right to manage these resources the way we are doing today? What kind of economy have we created and are we building?"

On hearing this, I thought: He is a minister, but he is not devoid of emotion. However, the minister moved on from pure emotion to export and import data.

"Extracting more oil than anyone in the world, we sell one-third of it (with gasoline and fuel oil, this amounts to approximately 200 million tonnes) abroad. The oil itself at $100 a tonne, and the gasoline and fuel oil—they feature in our statistics as 'petroleum products'—at $150-200. At the same time we use this same oil to produce four to six times less plastics per capita than the United States or Japan—which, as we know, extracts no oil at all but buys it. We have a deficit of tens of thousands of tonnes for polymers such as polypropylene and thermoplastic elastomers. The picture is no better with regard to others. If radical measures are not taken, the deficit will have more than tripled by the year 2000. I will point out here that one tonne of polypropylene costs $1,030 on the world market, and one tonne of thermoplastic elastomers costs $2,730.

"What is the result? Our oil stocks are rapidly declining, and oil extraction is becoming increasingly costly. But we are spending more and more petrodollars in order to buy the products of that same oil. Thus, next year we must buy chemical products worth several billion dollars. But that is not all. Some petrodollars go to buy pipes, and oil workers need more and more pipes in order to work at all competently.

"It is clear that the oil workers will never have enough pipes—a vicious circle!

"It must be clear from this alone," the minister continued, "that we are in bondage. And we will be in still greater bondage tomorrow unless we take urgent, radical measures. What else must be taken into account? With the reduction in stocks an ever-greater amount of casinghead gas, which contains substances that have to be burned off or processed, will be extracted together with oil in the future. So, whereas 12 billion cubic meters of casinghead gas plus 30 billion cubic meters of atmospheric oxygen are being burned in West Siberia today, forming thousands of tonnes of harmful discharges, tomorrow the picture will be still worse. Again, unless measures are taken. Tobolsk and Surgut are only part of these [illegible]es. I also propose the following measure: to reduce oil extraction by one-third, leave this for the future, and channel the funds saved into the development of machine building and into in-depth oil refining."

"Have you put this proposal to anyone?"

"I have. Above all, to West Siberian oil workers themselves. There is something to think about here. Let us recall that the Japanese miracle stemmed precisely from petrochemicals. It was the petrochemical industry that made it possible to obtain new materials for car manufacturing, electronics, and technical progress in other spheres. But we are burning off our opportunity to become a modern country, forgetting that, by deepening refining, we could turn one tonne of the products that are flared off into consumer goods worth at least R15,000. Is this not a way to resolve the problem of the state budget deficit, the problem of filling the market with cars, video recorders, refrigerators, detergents, and fragrances? Is this not a way to provide garment and footwear workers with modern materials? Or take housing: cast iron pipes and baths, glazed pottery toilet bowls, basins, millwork—the civilized world long ago abandoned all this and went over to modern materials, including finishing materials. Without this we will not resolve the housing problem for a long time, we will not ultimately improve people's general social state, and we will not change their motivation to work. Yet we ourselves must at some time derive benefit from our riches! I would like the project's opponents to dispute it taking these factors into account, i.e. to take a broader view of things and of the world in which we live.

"It all seems true: The economic approach must not be divorced from specifics. But the technical approach, if divorced from the economy, is also blind and unpromising. How can we brush aside the fact that the world or, rather, the country where the project's opponents and supporters live simply does not have R100 billion to spare for even the most attractive project? Where are we to find R100 billion if we do not even have R10 billion to modernize petrochemical enterprises? In addition, the project's opponents fear, not without reason, that while reducing the number of protracted construction projects we will get bogged down in new—petrochemical—ones. And what would be the point of that? And, of course, the opponents are concerned about the prospects for the ecology in the region. Flaring is harmful, but are the recent discharge of phenol in Ufa, for example, and other accidents of that kind really any better?

"Let whoever calculated the obviously rounded total of R100 billion explain it," the minister said. "I believe that it is once again the result of a speculative rather than a concrete approach. And I say in turn that, with specific regard to Tobolsk and Surgut together, the costs will total $2.5 billion plus R5.5 billion. That is, together with the social sphere. True, now that a joint venture is being established on the basis of the Tobolsk combine, we must specify the proportions of the partners' involvement in the statutory capital and the output quotas on the foreign and the domestic market: in short, keep a balance of interests among all sides. I consider the chief point to be the fact that projects of such complexity and scale are nothing new either for us or for our partners.

"Wishing to avoid protracted construction and even to accelerate the project's commissioning, we intend to make the foreign partners responsible for the construction site's engineering backup. There are takers. Hyundai, for example, a major association of firms constructing very diverse projects all over the world.

"As regards modernization—and we do not take a detached view of this—in terms of cost and the scale of the work it most frequently turns essentially into capital

construction, because everything has become so obsolete. Account must also be taken of the fact that additional capacities are needed in order to ease the load on the capacities to be modernized. These can be created today only in West Siberia.

"And, finally, ecology. The Tobolsk project fully meets all modern requirements—this is the conclusion of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection. Questions partly remain with regard to Surgut. In both those cities people who openly and firmly supported the petrochemical industry have been kept in office by an electoral majority following very intensive debate. Why? I believe that an understanding of the fact that chemistry must be transformed from a violator of tranquillity into an ally and a support in resolving ecological problems has become a part of the ecological awareness of people in those cities, where petrochemical production facilities have been operating for many years."

[Lynev] "Everything is fine in this discussion except for one thing. Do you know what it is? Your opponents are not involved."

[Lemayev] "I do not avoid meeting them. On the contrary. I have met them repeatedly, heard them out, and argued with them, including the writers of the letter to IZVESTIYA. I am prepared to do so again and again. How could it be otherwise? In the economy, as in politics, there must be a place for debate and an opportunity to compare different options. The time when the play all moved one way is over....

"It would be possible to end it here. But would it be for long? Will not a new round of arguments begin tomorrow? Well, we do not close the door to them."

Foreign Aid Needed in Food Processing

904D0107A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy G. Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by TRUD correspondent A. Trushin; date and place not given; first paragraph is newspaper's introduction: "Businessmen Are Knocking on Our Doors"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the 1970s our country has spent about $300 billion in order to purchase foodstuffs abroad. We purchase virtually everything: wheat, meat, butter, and sugar, but the shelves of our shops are still barren. Is it possible to eliminate the shortage of foodstuffs in the near future, to put back in the retail outlets the high-quality sausage and ham which most of us have virtually forgotten, and spread butter made in our country on our bread in the morning? USSR People's Deputy G. Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, believes that it is possible. He told our correspondent A. Trushin about what specifically would facilitate this.

[Trushin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, what prompted you, the leader of a large institute of the Academy of Sciences, to get involved in matters which would appear to be far removed from your professional sphere of interests—international relations?

[Arbatov] The point is that for many years representatives of American business circles specializing in producing and processing farm goods have been approaching various ministries and offices with proposals that are advantageous both for them and for us. Having walked the ministerial corridors and become entangled in a web of bureaucratic instructions, they finally come to our institute trying to find support here. The Institute of the United States of America and Canada has many skilled specialists to review a particular project and provide an evaluation of it. However, hardly anybody has lent us their ear.

[Trushin] What specific suggestions have foreign companies made?

[Arbatov] For nine years now, the head of "Mooreman" Company Peter Marcy has been coming to our country every year. This company has an impeccable reputation in the international business world.

Marcy has offered our country his method of fattening hogs by using a special mixed feed with protein additives. I will give you several statistics which show the advantages of such feed: Instead of 11 months, animals are fattened within just three months, and meat is obtained rather than lard, as is the case on our farms. About eight fodder units have to be used in order to produce one kilogram of meat whereas only three to four are required in Marcy's method!

Moreover, the company itself undertakes to organize the production of 1 million tons of pork annually, that is, more than 2 billion foreign-currency rubles could be saved.

[Trushin] Why has this advantageous proposal not been accepted?

[Arbatov] This is what I don't know. We sent official papers to the Politburo twice: once under Brezhnev and once under Andropov. This is where they were buried.

Apparently, now is a different matter. When the president of the "Mooreman" Company came to the USSR again he was received by V. Nikitin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Foodstuffs and Procurement. Marcy talked and argued, he was supported by the vice president of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin, and V. Nikitin sort of agreed. However, he proposed to build a new hog breeding complex in Tyumen. To be sure, developed infrastructure and a suitable climate are also needed in order to take advantage of American technology. All of this is available in Belgorod Oblast, from which a request for the complex has been made. However, Comrade Nikitin turned Belgorod down, arguing

that in Belgorod meat is available, if not always, whereas in Tyumen it is not. However, is it hard to understand that with this approach the residents of Tyumen Oblast will never get meat anyway! After all, we have already tried on occasion to plant corn above the Polar Circle, and nothing has come of it!

Unfortunately, Peter Marcy went home empty-handed this time as well. I do not know whether he will want to come here another time.... However, what has struck the businessman the most? During the entire time of negotiations, everything was discussed except the actual organization of the endeavor. Every time, these meetings were with new people to whom everything had to be explained and told anew. Is this how business people who are interested in success behave?

[Trushin] We also import grain. So, it turns out that the bread on our table which is made from American and Canadian wheat also "smells" of oil and gold. Have there been any suggestions concerning this?

[Arbatov] In 1988, the American company ADM offered to sell us the secret of generating $10 in profits for every dollar invested through the comprehensive processing of grain. Regular wheat is turned into six types of highly valuable products at a small, ecologically harmless plant which can be easily built next to an elevator: first, there is flour, naturally. Secondly, they extract gluten from the grain; it is needed for baking high-quality bread. At the same plant, they also produce table-grade and industrial-grade starch. Incidentally, the latter is added to plastic bags which in this case are destroyed by germs within months and thus do not pollute the environment. Also, there is a fructose syrup from which they make a sugar substitute for diabetes sufferers. All over the world, this is what a majority of the people use because fructose is considerably more useful than regular lump sugar. At the same plant they produce ethyl alcohol. Perhaps few of your readers know that as a result of the ill-conceived introduction of "minor prohibition" in 1985 and the dismantling of some distilleries we have already been forced to import...vodka, despite the readiness of these same Americans to deliver to us a great deal of the goods we need in exchange for high-quality Russian vodka.

Finally, the by-products of processing are a valuable fodder with a high calorie content.

The cost of one such plant is $68 million, and construction time is 10 to 12 months. However, we must keep in mind the fact that a lot can be made in our country, and the cost will thus be reduced.

This project hardly fared better than the previous one. To be sure, in Krasnodar they attempted to do something, but later no money could be found, as is usually the case, and construction ground to a halt. Meanwhile, we do come up with $17 billion annually for the import of foodstuffs! We also find hundreds of thousands every day in order to pay sky-high penalties for the idle time of ships in our sea ports and for the cars that are not unloaded. After that, we also find money to pay for foodstuffs bought to replace those rotted or pilfered.

This year, like 10 years ago, we are once again signing long-term contracts assuming an obligation to purchase still more. Is it not high time to understand that by saving millions we lose billions and squander the national wealth of our own people?

[Trushin] Serious problems occur in processing products. What do the Americans have to offer us in this field?

[Arbatov] For more than seven years now, the Nabisco Company has been trying to get our industry interested in ready-made breakfast cereals. This breakfast or supper is very convenient: You pour the flakes into a plate, pour hot milk (a packet with powdered milk is enclosed)—and your meal is ready. On top of this, vitamins and mineral salts have already been added to your breakfast. Similar products are made of bran. Bran facilitates your digestion and removes cholesterol from your blood.

This breakfast in a package may be stored for two years without getting spoiled. It is tasty and cheap.

By now the Kellogg Company has signed a contract for building a plant for breakfast cereal production with the agrarian company Adazi with the cooperation of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada. This is to say that such cereals will soon appear in Latvia. However, one plant is definitely not enough for the entire country.

[Trushin] These offers look lucrative, but where are we to find money to carry them out?

[Arbatov] I have already mentioned the first source of financing. It is hard currency freed up as a result of reducing foodstuffs purchases.

Secondly, there are barter transactions. Marcy whom I have already mentioned is very interested in hides. Our country is the largest producer of hides. We have the largest herd in the world (it is another matter that its productivity is low). Between 30 and 50 percent of hides rot away at trash dumps. Other opportunities of this nature are plentiful. Potential partners are prepared to take urea and wood-processing industry waste, which we now burn in furnaces.

[Trushin] Have you successfully accomplished anything at all?

[Arbatov] We have developed a program for training Soviet farmers in the United States. After a short course of English, young couples go to the United States for one year of practical training. The expenses are minimal: the cost of instruction and airfare. Over there they become farm hands. They are given living space, food, and spending money. While working with real, cultured owners they will gain the experience of operating a farm and learn the technology of production. In the process,

preference will be given to young peasant couples who have earnestly resolved to devote their lives to the land and peasant work.

Are these difficult conditions? Definitely, but our path toward abundance cannot be simple. I am sure that on returning from the United States the new generation of farmers will feel that they are real masters of their land and will not obey anybody's irresponsible orders and instructions.

Please do not get me wrong: Americans are not altruists and philanthropists who are in love with the USSR to a man. They are first of all businessmen, and they see most extensive opportunities for commerce in our country and a boundless consumer market. Therefore, why should we not take advantage of the opportunities given us?

I will repeat that there are dozens of opportunities, whether it is the construction of storage facilities using the technique of the Butler Company which can be assembled within hours right in the field, next to what has been harvested, and which will securely protect the grain against rain and wind, or a meat-packing plant from which nothing can be stolen because there are no windows at all in the external walls, and the gate is the only connection with the outside world. Finally, new lines may be added to the already existing ones at our meat-packing plants; they will really ensure absolutely waste-free production! We may also arrange for the delivery of truly universal combine harvesters capable of harvesting wheat, corn, sorghum, and barley, and of being converted into a tractor or a self-propelled chassis if necessary.

[Trushin] Specifically who is interfering with the implementation of such proposals?

[Arbatov] Primarily the system of economic operations itself. I have become convinced that the government lacks resolve to see the transformations initiated through to their completion. We do adopt laws, if indecisive and imperfect, but we do not comply with even these laws! As soon as criticism is heard from either the right or the left, it is "reverse full steam."

The foodstuffs issue is impossible to resolve in the absence of a profound and well-conceived economic reform. However, a lot can be done right now, today. First of all, it is necessary to get rid of things impersonal. The people should know their "heroes." If a specific Ivanov, Petrov, or Sidorov caused an advantageous contract to fail he should be held responsible. If a particular idea generates profits, he has our heartfelt gratitude. After all, such has been the practice throughout the world for a long time. There is no need for major discoveries in this matter.

The following aspect is important: The hard currency allocated for the purchases of foodstuffs should not be managed by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations but rather by those really responsible for the supply of foodstuffs for the country: say, by a Council of Ministers commission, or the agroindustrial committees in the case of republics. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations would act only as a broker in transactions and maintain itself on commissions on these transactions. The advantage is clear-cut: If you sign an unprofitable transaction or buy unnecessary products—you are left without a salary.

Finally, we should have switched to a contract system and wholesale trade long ago. In the absence of this, tomorrow may be too late; we will forever fall behind the developed countries, and will never feed our country.

Scientific

'Krystall' Module Launch Postponed Again

LD1005123190 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] The Soviet crew manning the Mir orbital complex are completing the third month of their mission. At present Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin are busy unloading the unmanned space craft Progress which earlier this week delivered more than two and half tons of cargo for the expedition.

Meanwhile major changes have been made in the flight's program following another postponement, for next month, of the launch of (?a) technological module, Krystall. Experts say a delay in the use of the module may lessen the efficiency of the mission. As a result the cosmonauts may fail to produce millions of rubles worth of superpure semiconductors.

Scientific Work Aboard Orbital Complex Reported

LD1105082490 Moscow TASS in English 0718 GMT 11 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Soviet cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin have worked in space for three months. They have carried out an extensive programme of technological, astrophysical, geophysical and medico-biological research and experiments in the interests of various branches of the economy.

A few days ago, Solovyov and Balandin began unloading the Progress-42 ferry craft, which docked with the orbital complex on May 8. The ferry had brought fuel, equipment, foodstuffs, water and mail.

In early May, the cosmonauts completed a long-term technological experiment—a gallium arsenide monocrystal had been created, and began a new experiment of the same series, designed to obtain zinc oxide, another valuable semi-conducting material.

Using the Maria spectrometer they carried out a number of experiments to study the generation and proliferation of elementary high-energy charged particles in near-earth space.

Extensive work has been done to study the earth's natural resources for various organisations.

Visual observation from space reinforces instrumental measurement in a number of cases.

Solovyov and Balandin are now getting ready to receive the Kristall technological module—a kind of microfactory to produce crystals in weightlessness. Its launch was put off several times and is now expected to take place on June 1, so that the present crew will have time to start the space factory before the term of their missions in space expires.

Austrian Pilots Resume Training for Space Flight

LD1005164290 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—Clemens Lothaller and Franz Viehboeck, candidates for a joint Soviet-Austrian flight to the Mir orbital station, have renewed training today at the cosmonauts training centre near Moscow, following a brief leave.

Lothaller and Viehboeck arrived at the star town early this year to prepare for the flight scheduled for 1991.

The Austrian pilots are now going through a general space training period, the USSR Glavkosmos told TASS. The pilots are acquiring knowledge necessary for the next stage—the study of special disciplines directly associated with the space complex. They are also studying the Russian language and keeping in shape.

Immediately previous to the flight, one of the candidates will be named to participate in the eight-day expedition.

Soviet and Austrian scientists are preparing a scientific reserach programme for the joint crew. The vast programme will include remote sounding of Austria's territory and medico-biological experiments.

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station To Stay Open

LD1105071690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Today, the time limit expires for the cessation of operation of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station, which was set by the State Atomic Energy Inspectorate if the shortcomings uncovered there were not eliminated. These were uncovered one-and-a-half months ago during an over-all examination of the safety of the station. More than 150 violations of the safety instructions, technological discipline, slowness in the reconstruction of the power units, and so on were revealed. So, will the station be shut down today? No, our correspondent was answered by the State Atomic Energy Inspectorate. The station is working since both its administration and the ministry have eliminated the majority of the shortcomings uncovered. New monitoring time limits have been set only on some of the operations which demand a significant amount of time.

IAEA Project To Examine Chernobyl Aftermath

LD1005211190 Moscow TASS in English 2053 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[Text] Vienna May 10 TASS—A project for international expert examination of the radiological consequences of the Chernobyl accident was submitted at a news conference here today.

The news conference, oganised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was attended by IAEA Director-General Hans Blix and by the heads of a number of departments and subdivisions of the agency.

The purpose of the project, Blix said, is to carry out an international expert examination of the USSR-elaborated concept of safe living of the population on territories affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the breakdown at the Chernobyl nuclear power station and to estimate the effectiveness of measures being taken in those areas to protect the population's health.

The project is to be implemented in several phases and is to be completed by the end of the current year.

The work will be directed by the International Consultative Committee under the chairmanship of Japanese scientist Itsujo Shigematsu, director of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima.

On the committee are experts from Austria, Belorussia, Britain, Canada, the Soviet Union, the United States, the Ukraine, Finland, France, Japan, as well as the commission of the European communities, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the World Health Organisation, and the IAEA Secretariat.

About 100 experts will participate in the implementation of the project, which is to be started in the coming few days. Work is expected to be done in five main directions: to recreate the chronology of all events occurring after the accident, the confirm the scope of its consequences for the environment, selectively to verify the data provided by Soviet specialists and their approach to determining the ultimate permissible doses and values and the effect of radiation on the state of people's health and to evaluate protective counter-measures taken by the Soviet side.

Upon implementing the project, the International Consultative Committee will prepare an authoritative report that will be published and circulated through IAEA channels.

This work will serve as a basis for subsequent surveys, including those within the framework of an international research centre being established in the area of the Chernobyl nuclear power station on the Soviet Government's suggestion.

Provision is also made for special conferences in Kiev and Minsk where the results of research will be submitted for open and wide-ranging discussion.

Military

Veterans Return to Murmansk for Anniversary

LD1005162190 Moscow TASS in English 1542 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Vasiliy Belousov]

[Text] Murmansk May 10 TASS—"We are leaving in Murmansk not only part of our hearts but new friends as well," British World War II veteran Harold Hewitt, told TASS. Together with 70 other world war two allied convoy participants from Britain, Australia, Canada, United States, and New Zealand he specially came here to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the rout of Nazi Germany.

Allied convoy participants' meetings in Murmansk in May have become traditional. This time the meetings have been notable for particular warmth and cordiality.

Mr. Hewitt remembers well not only the Nazi-destroyed city in Russia's north where he as a staff member of the British military mission more than once received allied convoys.

On the victory day, May 9, 1945, he happened to be in the Red Square in Moscow and saw the jubilant people. He regretted that he did not take a camera with him that time.

This time when visiting Murmansk he videofilmed all meetings with Murmansk people and marines, a tea party near a soldiers' fire in the thick of the polar tundra, and a procession of many thousands of people towards the majestic monument to the defenders of the Soviet polar region.

The convoy participants left Murmansk for home by air today. Before departure they traditionally visited the internationalist cemetery where seamen from Britain, United States, Canada, Australia and Poland lie buried.

They laid red carnations at the monument in honour of the Commonwealth countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. This is the world's only monument of its kind so far. They also laid carnations at the snow covered rocks near Murmansk port where their ships with military cargoes for Russia had been unloaded during the war.

During a meeting with Soviet veterans, it was decided (?to) institute a special badge commemorating the comradeship-in-arms between Russians, Britains, Americans and representatives of other allied countries. The first awards will be presented during a regular meeting in the hero city of Murmansk next year.

Admiral Interviewed on Novaya Zemlya Test Ground

PM0305113390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, chief of a Navy directorate, by "our correspondent" V. Litovkin under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA"; date and place of interview not stated; first paragraph is introduction: "Novaya Zemlya: Northernmost Testing Ground"]

[Text] The existence of the nuclear testing ground in Novaya Zemlya has long been no secret, although extremely little information about it "percolates" to our press. How matters stand there, how the nuclear weapons tests are affecting the ecological situation of the Far North and the health of the people living there—these and other questions from our correspondent are answered by USSR State Prize winner Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, chief of a Navy directorate.

[Litovkin] Gennadiy Yevpatyevich, what is the country's northernmost testing ground like, what is the history of its creation? Not a single reference work contains this information....

[Zolotukhin] Until recently this information was a state and military secret and its publication was not envisaged, to put it mildly.... So, the testing ground was created in July 1954 by a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers. You do not have to recall the complex situation of those years: the height of the cold war, the policy of deterrence and the arms race it imposed. Nuclear missile weapons began to be created in our country. The testing ground in Novaya Zemlya was intended for testing these weapons, improving them, and "finishing them off."

Its dimensions: 750 km long and 150 km wide. It occupies 90,200 square km, of which 55,000 are dry land. I recall that the area of the entire archipelago is 83,000 square km. The northern island is a dense glacier, in area the largest in the country. Arctic tundra determines the appearance of the southern island.

I add that the islands were virtually uninhabited and were hundreds of kilometers from the nearest population centers. And the region of the tests complied almost ideally with the required geophysical, geological, meteorological, and technical and economic indicators. Suffice it to say that even today in wind rose terms—a very important parameter for testers—it is one of the stablest regions of the Arctic.

The distance from the testing ground's southern borders to Amderm City is 280 km and to Vaygach Island, where several dozen people live in Varnet settlement, it is 180 km. And the geological structures of the lands of the Northern hemisphere are so unique that they rule out even the slightest seismic effect on adjacent regions.

[Litovkin] You spoke of the absence of people. But the Nenets lived in Novaya Zemlya itself and Northern Fleet

ships were based there.... Some specialists assert that these islands are rich in minerals....

[Zolotukhin] Let's be precise. As for the Nenets, by 1954 there were only 104 families living at Belushya Guba encampment who had migrated there at various times from Pechora. In connection with the need to create the nuclear testing ground the Soviet Government asked Tyko Vylko to examine the possibility of their resettlement on the mainland, in their fathers' home. At a rally of the island soviet this decision was taken.

It was not a base but a moorage for Northern Fleet ships which appeared on the archipelago during the war. It became the basis for creating a settlement of testing workers. And the first Russian seamen arrived here back in 1870, on the ships Varyaga and Zhemchuga.

There are no industrial stocks of minerals there. Nor are there any on Kolguyev Island. There are small deposits of copper, zinc, and zinc and lead ore on Baygach but their development is economically inexpedient. All this has become an additional argument in favor of using the testing ground.

Its feature is that at the first stages of the tests on nuclear weapons high-yield explosions were carried out in the air (their altitude varied from three to 10 km). And there was also a small number of underwater, surface, and ground explosions. The selection of the altitude for the detonation ruled out high levels of contamination of the surface below. In the 30 years since tests ended in three environments the levels of gamma radiation from natural decay are now at the level of the earth's natural radiation background.

[Litovkin] But nuclear weapons tests, albeit underground, are continuing. Where is the guarantee that as a result of someone's negligence or for some other reason there will not be a disaster? People are worried that because of the testing ground the ecological situation in the Far North has been exacerbated. Are such fears caused merely by the lack of information about the real danger of the tests which are being carried out at the testing ground or are there indeed grounds for anxiety?

[Zolotukhin] I want to say frankly that we too are to blame for this anxiety—secrecy has left its mark on everything. Of course, even now the testing ground is not the place for a stroll, but we will resolutely rectify the situation and give people reliable information about everything happening there. I hope that our meeting is only the first step in this direction and will be followed by others.

But the testing ground is not to blame for the exacerbation of the ecological situation in the Arctic. It is the result of the technogenic facts of man's multifaceted and, it must be frankly admitted, thriftless activity in developing the resources of the Far North. The oil, gas, and metallurgical workers, miners, and geologists have "had a hand" here.... In brief, many departments have been involved. In my view it is not very fair, to say no more, to blame everything on the military alone.

As for the radiation situation, the monitoring of its state, both daily and during tests, is conducted with the use of special highly sensitive aviation, naval, and ground-based facilities. And this is by no means narrow departmental monitoring. In addition to the special services of the testing ground and the Defense Ministry, monitoring is carried out by posts of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the USSR Health Ministry, and various institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In particular, at the end of last year a radiation and ecological monitoring laboratory-aircraft carried out an expert study of the background radiation situation over the country's northwest territory along the Arkhangelsk-Naryan-Mar-Vaygach-Novaya Zemlya route at altitudes from 100 meters to 3,000 meters. A 20-mile zone in the islands from the Barents Sea side was also studied. Experts from the Defense Ministry, representatives of the center for public information on nuclear energy, and scientists from the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences Physics Institute took part in the work.

In releasing specific figures—they are accessible—I shall say that no anomalies in the natural ecological situation for which the testing ground was to blame were revealed. The scientists' conclusion frankly states that the testing ground in Novaya Zemlya is not ecologically dangerous.

But on its territory there are sectors with enhanced ionizing radiation, about one milliroentgen an hour. Those are the regions were ground tests were carried out until 1963. They are of course closed. No one is allowed there, inside the cordons sanitaires.

In individual cases when carrying out underground nuclear explosions the radionuclei of inert gases may sometimes be observed coming to the surface. But their number is extremely insignificant and has no serious influence on the environment.

And if we are speaking of safety guarantees? I fear that reference to our people's high degree of professional competence and their painstaking and comprehensive preparation and organization of work is not persuasive today. Everyone realizes that a nuclear explosion is a potentially dangerous experiment. Anything could happen. But I shall cite the following argument. I myself spent a total of about five years at the testing ground and some of my directorate colleagues have spent 10 years or more. Some of them have had children born and raised there. Incidentally, the maternity department on the archipelago is never idle. Every year 17-20 babies are born there. The testing workers' settlement has its own primary school, swimming pool, and club.... I am sure that if people's health were threatened by any danger there, it would ne impossible to lure them there for any money. Indeed, their salaries are not that high....

[Litovkin] Nonetheless, Gennadiy Yevpatyevich, how do you reconcile the very existence of the nuclear testing ground and the military's tests there with the idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe which our government has put forward?

[Zolotukhin] You know, I would divide your question into two separate ones. First. The nuclear testing ground is an institution, an establishment of the Defense Ministry. It has come to pass historically that the military exercise has jurisdiction over it. But nuclear weapons are the property of the country's government. Their verification, improvement, and testing—all that is planned by the government and carried out according to its resolution. And not only with a view to consolidating combat readiness but also in the interests of fundamental scientific research. The very subtle physical processes taking place during a nuclear explosions so far cannot be reproduced by any means other than under the conditions of a testing ground. It is no accident that outstanding Soviet physicists like Yu. Izrael, Ye. Negin, M. Sadovskiy, Ye. Fedorov, G. Tsyrkov, and others once worked in Novaya Zemlya.

About the nuclear-free zone. We fully support this proposal. We are prepared for its implementation, although it will cost us a very great deal. But frankly not everything here depends on us or on the North European countries extremely interested in this. Other states must also renounce nuclear tests. In particular the United States. Or at least agree with us to reduce them to an absolute minimum—including in terms of yield.

[Litovkin] And how do matters stand at the testing ground today? What are its prospects?

[Zolotukhin] Our testing ground has been "silent" since 4 December 1988. Its further fate is in the hands of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the government which—I am convinced—are no less concerned than the military with keeping the combat readiness of the country and its armed forces at the appropriate level. It is up to them.

Baltic Republics

Lithuania Receives First Gas Shipments for May

LD1005220190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 10 May 90

[Excerpts] Today marked the 22d day of the economic blockade. By 7 May the losses suffered by Lithuania's industrial enterprises amounted to nearly R20 million. A communique of the Lithuanian government on the economic situation in the republic points out that the first shipments of liquified gas planned for May have arrived from the Soviet Union. The necessity to ration this fuel remains, however. The communique emphasizes the need to map out the strategic lines along which the Lithuanian economy is to be oriented and to balance the new structure of the economy according to that. [passage omitted]

The state's antiblockade commission has held a sitting during which the minister of finance was heard. He presented information on measures to cut down the budget expenditure in the conditions of the blockade. The government proposals have been approved and it has been recommended to warn clients in the Soviet Union of the possible withdrawal of financing of construction projects performed by Lithuania outside the republic. [passage omitted]

Klaipeda Port Adapted To Receive Oil Tankers

LD1105105990 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 10 May 90

["Blockade Diary" by correspondent Roma Pakeninene]

[Excerpts] On 14 May Lithuania will be prepared to receive oil deliveries by sea. As is known, Klaipeda port has not been hitherto adapted to receive oil from tankers. [passage omitted] Now Klaipeda port is being transformed so that it can receive oil imports. [passage omitted]

A special oil export enterprise was build in Klaipeda 12 years ago. It employs about 350 people, but its area is equal to that of Klaipeda commercial port. It is headed by Martin Gusyatin, a Russian-speaking good Lithuanian. He arrived in Klaipeda 40 years ago. The Klaipeda export enterprise used to obtain one-third of its exported fuel oil from Mazeikiai. When the enterprise ceased production, and port renovations began, from 1 May fuel oil exports declined by three times. At present, oil is delivered to Klaipeda via rail from Russia and Belorussia.

The Klaipeda enterprise is the only enterprise on the Baltic Sea which exports fuel oil from the Soviet Union. [passage omitted] Because of the decline in fuel oil exports from Klaipeda, the Soviet Union has suffered great losses—about 2.8 million dollars per day. Today this sum has already reached 28 million dollars.

According to Alvydas Liaukonis, Lithuanian deputy minister of power engineering, Moscow is reacting to it with very angry threats. When asked why Lithuania does not completely halt fuel oil exports, the deputy minister replied that in that case, Moscow could apply even stricter economic sanctions. [passage omitted]

Lithuania used to receive only about one percent of the income from exporting fuel oil. But these sums used to be frozen in Moscow's banks. About 20 percent are paid for such services in the world. [passage omitted]

The question arises: Where will Lithuania be able to obtain oil from? [passage omitted] Leonas Asmonatas, minister of power engineering, says that this is a commercial secret. [passage omitted] We have succeeded in getting information from other sources that oil could be brought in from Saudi Arabia, Denmark, and North America. But so far not a single contract has been signed. [passage omitted]

Klaipeda will be able to receive its first tankers with a capacity not exceeding 26,000 tonnes. Initially, if tankers arrive, the Klaipeda enterprise will be able to receive only 1,500 tonnes per day. By the beginning of June, this amount will reach 10-11,000 tonnes. Meanwhile, the Mazeikiai oil refinery requires 16,000 tonnes per day for minimum operations. [passage omitted]

Oil Extraction Begins in Kretinga, Lithuania

LD1105000890 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] The extraction of Lithuanian oil was first started today in the Kretinga district in northwestern Lithuania. This borehole will yield 15 tonnes of oil a day. There are 26 boreholes in Lithuania at present which, if put into operation, will yield about 460 tonnes a day. This oil will be used to produce different lubricants which are most needed by the enterprises.

Vilnius Radio Carries 10 May Supreme Council TV Statute Debated

LD1005090690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 10 May begins carrying a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 0700 GMT the session starts its work. Deputies Bronius Kuzmickas and Akesandras Abisalas are in the chair.

At 0702 GMT Deputy Abisalas announces that today's agenda will include the TV statute and the appointment of general director, the draft labor law, and the regulations of the Supreme Council.

At 0703 GMT a proposal is made that Landsbergis make a statement on political situation and that this should be included in the agenda.

At 0705 GMT Deputy Sepetys objects to some articles in the TV statute, in particular to TV being independent and to the deputies having rights to make use of TV and radio.

At 0710 GMT Deputy Patackas stresses that TV should inform people about official political opinion.

At 0715 GMT Deputy Paliunas proposes minor changes to one of the articles in the statute.

At 0717 GMT Deputy Rudys speaks on the TV budget and its economic activity.

At 0713 GMT Deputy Karvelis argues that the main TV channel should represent government opinion.

At 0726 GMT Deputy Rupeika maintains that TV and radio should be an independent state office, and proposes several amendments to individual articles in the draft statute.

At 0735 GMT an unidentified deputy objects to deputies who are also journalists enjoying special rights to form public opinion thanks to their easy access to radio and television, whereas other deputies have no such rights.

At 0743 GMT Deputy Norvilas proposes amendments to articles in the statute concerning the TV general director's duties. At 0751 GMT a deputy (name indistinct) says that the statute should be adopted, bearing in mind the exceptional conditions of the economic blockade in the republic.

At 0804 GMT a deputy says that deputies who are also journalists should not occupy high posts in mass media.

At 0806 GMT Deputy Terleckas takes the floor. Details of his statement are indistinct.

At 0813 GMT an editorial commission is set up to edit the proposals received.

At 0818 GMT Deputy Stakvilevicius describes his visit to the United States and his meetings with American Lithuanians. He speaks of the favorable attitude of the majority of Americans toward Lithuania's cause, and conveys greetings to the Supreme Council from representatives of the Lithuanian community in the U.S.

At 0827 GMT a deputy (name indistinct) describes his visit to the Ukraine and favorable attitude of the Ukrainians toward Lithuania.

At 0829 GMT a Ukrainian Rukh representative reads in Russian a statement by Ukrainian democratic forces condemning the blockade.

At 0835 GMT the session adjourns until 0915 GMT.

Statute Adopted

LD1005114290

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0915 GMT on 10 May resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session. Deputy Abisalas is in the chair.

At 0918 GMT Deputy Abisalas announces that the editorial commission has not finished its work, and therefore the interval is extended until 0925 GMT. Music is then broadcast.

At 0928 GMT Deputy Liaucius reads amendments to the text of the Lithuanian radio and TV statute.

At 0941 GMT a vote is taken on amendments to individual articles in the statute.

At 0953 GMT the debate and voting on amendments continues. At 1034 GMT a vote is taken on the whole statute. It is passed unanimously. A decision on regulating the financing of Lithuanian radio and TV is adopted.

At 1039 GMT Landsbergis delivers a statement on the political situation.

At 1107 GMT Deputy Abisalas makes announcements concerning various documents distributed to the deputies.

At 1110 GMT Deputy Terleckas criticizes statements made by deputies during the debate on the radio and TV statute concerning the work of journalists.

At 1112 GMT the session adjourns until 1230 GMT.

General Director Nominated

LD1005141290

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1230 GMT on 10 May resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Session. At 1307 GMT Deputy Sniukas, candidate for the post of TV general director speaks. He pledges to discharge his duties, if appointed to the post, in an examplary and conscientious way.

At 1310 GMT questions are put to Sniukas concerning his candidature.

At 1324 GMT a deputy objects to the fact that Brazauskas gives his traditional interview every Friday, and says that this should be done by either Landsbergis or Prunskiene. Sniukas replies that this problem should be examined, adding that Brazauskas does occupy an important position and Landsbergis gives interviews on radio and TV sometimes three times a day.

At 1337 GMT debate starts on the candidature of Sniukas for the post of general director. Three deputies speak in support of Sniukas.

At 1403 GMT the session adjourns until 1430 GMT.

Labor Law Discussed

LD1005153890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1430 GMT on 10 May resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session.

At 1431 GMT debates on the appointment of the general director continue.

At 1435 GMT the candidate to the post of the general director thanks the deputies for their support.

At 1440 GMT discussion is held on next week's agenda.

At 1448 GMT a report on amendments in the labor law is made. Details are indistinct. The deputy making this report lists amendments to individual articles in the law. The text of this law is not read.

At 1511 GMT questions about the amendments are submitted.

At 1515 GMT the live relay is discontinued. The announcer states that the next plenary sesion of the Supreme Council will take place on Tuesday, 15 May at 0700 GMT.

Landsbergis Addresses 10 May Council Session

LD1105091890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 10 May 90

[Correspondent Edvinas Butkus reports on Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis' statement on the political situation in Lithuania to the 10 May Supreme Council session in Vilnius]

[Excerpt] Vytautas Landsbergis, Supreme Council chairman, said that the encounters of Premier Prunskiene in important Western capitals are a very important and a very successful diplomatic journey. In his statement on the political situation made at the Supreme Council session, Vytautas Landsbergis noted that the premier's activities succe[illegible]fully rebuff Soviet propaganda that Lithuania's st[illegible]ggle is allegedly harming the joint process of democrat[illegible]ation in Eastern Europe.

Kazimiera Prunskiene, said the Supreme Council chairman, successfully argues that it is essential to support both Lithuania and Mikhail Gorbachev. These matters are linked and only in this way can the process of democratization be saved and developed. Apart from this, according to Vytautas Landsbergis, Kazimiera Prunskiene has, with her presence and manner of speaking, rebuffed the Soviet propaganda line that Lithuania's policy is allegedly being formed by amateurs.

Everyone can now hear conceptual policy explained by precise diplomatic means, stated Vytautas Landsbergis. Thus real recognition is being earned both for Lithuania's government, for its qualifications, and for the whole Lithuanian political line, about which we never had any doubts.

Vytautas Landsbergis stated that after Kazimiera Prunskene returns to Lithuania, it will be necessary to evaluate everything and continue to correct Lithuania's political line, taking into consideration very important events in international politics, including a solution to the German problem, the summit in Washington, and the approaching second Helsinki meeting. Our main aim is to participate everywhere. All three Baltic states must strive for this, he said. According to Landsbergis, without the Baltic states' participation and a solution to their problekm, even now World War II will not end.

Meanwhile, Lithuania's position has been strengthened by new decisions in Latvia and Estonia, and demands among large Georgian public organizations to proclaim their nation's independence. We are all waiting, noted Vytautas Landsbergis, for what Russia will decide when its new independent Supreme Soviet meets next week. There are many intentions to cooperate with Lithuania and recognize Lithuania's political decisions, too.

Commenting on the blockade, the speaker noted that the situation is not easy, but people are demonstrating endurance and unity. [passage omitted]

Supreme Council Adopts Law on Radio, TV

LD1005172390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] The session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council continued its work in Vilnius today. A report on the political situation in the country was delivered by Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council. The deputies adopted a law on the status of republican radio and television. It says that the administrative body of this mass media is the Republican Radio and Television Directorate, which is accountable to the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian republic.

More on Law

LD1005185890 Moscow TASS in English 1825 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Vilnius May 10 TASS—The Lithuanian radio and television status was endorsed by Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies today.

According to the new status, it is a now state institution, accountable to the republican parliament, which appoints its general director.

Earlier, there was the Lithuanian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Committee, accountable to the republican government and the USSR Council of Ministers' Radiobroadcasting and Television Committee.

The new status disallows radio and television to have parties and political movements. The Lithuanian radio and television can independently maintain relations with relevant organisations of foreign countries.

Lithuanian radio transmits two republican programmes and relays Radio Moscow's first programme and the Mayak programme. Lithuanian television has one republican programme and retransmits the first and second Moscow programmes as well as the first Polish Television programme.

Commentary on Prunskiene UK Visit; Independence

LD1005153390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] [Announcer] Many agencies are giving as their main news today the meeting in London between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the head of the government of the Lithuanian Republic, Kazimiera Prunskiene. Our commentator, Aleksandr Malikov, will speak about this in more detail.

[Malikov] The two women, and I would like to add two politicians, spent 80 minutes in conversation with each other, but here one recalls that Margaret Thatcher has been involved in politics a long time, and has been involved seriously and creatively while Prunskiene is an economist who set off on the path of politics only relatively recently. So evidently it would be more accurate to speak of a dialogue between a seasoned politician and a novice in this business. Although on the eve of her departure flight from Washington to London, Prunskiene gave journalists to understand that even though she did not require the political advice of Western leaders, she had to pay careful heed to some.

In particular, the British prime minister expressed the desirability of seeking a practical compromise in Lithuania which would not undermine recent achievements in the sphere of relations between the East and West. Another piece of advice and wish was that it is necessary to find a solution acceptable not only to Lithuania, but also to the USSR. Both these pieces of advice, of course, do not exhaust the content of the whole conversation, but we are interested in whether or not the Lithuanian partner in the conversation listened to this advice, expressed in a pretty mild diplomatic form.

Some comments by Prunskiene in conversation with correspondents after the meeting with Thatcher hardly give sufficient grounds to speak of any kind of evolution in her position. Nevertheless, Western news agencies are quoting her words that Lithuania would be able to freeze laws adopted after 11 March, including the laws on citizenship, on border and customs regulations, on security matters, and on owning property on the republic's territory.

So as you see, what is involved, if it really is involved, are those laws that to a large extent are of a discriminatory nature and evoke fairly widespread dissatisfaction within the republic itself. In fact, I do not rule out that the mention of these laws is a kind of curtsey toward the West, or more accurately, toward France and the FRG, where Prunskiene heads after Great Britain. The FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand, in a joint message, recently suggested suspending the operation of various clauses of the Lithuanian declaration of independence.

In my view, the visit by Prunskiene to Western capitals, which became possible of course thanks to perestroyka alone, is somehow akin to shuttle diplomacy, but as distinct from the father of this diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, Prunskiene has so far earned no laurels for herself. Hence, evidently, the well-known contradictoriness in her own statements.

When she is recieved with restraint, she says that she is not collecting international support in the West, although it is evident that this is exactly what she is hoping for. When she is refused financial credits, she asserts that she has arrived not for money but for moral support, and finally when attempts to secure Western oil supplies fail, Prunskiene says that she does not need gifts, although she continues to give instructions to hold behind-the- scenes talks with the aim of relieving Lithuania's oil shortage.

All this lack of consistency and changeability in statements confirms the well-known truth that morale not fortified by practical ideas is a poor advisor. It seems to me that at present, the most dangerous thing is to persist in the mistakes already made, or to use the words of Prunskiene herself, to continue to derive satisfaction from one's own unyieldingness.

[Announcer] That was a commentary by my colleague, the journalist Aleksandr Malikov, devoted to the international aspects of the Lithuanian problem. In truth, the Lithuanian problem, in the fullest sense, is an international problem inasmuch as even when applied to the USSR, of which Lithuania is a part, the matter both of borders and on the status of the republic really is of international significance insofar as many peoples live in the republic.

After the well-known anticonstitutional actions by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which declared the break with the USSR, territorial matters also began to be heated up by certain Lithuanian figures. Various associations are being formed and claims of a similar nature are being made of other Soviet republics.

A TASS correspondent asked Doctor of Historical Sciences Fedosova, senior scientific staffer of the USSR Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to explain the situation that has arisen. As is known, she noted, the treaties of 3 August 1940 on the inclusion of Lithuania in the USSR, and of 28 September 1939 on nonaggression between the USSR and Germany have been declared void in the republic. If one considers the matter properly, this will lead to the rejection of all the territories acquired in accordance with them.

After all, the borders of present-day Lithuania took shape only after the end of World War II, at a time when the republic was part of the USSR. Doctor of Historical Sciences Fedosova stresses further that any national renewal carries within it the seeds of extremism, fanaticism, and xenophobia, which may acquire various forms. So even today, absurd claims are being made of the territory of others, particularly of Kaliningrad Oblast. It must be said in all clarity, Fedosova notes, that Lithuanian statehood with regard to many inhabited points on which some Lithuanian separatists lay claim is

secondary. The Great Lithuanian Principality included within its borders not a little territory with a population that was in no way Lithuanian, but these borders of 500 years ago have not existed for a long time.

Here it is fitting to mention the fact that the Baltic region's belonging to the USSR was fixed on Yalta and Potsdam, and also by the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which as is known, took place in 1975.

However, if one follows the logic of the Lithuanian separatists, one must proceed not only to a redivision of borders between the Union republics of the USSR, but also to rehashing European ones, and it would appear, to a revision of the results of World War II. All this, in the view of the senior scientific staffer of the USSR Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, may seriously complicate the political situation in Europe.

However, if Lithuania leaves the USSR and demands a rehashing of the borders, then internal Union borders should be resolved in the first instance. Incidentally, Fedosova noted, Belorussia already has presented its account to Lithuania and is demanding the return of its legal territories, which went to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic as did some Russian territories.

However, one cannot create independence at the expense of others, concludes Doctor of Historical Sciences Fedosova.

Lithuanian Communists Urged To Seek Talks

PM1005160590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy report under the rubric "Direct Link": "Ten Days of Anxiety Ahead"]

[Text] Vilnius—Data on stocks of energy resources in Lithuania are considerd secret, but recent press reports have revealed that they will be exhausted 15-20 May. What then?

The general mood in the Supreme Soviet is not to back down. As one of the speakers said: We will stand firm, come what may! The following forecast is also interesting: "The Kremlin could achieve four qualitatively different political results. First, it could destabilize the situation so that the Supreme Soviet and the government of Lithuania are removed by the inhabitants of Lithuania themselves, without help from Moscow. Second, destabilize it so that sufficient reasons emerge to introduce presidential rule and to replace the leadership of Lithuania by supporters of the CPSU Platform with the help of the Army. Third, replace the composition of the Supreme Soviet and the government with people who are more favorably disposed toward Moscow and who will make it easier for it to hold talks. Fourth, ensure that Lithuania's present leadership becomes more compliant."

Since the idea of presidential rule in Lithuania is very popular among the opposition, I will venture to surmise that it would be a lifebelt for the Landsbergis government. The tightly tied knot of contradictions is cut by Moscow's sword—and there is no need to either back down or seek reasonable compromises. The ousted leadership remains as great martyrs in the calendar of the struggle for freedom and receives carte blanche for any methods of struggle.

Incidentally, the idea was aired at a recent rally of the Saulis—a voluntary militarized organization (not yet armed)—that even if the government backs down and betrays the ideas of independence and freedom, the Saulis marksmen will not back down. So, to demand the introduction of presidential rule is like playing with fire in straw.

According to an official report, the disruption to the republic's economy caused by the application of economic sanctions is estimated at R19,996,000. This figure will evidently increase considerably if you take account of the fact that Lithuania has stopped delivering semimanufactures to other republics. Neighboring Belorussia is barely making ends meet in the production of refrigerators, for which compressors have stopped arriving from Lithuania.

The official mass media claim that Lithuania has withstood the blockade's first blow. The hope exists that it will continue to withstand it. If Lithuanian television reports are to be believed, Mrs. Prunskiene declared at a news conference in Britain that Lithuanian independence can be achieved within a year.

On the initiative of "Sajudis," people's diplomacy is coming into play to restore the disrupted economic ties. A challenge has been thrown down to all who wish to travel to Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and other republics to bypass the Kremlin and establish business contacts with the necessary enterprises.

On behalf of the Bureau of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, A. Brazauskas has sent an open letter to the USSR's communists. This document merits attention and, maybe, a commentary. Trying to justify the Lithuanian Communist Party's actions without reserve, the Lithuanian communists' leader levels quite serious charges at the USSR's political leadership.

"Yes, it is possible to make an ambiguous assessment of our actions. But let everyone answer himself—are the economic blockade measures taken with regard to the Lithuanian republic worthy of a civilized state? Is it really responsible to think that they can change the situation in Lithuania? Why is the harm that the blockade is doing to the working people of the entire Soviet Union being forgotten? It is not just a question of economic losses. It is also necessary to think of the moral harm occasioned to people by an intentional or unintentional attempt to accustom them to resolving complex problems by strong-arm methods."

Since the letter is addressed to all communists of the USSR, and I am one of them, I wish to share some views and observations. Maybe my other party comrades who live outside Lithuania will take note of them.

I experience the consequence of the USSR Government's economic sanctions to just the same degree as all the citizens of Lithuania. I would not call their consequences tragic. The blockaded counters of Vilnius look roughly the same as those in Irkutsk, let us say, during all these years without a blockade. Of course, everyday comfort is declining daily, and I would be glad if everything were to return to normal tomorrow. But I also cannot rid myself of the feeling that both the independent Lithuanian Communist Party and Lithuania's present leadership are beginning to reap what they sowed for so long and so assiduously. Everyone who so wishes can look up IZVESTIYA's file for January this year and find in the official reports on the visit to Lithuania by the CPSU Central Committee delegation and the general secretary words addressed both to Lithuanian communists and to the Lithuanian Communist Party leadership—words of warning that our history must not be torn up and that the Lithuanian people must be told the whole truth of what awaits them in the event of secession from the USSR. An explanation of the fact that it is nonsense to secede from the Union but to remain integrated in its economic system on the former terms will also be found there.

It evidently also needs to be said that no sanctions were applied to Lithuania until it announced its secession from the USSR and intended to guard its own borders itself.

Finally, would it not be logical to begin seeking mutual understanding with the USSR's communists not from somewhere afar but at home? With those very communists with whom the independent Lithuanian Communist Party yesterday constituted a single party? With the Central Committee that is under the same roof as the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee? It seems to me that it is important not just to agree on oil and gas, because they are not the greatest assets.

Lithuania has celebrated Victory Day. Not all of Lithuania and not all Lithuaniams marked this day in an identical manner. In Shalchininkskiy Rayon there was not a single house without a red flag or a village without a rally. Never before, according to Rayon Party Committee Secretary Ch. Vysotskiy, have people been so amicable, active, and united in their assessment of the past and the present. In the capital the parade participants were showered with flowers, and veterans were presented with bouquets.

But, at the same time, "catcall groups" hissed. Lithuania's Supreme Soviet was in session at the same time, having declared Victory Day a working day. This too was a hiss—a parliamentary hiss.

I believe that the Lithuanian television commentary was balm to the soul of some people (maybe even many people): "A closed military parade was held in Vilnius, and the public of Vilnius was not admitted.... Not even Pinochet in Chile after the coup would have dared to display his strength in such a way, but here there is such a cynical parade."

Victory Day, which is marked as a holiday on the calendars of many countries, was not, alas, a day of reflection on what is common to our destinies. Even though it has become neither less significant nor less important and festive for us—and that is a pity.

TASS Examines Lithuanian Independence Moves

LD1105092290 Moscow TASS in English 0844 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Vilnius May 11 TASS—TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun comments:

Judging by the aggravation of the political and economic situation in Lithuania, the actions of the republic's new parliament contradict the population's hopes and aspirations. Polarisation of political forces is under way in the Lithuanian parliament. It is now divided into advocates of more reliable ties with the Soviet Union and adherents of rapprochement with the West.

These differences, observers believe, were engendered by Kazimiera Prunskiene's trip to Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany. Sajudis political leaders are relying on this voyage of the "amber lady." The media presents it as triumphant recognition of the so-called independent Lithuanian state.

But no matter how hard the political "jugglers" from the new Lithuanian leadership try to convince the people that their option is correct, reality speaks for itself.

There are about 12,000 unemployed in the republic already. In spite of this, the leadership of the newly elected parliament continues to make generous assurances and promises.

Of course, apart from the difficult problems now facing Lithuania, it should not be forgotten that a large part of the republic's population still supports the policy of secession from the USSR. It is a pity that many rank-and-file Lithuanians still do not fully realise the crux of Landsbergis' policy, designed to restore capitalism in Lithuanian.

The people are being reassured and lulled by enticing promises of a better life, if Lithuania secedes from the USSR. There are also people who sincerely believe in the West's economic aid and support. This is drummed into their ears by deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the mass media.

What other evaluation can be there for the latest laws adopted by the Lithuanian parliament, particularly the law "on the restoration of the rights of people repressed for resisting the occupation regimes," which puts the country's real defenders on a par with occupationists,

criminal elements and bandits, who have gone down in the annals of history as "Forest brothers"?

Bourgeois Lithuanian nationalists, who loyally served German intelligence and supplied it with men who were trained as spies, agents-saboteurs, terrorists and then smuggled into the Soviet Union, are now being rehabilitated.

They include people who collaborated closely with the Nazis during the war, and also nationalists, who, in the post-war years, murdered local government and party officials, Soviet Army men, frontier guards and Interior troops, brutally put to death people who supported Soviet power in Lithuania. Already in the peaceful days they ruthlessly killed more than 25,000 people, including old folk, women and children.

Why did the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet have to adopt this law on the eve of Victory Day? I think this was done to reaffirm its negative attitude to the Soviet Union, to slur it once again in the eyes of world public opinion as an "occupationist" of Lithuania.

The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet apparently needed this law to bury in oblivion the achievements of the Soviet system in Lithuania, the republic's significant political, economic and cultural accomplishment during the Soviet period.

Historian Views Lithuanian Territorial Claims

LD1105070990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2300 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Now, respected listeners, we will attract your attention to territorial issues associated with Lithuania. After the well-known anticonstitutional acts of the Supreme Soviet of this Republic, which declared a breach with the USSR, a certain segment of Lithuanian figures have started to heat up all these territorial issues. Various associations are being set up which are putting forward claims of a similar sort to other Soviet republics. A TASS correspondent asked (Fedosova), leading research assistant of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the Soviet Union and doctor of historical sciences, to throw some light on the situation which has taken shape.

As is well-known, she noted, the treaty of 3 August 1940 on the inclusion of Lithuania in the USSR, and of 28 September 1939 on nonagression between the USSR and Germany, have been recognized as invalid in the republic. If one were to argue sensibly, Fedosova continued, this would lead to a renunication of all territory attained in accordance with them. After all, the borders of contemporary Lithuania were definitively formed only after World War II, when the republic was part of the USSR. Today, absurd claims on others' territory are appearing, in particular on Kaliningrad Oblast. It needs to be said quite definitely that Lithuanian statehood, in relation to many of the populated areas on which some Lithuanian separatists are making claims, is historical. The great Lithuanian principality included within its borders much territory with a completely non-Lithuanian population, but these borders of 500 years' standing have not been in existence for a long time. [sentence as heard] And it is also appropriate to note here the fact that the Baltic membership of the Soviet Union was established at Yalta and Potsdam, and also by the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. If the logic of the Lithianian separatists is followed then not only the borders between the Union republics, but also European borders will need to be redivided and consequently the results of World War II will need to be revised. All of this, in the opinion of the leading research assistant of the Institute of History of the USSR of the USSR Academy of Sciences, may seriously complicate the political situation in Europe. If Lithuania secedes from the Soviet Union and demands a redrawing of the borders, in the first instance internal Union territorial issues need to be resolved. Incidentally, Fedosova noted, Belorussia has already presented its bill to Lithuania and is demanding the return of its legitimate territory, which was lost to Lithuania as were some territories of Russia. One's own independence must not be created at the expense of others, Fedosova, doctor of historical sciences, concluded.

Article Cites Landsbergis' Actions as 'Illogical'

90UN1584A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 15, Apr 90 p 6

[Article by special correspondent Sergey Romanovskiy: "Game of Principles"]

[Text] Vilnius-Moscow—"The actions being taken in Lithuania have no basis in logic. They are being taken precisely at a time when we have really begun to tackle fundamental questions of the Soviet federation on a democratic basis"—these anxious lines from the president's appeal to the people of Lithuania reveal best that very bewilderment being experienced by our compatriots in connection with the Lithuanian events.

In fact the enactment "Restoration of an Independent Lithuanian State" seems to many people premature. Should we have declared our independence on the spur of the moment and have severed at a stroke all political connections which have been taking shape between our peoples over decades? But how to "believe the algebra" of the aspiration of the Lithuanian people to independence which had matured in these same decades and call it premature? Yes, the independence act is an illogicality. But there are more than enough illogicalities in Lithuania today. For example, in the press center of the republic Supreme Soviet foreign journalists pay for international telephone calls in dollars, but receive their change in rubles. At what rate of exchange the settlement is made I, for example, find it difficult to say.

It is even more difficult to understand on which exchange rate Lithuania, reports on events in which are ever-present on the front pages, is floating generally.

All members of parliament in Lithuania currently are for independence. Not one voted against the "Restoration of an Independent Lithuanian State" Act. It is only the independence itself and, even more, the paths toward it that the republic's inhabitants conceive of differently. This could, for example, be the path of Landsbergis—a fan of radical change and dialogue with Moscow "as equals." Or the path of Brazauskas—a supporter of compromise and endless negotiation. Each direction has its pluses and minuses, but the Lithuanian parliament opted, as you know, for the first path. "Brazauskas has continually to be pushed," a Lithuanian journalist acquaintance told me. "But the time had come to decisively make a choice, and we needed a Landsbergis." There are many radical ideas in the air concerning transformations in Lithuania, which sooner or later will have to be realized. But the question lies elsewhere: Perhaps the people need a leader who moves like a draft horse, but pulls the sleigh of state more reliably than a temperamental racehorse? The more so in that leisureliness and a carefully measured approach are in the blood of Lithuanians themselves and that hasty decisions are not to their liking. So has the right course been chosen?

Many inhabitants of Lithuania are unhappy that parliament decided the question of the restoration of statehood behind their backs. People believe that such serious matters should unfailingly be decided by the whole people, by referendum. But Landsbergis has a negative view of the idea of a referendum. He maintains that, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, a referendum cannot be conducted in an occupied country. In addition, inasmuch as Lithuania is inhabited 80 percent by Lithuanians, the results of such a referendum would seem to the professor to be known in advance....

But if Landsbergis maintains that Lithuania was occupied in 1940 by the Soviet Union, why is he not questioning his deputy's mandate obtained at the recent elections? After all, they also were held "under conditions of occupation." But no, Sajudis believes that the recent elections of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet were conducted honestly and democratically....

Landsbergis is implacable. To the question of a caustic foreign correspondent regarding a referendum, he replied approximately as follows: "Please finally understand that you are on the territory of an independent state. A referendum may be held in Lithuania today on entry into the USSR and the formation of a union with Poland or a federation with the Baltic republics. But how can a referendum be conducted on secession from the Union if we were never a part of it?" You cannot deny the professor consistency of his beliefs. True, many inhabitants of the republic think somewhat differently and consider themselves, as before, citizens of the USSR.

A 180,000-strong mass meeting of working people was held on 18 March in Vilnius on the initiative of the "Yedinstvo" intermovement and the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) Central Committee. Those who spoke at the meeting evaluated the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on the restoration of independence as a coup d'etat and called on people to boycott all parliament's decisions. It was decided at this meeting to create a structure of power alternative to the Supreme Soviet—the USSR Citizens in Lithuania Committee—which was done. True, many people have doubts as to the competence and authority of this committee today—it is being said that there was no plenipotentiary mandate for it. There are rumors that "supporters of Soviet power" were brought to Vilnius not only from all of Lithuania but from Belorussia and Kaliningrad Oblast even. The number of participants in the meeting—180,000—is being questioned also. Specialists have calculated that the square in front of the Sports Palace can accommodate only 58,720 persons standing four to a square meter even.

But good luck to them, to the skeptics! One way or another, the USSR Citizens in Lithuania Committee has been formed. It is composed mainly of former candidates for deputy from "Yedinstvo" and the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform), whom Sajudis "flattened" at the recent elections. They also have their own program geared to defense of the rights of Soviet citizens in Lithuania. True, hardly anyone takes the latter-day "parliament" seriously. K. Moteka, deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, treats the declarations of this committee with irony: "What persecutions of the other-language population are they talking about—there is no Siberia, no Laptev Sea in Lithuania. If these citizens feel that bad and are having bad dreams, no one is stopping them from going to their great motherland." But it is precisely the point that no one is intending to leave Lithuania, although the changes are frightening many people. The question arises: Will the rights of the minority in the republic be secured? If so, by what methods? As I have gleaned from conversations with people, no one wants this to be done with the aid of tanks. But even now it has not been possible to avoid the participation of the Army. Thus, as a surprise to everyone, airborne forces occupied a number of party buildings in Vilnius. Inasmuch as during the first days of the operation on the part of the military there was no comment about it, anxious rumors began to make the rounds of Vilnius. For example, there was a rumor that Lithuanian Television and the Press Center, where the editorial offices of republic newspapers are located, were next. "Just in case," the Press Center was heavily ringed by police. Foreign journalists, on whom the appeals of the Foreign Ministry that they refrain from traveling to Lithuania had no effect, stocked up on cigarettes and kept watch the night through at the republic Supreme Soviet building. It cannot be ruled out that it also will be occupied by troops. On 27 March the military took control of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee building. And it was only afterward that journalists acquired information shedding light on such unusual operations on the part of the military. They were informed at a press conference that Brazauskas' party was about to transfer a number of party buildings to other organizations. And that in order to protect party

property the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) Central Committee Bureau then requested that the military put these buildings under guard. Truly, property needs to be respected. No one is allowed to "expropriate" others' property, whatever the attitude of those laying claim to it toward the Communist Party and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. This is all understood. The question lies elsewhere: Why are two public organizations—the Central Committee of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform)—resolving their economic dispute not by the courts and arbitration, as is the case in civilized countries, but with the aid of decided intentions on one side and airborne forces on the other? The more so in that both in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the provisional basic law of the republic of Lithuania, neither is any longer a "leading and directing" force.

The business of the airborne forces and the guarding of the party buildings was, incidentally, a kind of exception. The leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) and the USSR Citizens in Lithuania Committee usually address to the military far more delicate requests. To scatter leaflets, for example....

The inhabitants of Vilnius are already accustomed to being awakened in the morning by heavy-lift military helicopters without markings flying over the city. The pilots handle the controls of the military vehicles far better than the canvassing work, to which they are unaccustomed: There have been instances of bulky packages of leaflets being dropped on the city unwrapped (one smacked directly onto the roof of the Lithuanian Communist Youth League Central Committee building, but there were fortunately no casualties).

People view the flights of military aircraft over the city variously. Some are calling this a show of strength, others the necessary presence of the Soviet Army in Lithuania. But N. Liventsev, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Youth League Central Committee, put it best, in my view: "I believe that the commitment of the military is a mistake. School is out here at this time, and you have seen how many children from the whole of the Union we have here in Vilnius. Political passions should not affect them. And, as secretary of a youth organization, it is distressing for me that grownups do not realize to what any provocation or chance misunderstanding could lead. I believe that freedom is dearer than life. But the life of a single child is dearer than any freedom."

Lithuanian soldiers, who left their units following the proclamation of independence in the republic, have become victims of the political game also. After the airborne forces had seized deserters in the Nauyeyivilnyaskaya Psychiatric Clinic, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet immediately adopted a declaration in connection with the actions of Soviet forces, which do not recognize Red Cross immunity. However, it was manifestly in too much of a hurry with this statement. An explanatory telex was received on 28 March from Red Cross headquarters in Geneva: "The emblem of the Red Cross represents protection stipulated by the rules of international humanitarian law only in instances of *armed conflict*(my emphasis—S.R.).... The International Red Cross Committee affirms that in this specific instance deserters may not be accorded any protection."

All sober-minded people in Lithuania today are trying to avoid confrontation. Landsbergis is trying to do so also, although his correspondence with Gorbachev—called by Western correspondents a "war of nerves"—will hardly become a part of the treasure house of world diplomacy. Each side is convinced that it is right. For example, it is of fundamental importance to Vilnius that USSR laws not have effect on its territory. Specifically, parliament appointed the Lithuanian foreign minister only after the latter had promised... not to abide by laws of the USSR. Moscow, in turn, is reacting extremely painfully to all Lithuanian innovations, switching unceremoniously from warnings to organizational conclusions.

But there is one further factor on account of which, in my view, the parties cannot understand one another. This is Landsbergis' self-deception as regards Gorbachev's actual aspirations. The professor for some reason believes that Moscow's uncompromising tone is by no means in keeping with the beliefs of the president himself. Why? Gorbachev is being pressured by conservative circles. And, what is more, Landsbergis is disposed to see even such a trifle as the absence of the president's signature from the decree of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the Lithuanian question as a "good sign." "True," Landsbergis adds, "the USSR president subsequently issued the edicts on Lithuania under his signature. Recalling them politically will be difficult." This is true. Although why, in fact, should Gorbachev recall his edicts?

I confess that all this talk of the "interpreters of Gorbachev" reminds me very much of some political game, whose participants are concerned not so much for the soundness of the chosen path and responsibility for the fate of the people as with an aspiration to stick to their guns at all costs. In addition, it has sometimes seemed to me that the new parliament is most suited by the role of a "sacrificial calf" which has to die under the hatchet of a ferocious neighbor. Obviously, some people would very much like to make a handsome sacrifice on the altar of international democracy and stun the world with their nobility and nonresistance to evil. The more so in that, regardless of the outcome, the political leaders will hardly be any the worse off. But is such a game appreciated by the Lithuanian people themselves, to whom the republic Supreme Soviet has still to answer?

Lithuanian Airlines Reportedly Sustains Losses

LD1005162390 Moscow TASS in English 1601 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius May 10 TASS—The Lithuanian Airlines company is sustaining losses because of the lack of passengers. The drop in travel is being attributed to the disquieting situation in the republic and the new Lithuanian parliament's declaration of the state's independence.

"Our company, which is maintaining lease relations with the USSR Civil Aviation Ministry, started the first regular international flights last year," Lithuanian Airlines Commercial Director Nazyryan Khusnutdinov said.

"A number of flights were in great demand. Extensive preparations have been made for flights between Vilnius and Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig, Warsaw and Varna.

"But our hopes have yet to come true. The Frankfurt am Main flight has been postponed indefinitely. The company is experiencing financial and economic difficulties, although it has aircraft, well-trained crews and fuel."

Lithuanian Leaders Interviewed on Power Struggle

90UN1636A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 16, Apr 90 pp 3, 8, 9

[Report on interviews with V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, on 10 April; A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, on 13 April; and M. Burokyavichyus, first secretary of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU platform) Central Committee, on 12 April; by A. Lugovskaya: "Three Conversations in Vilnius"]

[Text] **I traveled to Vilnius with one purpose—to meet the people who today hold the political, economic, and social threads of Lithuania. They have made their choice. An implacable struggle is underway in Lithuania—for power and for minds—and at stake is the future of the republic.**

"For Now There is No Dialogue...."

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Vytautas Landsbergis. A man whose ascent has been swift, just yesterday he was a professor, an expert in music, and today he is head of the republic and leader of "Sajudis." Aware that the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council does not regard journalists from Moscow with favor, I nonetheless made a request for a meeting. There were tedious hours of waiting in the reception room and the evasive answers of the assistant: "I do not know, I do not know...." And finally a fleeting conversation with Landsbergis, who was hurrying to a press conference: "We will meet, but it will probably be tonight...." And a glance—partly past me and partly through me. Our conversation in the parliamentary office was official, businesslike, and it ended... after 0100. I will remember another conversation, three days later, for a long time. At the request of the chairman I brought the prepared article, again went through the hours-long process of being kept waiting in the reception room, and finally in confusion I heard Landsbergis say, "I have no time, but you keep 'plaguing' me. Do you think you are the center of the universe? Frankly I doubt that the article will appear in the press." Understanding that I represent "the oppressive capital," I nonetheless did not let his comment go unanswered: "It seems to me that the head of the Lithuanian parliament would have proper manners." And with that we parted.

[Lugovskaya] Why does Lithuania, which has already declared its independence unilaterally, need negotiations with the USSR?

[Landsbergis] To settle problems which otherwise could not be settled. We implemented a whole package of multilateral ties which should have been subject to radical perestroyka. But they did not come under the influence of perestroyka because of the central administration's lack of interest. So then we took the political step that freed our hands in the political sense. And now we can carry out perestroyka both at home and in our relations with the Soviet Union. We need to make horizontal contacts in economics, market relations, and independent policy, and direct ties with the world.

[Lugovskaya] But Lithuania will have the same opportunity if it is part of a USSR based on new federative or confederative principles. Or does your political step signify a full and final break?

[Landsbergis] We have declared the restoration of the republic of Lithuania's political independence, which existed before 1940 and Stalin's occupation—this is what our political step signifies. And we intend to restructure relations with the USSR based on principles that are mutually profitable for two independent, neighboring states that have close contacts as a result of tradition and their geopolitical situation.

[Lugovskaya] Does it not seem to you that the legislative acts adopted so demonstratively by the parliament of Lithuania have made negotiations impossible from the very start?

[Landsbergis] It does not seem that way to me, although the Soviet Union has said as much to us. We explain this the same way that it is sometimes explained in Moscow today as well—the USSR "overreacted." The Third Congress of People's Deputies passed its decision at a time when emotions ruled over reason. To some degree the deputies have put the leadership of the Soviet Union in an unprofitable, constrained position as well. But there is no such thing as a hopeless situation.

[Lugovskaya] A few of your statements in the Lithuanian parliament in reference to USSR President Gorbachev—"....a dictator trying to drive Lithuania into a corner, a man of the past...."—lead one to suppose that in the event of negotiations your personal contacts and the search for mutual understanding will be made more difficult. Have you taken this into consideration against such an event?

[Landsbergis] Yes, I take it into consideration. Especially in a deliberate reinterpretation such as yours where a question I have raised is repeated back in the form of an answer. In my statement, it was specifically a question: What will Mikhail Gorbachev be—a man of the past or of the future? It was only a question, and his actions will provide the answer.

[Lugovskaya] I am speaking in terms of the contradictions of your own statements: In a personal telegram you appeal to the president of the USSR as to a man of democratic convictions, and then you immediately give quite different assessments.

[Landsbergis] I have to give assessments and discuss both the situation and the statements of the president of the USSR. And they contain words that are insulting to a whole people and the leadership they have elected. I could give you quotes. It has been said that we are madmen here, destroying our people. But because of this sort of thing would it look better to do things the old ways? We cannot help but discuss everything, including the fate of the Soviet Union, our neighbor, possibilities for its evolution—to the right and backward to Stalinism, or forward to progress, to liberating the peoples of the republics, to perestroyka of the USSR. We spoke openly about this one-to-one and a half years ago: At meetings, in the press, and at congresses of USSR people's deputies. We also spoke about the prospects for perestroyka of the USSR within an association of independent states—at the time they did not want to talk about that subject. It is true that they are beginning to talk about it now, but it is very late. They themselves understand that it is late, but they blame those who have dared to take a step forward. They call us foolhardy and adventurists. But a bit of self-criticism would not hurt them.

[Lugovskaya] No one could possibly be suspected of slowing down the process of perestroyka. I do not believe that it is in the interests of President Gorbachev himself, who was laid the foundations of perestroyka, or of the new USSR parliament....

[Landsbergis] Nonetheless, the process is being slowed down there, possibly under pressure from the right. We certainly have not been making any such demands on our side.

[Lugovskaya] But you will not deny that under the present circumstances the Soviet Union has interests in Lithuania and Lithuania has interests in the Soviet Union. Does that mean that negotiations are unavoidable?

[Landsbergis] You judge correctly. Tell that to anyone you can in Moscow. Right now they are avoiding a dialogue. For example, take the recent meeting of our delegation with A.N. Yakovlev. It was not advertised, but it was sufficiently official—people were there whom we had authorized. We did not pin all our hopes on it, but we looked upon it as the beginning of movement. Moscow presented it to Washington in a favorable light too, but now Moscow contends that it was an insignificant meeting with some kind of private persons, in the course of which they told "representatives of the Lithuanian public" what they should be thinking about.

[Lugovskaya] Why will the Lithuanian parliament not return to its original position and revoke the legislative acts that contradict the USSR Constitution?

[Landsbergis] We are not being presented with just any conditions, but with deliberately impossible ones. That is, that we must renounce the independence we have proclaimed. Forgive me for such a comparison, but it is as though a man leaves a jail where he was placed without grounds, illegally, and they say to him that he was wrong to leave on his own. They say, "Come on, go back there and admit that you were there legally, and we will think a bit, and perhaps then we will let you go."

[Lugovskaya] I know that as a youth you were a well-known chess player in the republic. As a result, I will also phrase my question as an analogy: If you examine the current situation with regard to the arrangement of all the forces, like a chess match, are you playing correctly? Do not you personally, respected chairman of the Supreme Council, bear special responsibility?

[Landsbergis] You overestimate me when you say that I am playing a chess match. There is a habit, especially in the eastern part of Europe, to exaggerate the importance of the personality who is in the public eye owing to some circumstance. What has happened in Lithuania has genuinely sprung from the people. This also includes the movement "Sajudis"—its program, the evolution of that program, its victory at the elections—none of that was accidental. And the decisions made by the parliament on 11 March crowned the aspiration of the people, both political and moral. Indeed, an independent republic of Lithuania existed de jure all these years, because almost none of the democratic states recognized the annexation of Lithuania by the Soviet Union. The duty has fallen to us of giving form to these aspirations, efficiently coordinating as far as possible the legislative acts and their consistency, and coordinating them with the legal existence of an independent Lithuania. And if you think that the parliament thought up all this or that I personally have "played" such a game, then you are mistaken.

[Lugovskaya] Not at all. I am talking about realities. I do not know, perhaps here in Lithuania you see events and the possibility for negotiations differently, but many people have the impression of an impasse—and you are aware of this. I had the opportunity to talk both with Lithuanians and with representatives of other nationalities, and I sensed their concern and uncertainty about the future. Everything is unsteady. They are afraid that there will be no place for them in Lithuania's future. What is to be done?

[Landsbergis] What is to be done? I can only assure them that there will be a future. Indeed, a portion of the non-Lithuanians is finding itself in the difficult position of defining and realizing itself. It is easier for the Lithuanians in this respect—they know what they want and what they are prepared to sacrifice. And they are the

majority. But even the non-Lithuanian minority is not homogeneous—according to polls, more than half of them are with us.

[Lugovskaya] What is your opinion of the fact that many states, including your nearest neighbors, do not recognize you?

[Landsbergis] Everyone recognizes the legality of it. It would be more accurate to say that Lithuania has not yet established diplomatic relations with a given government. A number of states declared immediately that they had recognized Lithuania long ago, back in the twenties: Canada, Australia, the Scandinavian countries, and France, never mind the United States of America. And I should explain that Lithuanian independence was declared in 1918, but recognition "went on" for several years after that. In view of this, the current several weeks would not trouble us especially if it were not for the daily threat of violence.

[Lugovskaya] But everything is so peaceful here....

[Landsbergis] Indeed, everything is peaceful so long as you only walk about Vilnius. But if you sit in Moscow or live in the backwoods and get all your information from the newspapers PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA or something even a little cleaner—from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the television show "Vremya"—then perhaps you too would write letters to them full of horror about what is supposedly happening in Lithuania. Public opinion is being processed on a mass scale. We see the threat in the preparations themselves: They figure that everyone will breathe easier once we are properly dealt with. How much more of that outrage could we have endured?

[Lugovskaya] If we speak about the press and television, then it is easy to find publications with a nationalist, inflammatory, and clearly provocational tone in Lithuania as well. I was speaking about direct threats—they do not exist?

[Landsbergis] You should have been sitting in my office those days when people were phoning here and reporting, for instance, that a column of tanks was approaching Vilnius from Kaunas. Deputies went out to meet them, and there really were 80 BTR's (armored personnel carriers) with assault forces. They entered Vilnius and rumbled past the parliament. At night, across the whole city.... And you say that everything is peaceful. And not just once. They explain to us that these are regular maneuvers. We have asked the esteemed generals to inform us of upcoming troop movements so that we could calm people and know for certain ourselves that they are maneuvers. But we hear nothing, and every day we live in uncertainty.

[Lugovskaya] It resembles an emergency situation, but life goes on, the enterprises work normally, and there are preparations for huge meetings. Are you perhaps exaggerating somewhat?

[Landsbergis] More than once we have found ourselves in a situation where it seemed to us that the Supreme Council was working its last day.

[Lugovskaya] How long, according to you, will the uncertainty and opposition last? What is it—stagnation?

[Landsbergis] Not stagnation but a suspended situation. It is very uncomfortable, but we can hold out. Perhaps it is just this which irritates the other side: How are they enduring it? An escalation of pressure is under way, and we feel it. People arriving here from abroad consider this situation clearly abnormal. But life in the republic goes on despite all attempts to ruin even the structures of law and order and to create an unheard-of double authority and even organs for implementing that second authority, which is foreign to our land. And if in our declarations and statements we sometimes give a direct evaluation of the conduct of a great state in relation to us, then I do not know who can reproach us with it. Of course when you speak of responsibility in the event that something happens, then you can blame whomever you want. And me too.

[Lugovskaya] But do not you yourself blame Gorbachev, connecting his name with any incident? Cannot one say the same about you?

[Landsbergis] Gorbachev is the commander-in-chief. In his hands are all the forces of suppression and every kind of repression. And when those forces are put into action, one really can see the responsibility of the leader, the official making the decision. We do not have any of those forces. And we cannot put up forcible opposition—only moral opposition.

[Lugovskaya] Does this mean that you expect such actions in relation to Lithuania?

[Landsbergis] Unfortunately, yes. With regret beforehand that we must expect such actions. The content of the statements from Moscow, the threats in words, the constant provocations here in Lithuania, and the attempts to "turn the people upside down," sow discord, and achieve lawlessness are all designed so that we may be accused of having lost control of the situation. And at the summit of this whole thing stands Gorbachev. Perhaps he is not aware of the particulars, but he directs the machine and sets it into motion. I also expect that direct presidential rule will be introduced into Lithuania, although no one in the USSR is empowered to do that. In a similar way one may arrive at presidential rule by Moscow in Bulgaria and Poland.... We will view such an action as force. Imperial states have always treated rebelling colonies this way.

[Lugovskaya] So you intend to be uncompromising and even confrontational? Have I understood you correctly?

[Landsbergis] No you did not understand me correctly. I was speaking of the officials who set up deliberately impossible conditions for a dialogue and then say, "Look, they are

not carrying out the conditions. They are uncompromising." This is done for purposes of propaganda or to draw out the dialogue process. Nonetheless, I have the feeling that our positions will begin to draw closer.

[Lugovskaya] Do the Supreme Council and the government of Lithuania really have a package of proposals—political, economic, and legal—which could be examined and would lead to a dialogue tomorrow?

[Landsbergis] We have rough drafts. The USSR threw preliminary demands on the table in advance which were frightening and intended to intimidate us if we dared to.... So, we have also prepared ourselves for them. We will have something to say. But we do not expect to be sitting at the negotiating table tomorrow, although that would be splendid. A productive dialogue must be preceded by conditional contacts, exchanges of opinions, and a search for formulas that could circumvent and smooth over incautious statements made "in the heat of the moment"—on both sides.

[Lugovskaya] On what note will we finish the conversation?

[Landsbergis] I am an optimist. This does not mean that the affair to which I have dedicated myself will be completed under me or with my participation. But it is a just matter. And I believe that the world cannot be governed by an exceedingly evil principle.

[Lugovskaya] I would like to ask you a last question, which concerns me personally. But it is important to me: At first I was told to establish my accreditation for a Supreme Council session through the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.... Please tell me, am I a foreigner in Lithuania or not?

[Landsbergis] Well.... Let us say you are a foreigner.

[Lugovskaya] And I am a foreign journalist?

[Landsbergis] What is the difference? I see you as a person of the past. And it is much better to be a foreign journalist from a friendly country than simply a journalist from a capital oppressing and enslaving a conquered province.
10 April 1990

"I Do Not Want To Be an Outside Observer"

Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.

Algirdas Brazauskas. I approached him in the hall where they were triumphantly handing out the first party membership cards in the new format to members of the Lithuanian Communist Party. There were handshakes, kisses.... At that moment he was at his best, the A. Brazauskas known to all of us, the leader of the party. He agreed to a conversation unwillingly, explaining, "I do not speak in public these days." And indeed A. Brazauskas appears rarely in the Lithuania press and on television. It seemed to me that it was a desire to stay in the shadows. Why?

[Lugovskaya] The country shows great interest in you. Your defeat in parliament was unexpected for many people. Here in Lithuania they explain it in part by saying that a leader who is not connected with the communist movement is needed today. How correct is that point of view?

[Brazauskas] It may also be that the communists did not win the elections to the Supreme Council. And logically the chairman should be a representative of the movement "Sajudis" (it is not a party), which has the greatest number of supporters in parliament. And there is nothing more to say about it—that is the way it is done all over the world, and that is the way we have done it.

[Lugovskaya] Do you think parliament's choice reflects public opinion?

[Brazauskas] Only the people can answer for the people. About 300,000 voters said in various ways—in the form of subscription lists, letters, and telegrams—that they would like to see Brazauskas chairman of the Supreme Council. But there has been no organized inquiry into this. I cannot add anything else to that, insofar as we continue to talk about me.

[Lugovskaya] I am familiar with your statement that obtaining the republic's independence is not a one-time act but a process with its stages. If I am not mistaken, this position is also written into the program of the Lithuanian Communist Party. As we know, events in the republic have turned out quite differently. What do you think about it now?

[Brazauskas] You and I are returning to politics again even though we agreed to speak about party matters. This question does not have anything in common with the Lithuanian Communist Party. It has to do with the fate of Lithuania, not with the party.

[Lugovskaya] Is the Lithuanian Communist Party really outside politics? Does it take no part in deciding Lithuania's fortunes?

[Brazauskas] Of course it takes a part, just like all the other parties and movements. Like many members of the Central Committee, I imagine that the question of obtaining independence and the very fact of declaring it cannot be unilateral and cannot be decreed. This process has its temporal parameters, and we must examine the process of obtaining both independence and statehood within them. It is a long and difficult process which demands composure, deliberation, diplomacy, and skill from the politicians. And we must travel this road. There are various ways to travel it, but the most important is in the form of normal intercourse with the Soviet Union. And we must simultaneously search for an exit from the situation that has arisen in the republic. The republic's

leadership is taking just such steps with good will. But I have to differ on one important point: Once the USSR recognizes the restoration of Lithuania's independence, then we can take up the question of statehood.

[Lugovskaya] What do you see as the starting point for a dialogue?

[Brazauskas] Right now I see what there is to see.

[Lugovskaya] Chaos?

[Brazauskas] I would not want to characterize the present situation in Lithuania: For now, that is the function of other figures. The republic has a political leadership and a Supreme Council, and this question should be raised with them.

[Lugovskaya] In your opinion does the recently adopted USSR Law "On a System for Deciding Issues Concerning Secession of a Union Republic From the USSR" provide an opportunity to settle the situation in Lithuania?

[Brazauskas] I do not think so. This mechanism is too complex. No such mechanism existed when it was a question of including Lithuania in the Soviet Union. Everything was simple, efficient, and clear. And now it has appeared. I realize that it is impossible to ignore the 50 years the Baltic republics have spent in the USSR. Integration in science, economics, and culture and the geopolitical factor have changed the previous situation considerably. And, of course, neighbors are still neighbors, but even they look different today. I do not believe that a mechanism for secession should be the same for all the republics if only because they joined the USSR in different ways. As for Lithuania, the whole world knows that it was an act of force. And there is no reason to be "coy" about it. The acknowledgement by the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies of the illegality of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is also important, although I cannot understand why the obvious consequences of that pact and the secret protocols have been passed over in silence. These are historical realities. The new law on secession greatly complicates the 72nd Article of the USSR Constitution, which grants the republics this right without the use of any sort of mechanisms. Now this process will become long and difficult. But in any case it is not possible to take away a people's sacred right to self-determination.

[Lugovskaya] Do you see a real possibility for a dialogue to begin?

[Brazauskas] Yes. It is a question of time, but I do not think it will be a long time. A dialogue must take place. We ourselves cannot "hang" in this condition any longer, and the problem cannot remain unresolved. And neither we nor the Soviet Union can manage without a solution. Increasing the tension is not a goal in itself.

[Lugovskaya] Your fate has changed abruptly but, being the leader, you bear full responsibility for it. Is there not something ambiguous in your current position? On one hand, you are as popular in Lithuania as before, and on the other... you only have a secondary role. Nonetheless, it was your choice to do this, and your step makes one reflect.

[Brazauskas] I think that I acted correctly by agreeing to join the government. I wish to take an active part in our life too and not be an outside observer. There was an additional reason in that the role of the Communist Party in society has changed noticeably. I do not know, maybe they have not felt it yet in the other republics, but here the change was sudden. And after Article 6 of the Constitution was modified, the change became fundamental. The multiparty system, having given an entirely new content to the political life of society, has changed my own views in many ways as well. I realized that to be a communist, a social democrat, or something else is not the most important thing for a person. The most important thing is to work for something that will genuinely serve to improve the life of society. Almost half of our government is communist, and we will contribute actively to the fulfillment of this goal.

[Lugovskaya] What are your various responsibilities as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers?

[Brazauskas] Economics, the field of the national economy, and the realm of material production.

[Lugovskaya] Apparently you are working directly on proposals for a future, specific dialogue with Moscow.

[Brazauskas] Yes, we have already discussed one variant, but now we have decided to complete it, perfect it, systematize it. And a draft of a basic agreement, and those treaties and agreements which will come after its passage. A possible draft and the possible passage—I want to be careful how I express it.

[Lugovskaya] What is the economic concept of the draft? Not the political concept.

[Brazauskas] First of all we would like to maintain the ties we now have with the Union republics inasmuch as we are closely integrated into the economy of the Soviet Union. These intentions are substantiated and written into the draft. For the normal functioning of the economy we normally import one-third of the social product and approximately the same amount of material resources today. We understand that in the future our ties will change, and as a result we are already looking for ways to increase the efficiency of production. Obstacles to the free development of the economy will disappear, although for the present, unfortunately, there are still no such opportunities for development. But these questions are being resolved.

[Lugovskaya] One gets the impression that you have in some way withdrawn from political activity, although your popularity in the republic is one of the highest. However I also happened to hear another opinion—about your unconditional support for the positions of "Sajudis." What is that—a tactic, or concurrence of views?

[Brazauskas] I do not agree with such opinions at all, most importantly because I do not consider myself a

member of "Sajudis." Yes, our Communist Party is in genuine agreement with the basic positions and goals of that movement, which has seized all of Lithuania—we too are fighting for the independence of our republic. But we have different tactics. And I absolutely deny the accusation that I "sold out" to "Sajudis" or to anyone else. I have my own ideas of how it should have been done. But those people who now find themselves in the majority in the Supreme Council may not agree with me and my colleagues. Well, that is life.

[Lugovskaya] What is the reason for the strained character and even the hostility in the relations between the two Lithuanian communist parties? What has happened—a complete break? Apparently the distribution of the property was the last straw. Are your political goals "alien" to each other?

[Brazauskas] The break happened in December of last year, and there has been nothing new since then. They are not fighting for the independence of the republic or its autonomy, and this is our principle difference. As for the distribution of property, it probably should have been carried out differently. On principle I do not agree with the ruling adopted at the center stating that all the property belongs exclusively to the CPSU. It is unjust. But even though we do not agree with such a situation, it does not mean that it is necessary to rely on naked military force in resolving these questions. And this is just how former party comrades acted by bringing into the Central Committee building assault forces, which now stroll about the building in full uniform, in helmets, and with assault rifles. But I think that the essence of the conflict lies elsewhere. We, the Lithuanian Communist Party, do not live and function for the accumulation of property but rather to act in the interests of the people and to enjoy their mutual respect and support. Our program has been constructed on these grounds, and it is for this that we work. And I am convinced that the use of military force to provide oneself with a comfortable existence and to force others to listen or submit looks incongruous today at the very least. Who needs such a party?

[Lugovskaya] Is the Lithuanian Communist Party communist in its essence? One of the members of the Central Committee told me that we should read its name using a mirror. The reflection would say Social Democratic Party. Is that true?

[Brazauskas] Our program really is close to that of the Social Democrats, and we have been accused of that more than once. Nonetheless, at a recent plenum we came to the conclusion that it would not be expedient to change its name. We are keeping the program because it is contemporary and responds in many ways to the aspirations of the Lithuanian people and all of Lithuania. But the way it works has changed fundamentally. We have already abandoned the previous methods, and today our party is the same type of political force as the other Lithuanian parties. We are learning to live in a world that is new for us.

[Lugovskaya] Does your party maintain ties with the communist parties of the other Union republics and with the CPSU as a whole? Do you have personal ties with M.S. Gorbachev?

[Brazauskas] Today I do not have any opportunity to maintain ties with M.S. Gorbachev. The last time we met was 13 March, a month ago. I will always be happy to maintain relations with him because it cannot be otherwise: I always felt great respect for Mikhail Sergeyevich, and the respect is still with me. But with regard to the party line, our ties have been reduced to practically nothing.

[Lugovskaya] Do you regret it?

[Brazauskas] Why regret it? It would be good if we kept up good ties. But many of the Communists have reacted negatively to the demonstrative support for the loyalist Communist Party and all the incidents relating to the distribution of property and the use of military force. Apparently it means that good relations have been set aside. 13 April 1990.

"The Situation Is Almost Tragic"

Mikolas Burokyavichyus, first secretary of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU platform) Central Committee.

Mikolas Burokyavichyus. There were obstacles to our meeting. First, there were boys in militia uniforms blocking the entrance to the building of the Central Committee of a formerly united Lithuanian Communist Party. They studied my identity card, phoned wherever they were supposed to, and exposed me: "There is no such arrangement. It has not been authorized." My attempt to explain that I had come for that very reason—to arrange it—did not help. And nonetheless at the end of the day I was sitting in small, modest office and conversing with the modest, intelligent, but resolutely minded M. Burokyavichyus, whom fate has put on the front lines of the political struggle at a difficult time.

[Lugovskaya] Is it true that the Communist Party Central Committee building is currently being guarded by assault troops who have been quartered in its lodgings and its basements?

[Burokyavichyus] That does not correspond to reality. The guard is manned by servicemen of a militia regiment which is stationed in Vilnius but is subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs—to the minister or his deputies.

[Lugovskaya] Judging by articles in the Lithuanian press, one might call the position of the Communist Party loyal to the CPSU quite complex.

[Burokyavichyus] The political situation in Lithuania really is almost tragic. A dual power has in essence arisen here. One portion of the republic's citizens adheres to the USSR Constitution, and the other part—primarily the nationalist forces—is governed by laws adopted recently

by the Lithuanian Supreme Council. The majority in the current parliament pursues the policy of the reactionary part of "Sajudis," whose dream is to restore the economic and political systems of the bourgeois past. The ruling circle, headed by Landsbergis and Prunskiene, has a personal, mercenary interest in such aspirations. They are demanding help from the West in order to realize their plans, and they are taking an implacable and confrontational stance with the Soviet Union and refusing to make any concessions. The actions of the parliament have nothing in common with democracy and political pluralism. The words which are being spoken at congresses of "Sajudis" and at the sessions of its Seimas are worth nothing. Neither pluralism nor those who think differently—they only support those who are with them. Television and radio are closed to us, a Leninist Communist Party, and we do not publish our two newspapers—in Lithuanian and Russian—in Lithuania but beyond the borders of the republic, in Minsk. A genuine persecution of communists is under way: Slander, threats....

[Lugovskaya] Nonetheless, does a multiparty system exist in the republic? And if those who think differently are being persecuted in the republic, then should not something be announced about that?

[Burokyavichyus] That is the way it is. The Supreme Council Presidium adopted a ukase establishing legal liability for political activity that benefits another state. True, it still is not in effect, but let us analyze what it means. That portion of the citizenry which acknowledges the USSR Constitution which is common to all the Union republics will fall under this ukase. And of course communists and members of the CPSU connected with the Soviet Union are potential candidates for the political jails inasmuch as we pursue the policies of "another state" in Lithuania. The ruling clique itself believes that the republic has already seceded from the USSR. I am convinced that if they had the forces and the opportunity they would already have jailed us. But no one is afraid of them. A second example. If they force me to replace my Soviet passport with the temporary identity card of a Lithuanian citizen, that little card, and I refuse, then I will be deprived of all my rights—electoral, political, and civil.

Here is one more method that the nationalist forces are resorting to. On the eve of an announced meeting that was to be held in support of USSR President Gorbachev's Address to the Lithuanian People and the Lithuanian Supreme Council, radio and television announcers began to broadcast warnings every hour that television cameras would be set up in front of the parliament building to take pictures of everything and everyone. It is not difficult to discern the anonymous author of the threat. But the people were not frightened, and they came to the square and expressed their lack of confidence in the parliament and the government and demanded their resignation. The meeting, which consisted of about 30,000 people, declared its support for the USSR president's address.

I spent my youth in bourgeois Lithuania, I grew up in a family of communist members of the underground, and as a result I know well how the reactionary regime defended its interests and how it persecuted those who thought differently. Now the situation is repeating itself, although it is at another historical stage.

[Lugovskaya] Nonetheless I would like you to clarify why you call the majority in the present Lithuanian Supreme Council nationalist and conservative. Perhaps yours is a subjective opinion.

[Burokyavichyus] What else should they be called when they have restored the bourgeois Constitution of 1938, throwing Lithuania, if only for a short time, 52 years backward? It has currently become fashionable to seek out conservatives in the CPSU or in the state structures of the soviets. In fact it is just these supposedly "new" people who wish to restructure the life of Lithuanian society along bourgeois lines.

And now about the nationalist face of the parliamentary majority. The far-right forces of "Sajudis" have proclaimed the reactionary slogan "Lithuania only for Lithuanians," which has not met with any objections in the Supreme Council, and the other portion has proposed separatist goals, declaring that the republic can only develop outside the USSR and must join the system of the Western capitalist world. And both portions openly deny everything that is Soviet and internationalist and emphasize only the national aspects, which are in fact nationalist aspects.

[Lugovskaya] You speak about the leadership of the republic, but what is the genuine attitude of the Lithuanians toward the other peoples?

[Burokyavichyus] Of course one should not equate the Lithuanian people with those who have taken the anti-Soviet, anticommunist course. Those with nationalist tendencies are implementing a concept of the reactionary wing of "Sajudis," headed by V. Landsbergis. A considered and well-organized effort is being carried out. These forces received a majority in the elections to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Council, and they began to speak in the name of the Lithuanian people and to pass unjust laws in its name. It is not difficult to prove this. When the votes of all the voters entered on the lists at that time were counted, "Sajudis" received only 41.2 percent. And that means that about 60 percent of the adult population of Lithuanian still has not said whether or not it wants to stay in the Soviet Union. And then we have the main question: On what basis was the law on Lithuanian independence adopted in the name of the entire people?

[Lugovskaya] Is a referendum possible now?

[Burokyavichyus] First and foremost, normal conditions are necessary for a referendum. Not every person will have the bravery to stand up under conditions of moral terror and say, "I am for the Soviet power!" He will immediately be

accused of antistate activities and lose his job. But he will have something quite different in his heart.

[Lugovskaya] Something similar, so far as I am aware, happened to you personally. Could you tell us the details?

[Burokyavichyus] Indeed, since my election to the post of first secretary of the (loyalist) Lithuanian Communist Party provisional Central Committee there have been constant attempts to discredit my name, both in the press and by other means. All this has already lasted several months. I realize that the reason for that is my political activity. Recently at Vilnius Pedagogical Institute, where I taught until the beginning of February of this year before leaving for party work, they wanted to deprive me of my... title of professor, although only the Higher Attestation Commission under the USSR Council of Ministers has the right to do that. They accused me of everything—the disparity between my past articles and Lithuania's current statehood, that military posts supposedly were introduced to the Vilnius Higher Party School at my request, and that the students were not attending my lectures although I had already officially sent in my resignation. In addition there were moral pressures, open slander, and groundless insinuations. Each fabrication was more absurd and monstrous than the next. The result was that on 10 April I read in LIYETUVOS RITAS a dialogue between a journalist and a soldier who had deserted. The journalist asked why he had his rifle. And the other answered, "To kill Burokyavichyus...."

[Lugovskaya] Do you regret that you transferred over to party work at such a difficult time?

[Burokyavichyus] The communists let me know that this was their will. And I do not regret it. We are conducting a genuine struggle to maintain Soviet power in Lithuania, and I feel that I am where I should be. The Soviet socialist society is currently renewing itself according to the principles of democracy and humanism, and I am also taking part in this.

[Lugovskaya] How many communists belong to the (loyalist) Lithuanian Communist Party?

[Burokyavichyus] Almost 41,000. I am happy that three difficult and, it would seem, gloomy months after the split the party's ranks have grown by 7,000 communists.

[Lugovskaya] Do you have any trends which are characteristic of the CPSU as a whole?

[Burokyavichyus] Right now because of our circumstances we have no time for trends. That would be a luxury for us. Those who supported the "Democratic Platform" sided with the Lithuanian Communist Party headed by A. Brazauskas.

[Lugovskaya] What was the reason the Lithuanian communists who support the various platforms broke off relations with each other?

[Burokyavichyus] The split took place in December 1989 after they made the decision to break ideological and organizational ties with the CPSU. Now we have directly opposite goals: We are for a Lithuania within the USSR, and they are for an independent Lithuania. So long as we maintain these positions, compromise between us is impossible. Of course some people would like to present our differences solely in terms of property. But in this instance there is nothing to argue about. Once the Lithuanian Communist Party declared that it was withdrawing from the CPSU and broke all ties with it, the property and the rights to it naturally remained with the CPSU.

[Lugovskaya] What issues will be reviewed at the 21st party congress on 21 April?

[Burokyavichyus] It will take place in three stages. First there will be discussion of the political report and the mission of the Communist Party in the current situation, and its Central Committee will be elected. We will again meet at the end of May or at the beginning of June to examine the draft Rules and Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 23d congress. And after the congress we will discuss the program of the Lithuanian Communist Party and its status.

[Lugovskaya] To my knowledge, the Communist Party is represented in the parliament by six deputies out of 137. Are they able to conduct the struggle with such a minority and influence the course of events in Lithuania?

[Burokyavichyus] Right now the parliamentary struggle is not very important to us. The most important thing is to raise the activity of the masses. Many people are already beginning to come to their senses and find political reference points. Proof of this are the meetings attended by many thousands of people which are going on in various regions of the republic—in Vilnius, Kaunas, Sneckus.... Numerous civil committees are being created or are already functioning which at the end of April will send representatives to their republic's constituent congress. One more social organization will appear that is able to defend the interests of the people. So we do not consider ourselves vanquished, and we are not preparing to go underground.

[Lugovskaya] Some see the resolution of the Lithuanian question in the search for compromise and in a dialogue between the leadership of the USSR and Lithuania, and others in Moscow's sanctions and the introduction of presidential rule. Which point of view is closer to yours?

[Burokyavichyus] The further the situation goes, the worse it gets. Confrontation is unavoidable. The policy of tension, of depriving those who think differently of their social and political rights, and of Lithuania's opposition to all the Union republics and the government of the USSR, which the Lithuanian powers are conducting will lead to the use of economic sanctions. I am sure that each of us realizes that such a course of events will lead us to an impasse.

12 April 1990.

Estonian Parliament Endorses New Parties, Flag

LD1005193390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] The multiparty system in Estonia has now become a reality from the state point of view too. The Supreme Soviet Presidium has officially registered the Estonian National Independence Party, the Estonian Christian Democratic Union, and the Estonian Liberal Democratic Party.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium ratified the agreement which was concluded on 12 April in Vilnius, on the formation of the Baltic Common Market. The agreement envisages cooperation between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in all branches of the national economy, in banking, in foreign trade, in the cultural sphere, in politics, and so on. Now the next step will be to register the agreement of the Baltic Common Market at the United Nations.

The Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a resolution to declare the blue, black, and white national flag to be the state flag of the independent republic of Estonia. The standard measurements for the flag were laid down, as well as the rules for its use. It was also decided that during the transition period, on the occasion of USSR state holidays, the use of the USSR red flag will also be allowed alongside the blue, black, and white flag. On such occasions the former must be on the left of the Estonian state flag.

The Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium endorsed the status of the republican government's representative at the Supreme Soviet.

A working group on awards was set up, with Enn Poldroos at its head. It will begin to draw up a statute for awards of the republic of Estonia, rules for (?presenting) the awards, and the awards themselves.

The Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium must also begin to deal with appeals for clemency. A corresponding commission was set up for this purpose.

The "Gazette of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet and of the Estonian SSR Government" publication was renamed the "State Gazette."

People's Front Activist on Independence Tactics

PM1005152590 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 7 May 90 p 18

[Report on interview with Estonian People's Front activist Rein Ruutsoo by Bjarne Nitovuori; date, place not given: "Estonian People's Front Aide: No Illusions of Western Support"]

[Text] The Estonian People's Front has never had any illusions at all about Western support for independence. In this respect the People's Front is different from its Lithuanian brothers, but also different from the groups which took the initiative for the Estonian Congress. These have always put their faith in the United States, which is now kicking us in the teeth.

So said historian Rein Ruutsoo, a leading Estonian People's Front activist. Ruutsoo himself is a member of the Estonian Congress, the body that was elected in mid-May [as published] by those who were citizens of the republic of Estonia before the 1940 Soviet occupation, and their descendants. For those who took the initiative for the congress it is the congress which will restore the legal organs of the republic of Estonia, while the Supreme Soviet is viewed as the organ of the occupying power and therefore illegal. However, the People's Front has always considered it to be poor tactics to put all its money on the congress alone, since it ought to be possible to use both routes to independence.

Ruutsoo's name is current in Finland at present as one of the authors of two of the best descriptions of the background to today's events in Estonia—"The Winds of Freedom in Estonia" and "The Letter of the Forty."

The division between those who took the initiative for the congress and the People's Front still exists, Ruutsoo said. The People's Front backs flexible tactics with the aim of gradually achieving independence. According to Ruutsoo, Estonia could not reach as categorical a decision on independence as Lithuania because there is the risk the whole time that the Russians in the northeast would try to break away from the rest of Estonia.

"The Russians in Estonia must be given time, for time is on our side. The leadership of the Russian Interdvizheniye [International Movement] is the whole time losing its base as the Russians are persuaded that Estonia will not become anti-Russian, that their rights will be guaranteed, that they can maintain normal relations with Russia, and that they will have a higher standard of living in Estonia," he said.

Ruutsoo admitted that it is a reality that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev does not want the Baltic republics to achieve independence.

"We cannot take this as the point of departure for our actions, for much of what has happened has happened against Gorbachev's wishes. He has been forced to get used to it.

"The Baltic countries must become independent. All other avenues have already been explored. The program for the economic independence of the Baltic region was approved in Moscow, but in reality Moscow's grip on the economy has been tightened," Rein Ruutsoo pointed out.

Ruutsoo believes that the creation of a separate Estonian currency can be of great significance in the independence process.

"When we get our own currency, it will unite all Estonians regardless of their nationality. When they receive their wages in krooni they—and this includes the Russians living in Estonia—will begin to defend Estonia's borders against those from outside," he said.

The currency is a way of achieving economic independence. It also promotes cooperative relations with the West. In this way the West will also become interested in political independence. The currency gives rise to a chain reaction—such is Ruutsoo's argument.

That is why the decision on a currency is both an economic and a political decision.

Ruutsoo thinks it quite possible that Moscow will declare the new currency invalid when it reaches a decision on it. But Moscow cannot alter the fact that the new currency already exists in the form of various sorts of cards which are being used as a method of payment.

Estonian Scientists Issue Appeal to USSR

90UN1600A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 3

[Text] **Academicians Yu.A. Osipyan, Ye.M. Primakov, S.S. Shatalin, A.N. Yakovlev, members of the USSR Presidential Council.**

Your incorporation as representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences and simultaneously the entire Soviet scientific community in the Presidential Council which has just been created makes it possible to hope that subsequently the adoption of vitally important official decisions will to a greater extent than hitherto be based on scientific analysis and a forecast of development trends. While wishing you success in your responsible work we consider it necessary to call your attention to one trend in the prevailing official and public thinking which is causing extreme concern. This trend amounts to the transformation of the imperial thinking stereotype from the former messianic "elder brother" syndrome to an offended "big brother" complex. This complex is spreading, subconsciously, at least, in generally democratic circles also. In certain conservative circles it has reached the point of new versions of Nazism.

The losses of the USSR's scientific potential on account of emigration brought about by the growing wave of anti-Semitism, of which you are well aware, are a consequence of this dangerous process.

The second clearly predictable consequence are the relations between the "elder brother" and the "younger brothers" inevitably acquiring independence, which will be damaged for decades.

The third, escalation of the cult of violence with the apocalyptic outcome ensuing from this.

We express the hope that, in accordance with the possibilities of your new positions, you will contribute to the said dangerous trend not gaining at least direct or indirect support at Presidential Council level. We deem it necessary specifically, before it is too late:

1. To put an end to official propaganda of the demagogic proposition concerning the Union republics' indebtedness to the Union.

2. To change the practice of the diametrically opposite approach, depending on whether it is a question of overseas peoples or of peoples today residing within the borders of the USSR, in Soviet official science and policy in respect of the national liberation struggle and the right to self-determination.

3. Today, when the Brezhnev aggression in respect of Czechoslovakia has officially been condemned, but this has not been done in respect of Stalin's occupation of the Baltic states, to refrain from indoctrinating all-Union public opinion by methods of propaganda and disinformation which are well known from the past, as is being done in respect of Lithuania.

4. To cease the provocative dramatization of the problem of the emergence of Russian national minorities connected with the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states.

5. To halt the futile attempts, which are without a legal basis, to compel the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania and Estonia to reverse their recent decisions on state independence expressing the legitimate will of the people.

The prestige of the USSR would not suffer from recognition that the problem of the Baltic states is not an internal matter of the USSR but a problem, which arose as a consequence of Stalin's crimes, which should be resolved at the international level.

Copies of this appeal will be sent to the Union republic academies of sciences and unions of scientists and also to the central newspapers of Estonia and the USSR.

[Signed] Estonian Academy of Sciences General Assembly
Estonian Union of Scientists Board

Academician Estimates Estonian Trade 'Losses'

904A0335A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Ya. Tolstikov, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA government correspondent, on talk with Raymond Khagelberg, adviser to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and Academician of the Estonian Academy of Sciences: "Who Is Living at Whose Expense, or Once Again About the Reciprocal Calculations of the Republic and the Union"]

[Text] **"Import-Export Reflected in Statistics" was the title of a rather long article which appeared in SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA on 27 December 1988. Proceeding from the republic's import-export trade balance for 1987 (inquiries like this are made once in five years), the article reaches the conclusion that during the year products were shipped out of the republic (excluding foreign exports) in the sum of R2.73 billion, and that products were shipped into the republic from other regions of the country (excluding foreign imports) in the sum of R2.97 billion (in final consumer prices, including trade and transport charge). In other words, the imbalance in favor of imports was equal to R240 million. Economists**

think, however, that the commodity turnover balance between republics should include the internal import-export of products attributable to tourists. Guests of Estonia (until recently, in any case) made purchases in and took out of the republic and into other regions of the country considerably more commodities than the residents of Estonia purchased in other republics and brought into Estonia. If this hidden import-export is taken into account (and in this case it appears to be possible to calculate the volumes), another picture is derived. Export exceeded import by R20 million, the article printed in our newspaper stated. In other words, the situation was quite favorable. Matters are worse with foreign export-import. Here the balance for Estonia clearly is unfavorable: Foreign import, according to statistical data, exceeds foreign export by a factor of three.

If you calculate everything, using world market prices, we find that import into the republic (including foreign import) exceeds export (including foreign export) by R1.35 billion. The problem is that world prices for basic types of products shipped out of the republic (for example, light industry and food products) are comparatively low, and prices for products brought into Estonia (petroleum products, metals, and equipment) are comparatively high.

Today, in connection with events in Lithuania, questions of reciprocal calculations become urgent once again. On 10 March 1990, the newspaper IZVESTIYA published an interview with Yu.D. Maslyukov, chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], in which he presents a colossal bill to the Lithuanian republic for what was built on the republic's territory, for what was shipped in, and for what was consumed by the people of Lithuania during the postwar decades. In the opinion of Yu.D. Maslyukov, this is a bill that Lithuania must pay in full in the event it secedes from the USSR.

As we understand it, the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] might also find itself in a similar situation in the near future.

Well, nonetheless, who owes what to whom? Can a summary balance of reciprocal accounts between the republic and the Union be compiled? If this can be done, then what are their criteria?

Ya. Tolstikov, our government correspondent, discusses this subject with Raymond Khagelberg, an adviser to the chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and academician of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences.

"It is necessary to put an end in principle to the demagogic formula of some sort of debt of the Union republic to the Union, to the central authorities," Academician R. Khagelberg believes. "We will begin with the fact that if it is a question of Estonia and the other Baltic republics, then we did not ask to have our state included in the USSR structure, and we never took loans from the Union, and we therefore did not incur debts. So, what is there to give back now, and on behalf of what or whom? "It is also necessary to take into account that central authority derives from those states and Union republics which, for one reason or another, were included in the USSR. The 'center' is based on the Union republics, including, of course, on the Russian Federation, and by itself it produces nothing. All of the land, its mineral wealth, water, and other natural resources—all of these are resources of the states that make up the Soviet Union. The 'center' itself does not have anything, and it cannot have anything. In fact, it is the central authority that is in debt to all of the Union republics, and, most of all, to Russia. It is the center itself, and it alone, which in recent years (although it still is to this day) the organizer of military expenditures that are unprecedented in their scale."

The central authority did not ask even one Union republic, its government, or the Supreme Soviet whether such and such expenditures should be made on arms. Without asking, it took from our pockets, and practically on an unlimited scale. Here is where there was a complete functioning of the principle of distribution of wealth, which was created by the people, exclusively "according to need," and the needs of the military-industrial complex were colossal and practically not controlled by anyone. It is not known to this day how many billions the war in Afghanistan alone cost all of us (and costs us to this day), a war that the central authority unleashed, also not asking anyone. But it is undoubtedly tens of billions, if not hundreds of billions of rubles. Who today will return the money confiscated from the pocketbooks of the citizens to the people of the USSR and its Union republics? That is, confiscated and not borrowed! Who?

Perhaps Yu.D. Maslyukov, as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, should be the first to answer precisely this question?

And "our" assistance to the underdeveloped and developing countries of Africa and Asia. Assistance whose dimensions are not known to this day. I consciously placed the word "our" in quotation marks, because the central authority simply did not ask the opinions of the citizens of the USSR. And so the Union republics have a right to claim this debt of the center from it. And the poorly reasoned and at times unsound investments of the central departments and of that USSR Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources], for example, which carried out gigantic reclamation work? Investments that cost the people of the USSR billions of rubles and that turned out to be gone with the wind? And the Baykal-Amur main line, whose construction is not complete to this day—how well-reasoned an act was its construction? And Chernobyl? No, no, this is not simply an accident. It is also criminal negligence, for which all of us, including Estonia as well, are paying to this day.

And, finally, it is precisely the central authority, synonym USSR, that is the usurper of foreign territories, including the territory of the Estonian republic. It is the

USSR as an aggressor, according to international standards, which is obligated to pay reparations to people who suffered as a result of its aggression. The question can be put exactly this way, although we do not at all intend to strain relations with the center. And I speak of the idea of reparations only from a theoretical position—there can also be this viewpoint.

Our discussion concerns directly certain positions of Yu.D. Maslyukov's article in IZVESTIYA. The chairman of the USSR Gosplan cites these figures: About R50 billion of capital investments were made in the development of the economy of Lithuania during the years of Soviet power, and the rates of growth of investment exceeded the national rate by a great deal. Enterprises were built here that other republics also aspired to, etc. What could you say on this score?

"I will comment on these positions using Estonia as an example," R. Khagelberg says. "The aggregate capital investments made in the national economy of Estonia constituted, according to my data, R24 billion. The rates of investment are actually higher than the Union average. Thus, for the last three to five years they constituted on the average in the country approximately R700 per capita per year, and in our republic, R800 per capita per year; that is, 14 percent higher. According to Maslyukov, it turns out, well, according to him, what concern the center shows for its wards in the Baltics. But is this actually the case? Let us look into what the per capita gross national product (or, otherwise, internal) is in the republic and the country overall. According to calculations we made, in 1988 it constituted in the USSR R3,052, and in Estonia R3,772; that is, 24 percent higher than the average Union level. It turns out, investments notwithstanding, that our income in the republic was higher than the level of capital investments by a factor of about 1.7 (24 divided by 14). That is the way it was earlier, and not only in 1988. In other words, the high rates of investment were not assured by the center, but they were created owing to the efforts of the people themselves. This is a very important fact, and it is necessary for us to know it."

Further, Academician R. Khagelberg cites his own data on the balance of products shipped into and out of the republic. They differ somewhat from those cited by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in December of 1988 (article "Import-Export Reflected in Statistics"). Thus, for example, according to these calculations, the shipment of products into the republic (in existing wholesale prices) exceeds shipments out of the republic, even taking into account the tourist commodity turnover in the sum of R500 million. At the same time, Academician R. Khagelberg believes that shipments in and out must certainly take into account the export of services and, first of all, the volume of transit shipments (through the republic) that the republic provides the country. The annual volume of such services is equal to about R200 million.

By far not the entire import of capital investments is implemented in the interests of the population of the republic itself. For example, construction projects of strategic significance. The Novoaltinskiy trade seaport. Unquestionably the country needs it, but the republic itself has only a slight interest in it. How in this case does one assess investment in construction? Also, quite a few plants are built here like "Dvigatel" and "Baltiyets," and these resources are included in the aggregate sum of investments, but the republic itself gets very little from this, or nothing at all.

"Indeed, if you translate calculations into world market prices," R. Khagelberg continues, "the balance will not be in our favor. But even the specialization of the economy of the republic in the production principally of the light and food industries was by no means established by us alone—in the interests of the economy of the Union first and foremost. And to reproach us with the fact, they say, that what we produced was 'not what was needed' is at the very least incorrect."

In his article, the Gosplan chairman reproaches Lithuania for, according to the territorial division of labor, bringing in products for 101 items out of 103, which are taken into account in the interbranch balance, and for shipping out according to 83. He reproaches Lithuania because it satisfies 75 percent of its fuel and energy needs at the expense of other regions. This statement of the problem is also incorrect. I will explain. If we are talking about Estonia, then we bring in products for 99 items and ship products out for 74 items. We satisfy half of our requirements for energy resources at the expense of other regions (we ourselves produce electric power at shale stations).

Well, there is nothing surprising (or "embarrassing") in this. Each state (and, in our case, republic) tries to use products brought in from the outside in the widest possible variety, which is quite natural. That is the reason also why they are brought in on a wide scale. But there are always fewer shipments out—according to one's own specialization—if you calculate according to nomenclature items. And this is absolutely normal from an economic standpoint. As for natural resources, then it is hardly possible to reproach the state for the fact that it is poor in minerals. By the way, Japan, as is well-known, lives practically exclusively on imported raw materials. However, the normal development of economic mutual relations with other states that are built on mutual benefits made it possible for it to become a leading power in the world.

"However, one more methodology exists of reciprocal calculations, between countries or between republics. This is the payment balance (for one year), or the calculation balance (for a long period)."

The payment balance of the Estonian SSR for 1988 was recently compiled in our department of statistics. It contains three basic sections—commodity turnover, services, and financial-credit relations. Without going into detail, I will say that, according to this methodology, in general the shipment of resources out of the republic exceeded shipments into Estonia by approximately R200 million. The redistribution of credit resources played a big role in this balance.

The savings of the population of the republic today constitute more than R2 billion. However, this money is not stored in the savings banks of Estonia, but in the USSR Gosbank [State Bank], and they are utilized by the central authority according to its own discretion for financing all-Union measures. The annual calculation (for 1988) for Estonia is R115 million. It was more in other years. It was exactly this sum that the workers of Estonia supposedly sent in one year to the center for investment on its part of capital investments in various places in the Soviet Union.

"Comparing the national income which is consumed and that which was produced," Khagelberg continues, "it is not possible to judge in a straightforward way: If you consumed more (and for Lithuania, according to Yu.D. Maslyukov, this increase in the last 20 years constitutes R5 billion), you are living at someone else's expense. This conclusion is also untrue. For the requirement on the territory of a republic, including Estonia, does not reflect the real requirements of the republic itself. In actual fact, there are fewer requirements. Supplemental sums of required income are obtained, in particular, owing to the migration of money, and also owing to the content of some closed establishments of a union significance."

And in closing, Academician R. Khagelberg comes to the conclusion: "The discussion on the subject 'who owes what to whom' is basically incorrect. Any discussions on this score in our troubling days should be weighed carefully, and not only statistical data has to be considered, but also the difficulties in the economic life of the country. Indeed, on the whole, economic relations are so diverse and multipronged, that each side can give them its own desired emphasis. But can human destinies and the mutual relations among people really be measured by the ruble alone?"

"I would like to end on this," R. Khagelberg says in conclusion, "but I still cannot do it. By what scales do you measure the losses sustained by Estonia in connection with the changes of 1940? And the losses were very great—human, material, and moral losses. As a result, Estonia lost approximately one-fifth of its population—those who were banished to Stalinist camps, who were repressed directly, who were killed, who died from hunger, and it is those who emigrated to other countries. And how many children were not born as a result of all of this? Who is taking a count?

"As for the economy, Kalev Kukk, my young colleague from the Economics Institute of the ESSR Academy of Sciences," Academician R. Khagelberg concludes his account," calculates the income of the Estonian Republic that was not received for 40 years in comparison with Finland. The fact is that Estonia and Finland in the prewar period were practically on the same level of economic development. We have similar geographic, natural, and climatic conditions, and there is a common ethno-social and cultural character. Therefore, a comparison of Estonia with Finland is entirely proper and legitimate. Thus, K. Kukk determined that in the postwar period, in comparison with Finland, Estonia was deprived of at least $150 billion of gross national product or 73 percent of that which it could have received additionally for these years. One hundred fifty billion dollars.... From whom can Estonia claim this sum"?

Latvian Supreme Soviet Continues Work

LD1105080790 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0700 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of Latvia continues its work today. During the morning the faction groups of deputies will discuss the structure of the republic's Council of Ministers proposed yesterday. Later, discussions will take place in the permanent commisions on the recommended candidacies for ministerial posts. In the afternoon the same questions will be examined at a plenary session. We shall relay it. The start of the evening session and of the relay is at 1500 [1200 GMT].

Riga Radio Carries 10 May Latvian Supreme Soviet Commissions Debated

LD1005083790

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0700 GMT on 10 May begins carrying a live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Reporter Aivars Tiltins outlines the session's agenda for the day and at 0702 GMT Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Gorbunov opens the morning session and a count of deputies is taken.

At 0703 GMT Gorbunov states that according to the militia and the KGB the situation in the republic is normal. He follows this with a brief report on a meeting held at the victory monument. He then goes on to outline the session schedule and agenda and give details on voting on the regulations for permanent commissions.

At 0713 GMT a vote on the regulations of permanent commission is adopted; with 156 votes in favor, 12 against, and three abstentions. Gorbunov then gives more information on the establishment and composition of 15 commissions.

At 0719 GMT Deputies Makharev, Dimanis and others, ask questions in Russian concerning the composition of the commissions.

At 0723 GMT Deputy Budovskis, in charge of establishing the commissions, answers deputies' questions, and gives details about the work and role of the commissions, the numbers in each, the faction proportions in some, and also vacancies existing in six of the commissions.

At 0706 GMT there is an exchange between Deputies Dimanis and Budovskis on the number of members in the construction, power engineering, transportation, and information science commissions and their make-up

with regard to Russian members. Contributions and questions by other deputies follow.

At 0742 GMT Budovskis and Gorbunov answer questions on the composition and role of the defense, internal affairs, and other commissions.

At 0757 GMT a vote on the numerical strength of commissions is taken, with 117 votes in favor of the motion, 48 against, and five abstentions.

At 0759 GMT the session adjourns for a 30-minute break.

Commission Membership Announced

LD1005092690

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0835 GMT resumes its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session proceedings.

Gorbunov reopens the session, and is followed by Budovskis announcing that agreement has been reached during the break on the composition of all the commissions. He reads the names of commission members.

At 0841 GMT Deputy Bojars asks if he can change from membership of the Economics Commission to the Foreign Affairs Commission. He is told he can participate in the work of the latter without making a change.

After a count of deputies is established as being 171, a vote is taken at 0845 GMT on composition of the commissions. Voting is 159 in favor, six against, with four abstentions.

At 0846 GMT there is a discussion in Russian between Deputy Alksnis and Gorbunov on Bojars' proposal, followed by replies to Alksnis about procedural matters concerning voting.

At 0851 GMT Budovskis gives details about the rooms in which the individual commissions will meet.

At 0855 GMT another 30-minute break is announced.

Voting Procedures Reported

LD1005105990

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian resumes its live relay of proceedings of the Latvian Supreme Soviet in Riga at 0930 GMT with a reporter commenting on the Commission for Economics, and then interviewing the chairman of the Trade and Consumer Service Commission and various members of commissions.

At 0950 GMT Gorbunov announces a resumption of proceedings, and explains voting procedures on commissions' proposals. Further discussion ensues.

At 1005 GMT proposals on electing chairmen of the permanent commissions are approved following voting, which ends at 1034 GMT.

At 1036 GMT the decision of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairmen of permanent commissions is approved by a vote.

At 1038 GMT the session adjourns for lunch. The reporter notes that appointment of the government will begin at 1500 GMT. At this point the relay ends.

Government Financing Viewed

LD1005141390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian resumes its live relay of proceedings of the Latvian Supreme Soviet in Riga at 1158 GMT following the lunch break with reporter Aivars Tiltins giving his views on a new government.

At 1202 GMT Gorbunov reopens proceedings, and says that Ivars Godmanis will report on the Council of Ministers.

At 1205 GMT Godmanis states that deputy chairmen of the council are present to answer questions posed by the various commissions. He says that there will be a reduction in the number of deputy chairmen, and that the cabinet would adopt joint decisions, with corresponding ministers assuming responsibility. He goes on to note that there will be a cut in the number of deputies, and that there will be 17 ministries. In conclusion he reports on the appointment of a commission for government reorganization, the restoration of sovereignty, the role of commissions in connection with government laws, the need to form a presidium, forming committees and departments, and on previous committees or ministries.

At 1218 GMT a deputy poses a question in Russian on the cost of such a government. Godmanis explains the duties of ministries, and says that the costs would not exceed previous costs, and might even diminish. He goes on to answer further questions on the distribution of duties, and then says that further questions will be answered by commissions or at plenary meetings.

At 1224 GMT a deputy asks about the inclusion of the USSR KGB in the administration. Godmanis replies about financing the Internal Affairs Ministry, and points out that the KGB, although appointed locally, is financed by Moscow. He says that this question can be discussed.

At 1226 GMT a deputy asks about forestry and construction materials. At 1231 GMT a question is asked on guidance for the law by the Council of Ministers or the Constitution. Godmanis says there is no contradiction in the law concerning the Constitution.

At 1235 GMT, by request, Godmanis reiterates his remarks, in Russian, concerning the KGB. He then goes on to answer questions about traffic and transportation problems.

At 1240 GMT Gorbunov calls for an end to questions. He says that debate should begin and that work in commissions should continue.

At 1242 GMT Deputy Lucans calls for reorganization of agriculture. He says that an agriculture machinery

building minister is needed because of the failures of this branch of agriculture. He goes on to point out problems concerning forestry.

At 1247 GMT Deputy Gavrilov, in Russian, also gives detailed criticism of the agricultural industry.

At 1254 GMT Deputy Grube outlines problems facing agriculture, and calls for an agricultural machinery building department and also a forestry department. At 1258 GMT Deputy Salitis comments on the importance of forming a government, and goes on to marine and fishing issues. He calls for a Marine Affairs Ministry.

At 1303 GMT Deputy Blazevics is heard talking about forestry and a market economy. At 1307 GMT debates begin between various Russian and Latvian-speaking deputies concerning the functions of a construction ministry, agriculture, and the agro-industrial committee.

A 30-minute break is announced at 1328 GMT.

Formation of Government Urged

LD1005171290

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian resumes its live relay of proceedings of the Latvian Supreme Soviet in Riga at 1358 GMT on 10 May following a 30-minute break. Gorbunov is in the chair.

At 1359 GMT (Lukashevits), speaking in Russian, talks about relations with other republics, compares the prices for purchased materials, and discusses other economic topics.

At 1408 GMT Dimanis discusses what kinds of ministries are required and notes the poor situation in the municipal economy.

At 1412 GMT Gorbunov discusses the agenda for today and tomorrow.

At 1416 GMT Kehris says that there is no government at present, noting that two people are doing all the work. He talks of the necessity of expediting matters.

At 1420 GMT (Leonids Alksnis) discusses construction, and says that in his opinion, speaking as an architect, ministries are necessary.

At 1425 GMT a Latvian speaker discusses the transitional period, talks of the importance of introducing a Latvian currency, and addresses the issue of housing problems. He says that in principle, he supports the law on government, which should be established without delay.

At 1432 GMT Einars Repse speaks against the inclusion of the KGB within the government. This had not been discussed within the factions, he says. There are realities which must be considered, and some questions should be clarified before including the KGB in the government. Repse says he is concerned about KGB participation in repression.

At 1436 GMT Dzintars Abikis speaks of his concern about forests, and says he wants a department of forestry.

At 1439 GMT Premier Ivars Godmanis talks of the difference between ministries and departments, before moving on to a detailed discussion of agriculture. He speaks of the role of ministers and deputy ministers, forestry, and offers his proposals on the government's program, specifically concerning the KGB. Godmanis says he had telephoned the Baltic Military District commander asking about the number of paratroopers in Riga and had received a reply that they had come for the parade, but should leave, to return, if necessary. Godmanis says that relations with the Army and the KGB should, nevertheless, be developed correctly, and should be decided by the deputies....In conclusion, Godmanis speaks of the administration functions. His 19-minute speech ends at 1458 GMT.

At 1500 GMT a report is read in Russian in reply to a question concerning public order around the session's building.

At 1502 GMT another report is read in Russian by deputy editor of SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, (Stapanovich), about the paper's publication.

At 1508 GMT Gorbunov discusses the meetings of commissions and says that the plenary meeting will resume tomorrow at 0700 GMT.

At 1510 GMT the relay ends.

Godmanis Discusses Army, Security Committee

LD1105074990 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1439 GMT 10 May 90

[Speech by Ivars Godmanis, Latvian prime minister, at the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga—from the live relay]

[Excerpt] First I want to reply here to specific questions, criticisms, and to start with, perhaps, replies to matters of principle, from my viewpoint. [passage omitted]

The next question is connected with the very last political matter, the Committee for Security.

Yes, well, here we have approximately the following situation. For example, there was talk here also about the Baltic Military District, about the Committee for Security.

I could perhaps take this opportunity, since all the inhabitants of Latvia are listening. I am able to state very clearly: I telephoned today the commander of the Baltic Military District and asked only one question: Could he competently tell me in what connection are tank units, in a large number, in Riga. Moreover, during daytime. Knowing well, I myself have served, I can well imagine what the daily regime of the Army is, but I nowhere remember that during the working week there would be such a number on leave that so many, let us say, representatives of the assault army [desanta armija] could be on the streets of Riga. Without doubt, not at all softening the political situation.

Well, I received the following reply: The assault troops [desanta karaspeks] have arrived here in Riga for the parade, and after the parade they will leave Riga, but, if necessary, they will return.

Then I said, of course, I do not know in what connection they should return, whether as it happened in one or another southern republic in the Union.

No, well, if there would be questions to be solved with property. I do not know if it is possible to solve juridical questions with the Army; in such an instance, I think we shall not get far.

You see, the same question, which is a very serious question, and which shows to what a great extent the rights of even that republic are respected which, (?according to) the opinion of the supreme commander of the Army, is still within the composition of the USSR and is the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, and all that which he said in his speech, this simply shows to how great an extent our Army regards its rights to interfere in civiian life, to interfere in that sphere which comes under the competence of the Supreme Soviet and without doubt also under the competence of the Council of Ministers.

Talking here about the Committee for Security: Yes, this question had to be discussed, but, nevertheless, I would like to say, and to a certain extent also express the following opinion to the deputies:

If we regard this as a transitional process, then also all the relations which are being formed here with the Army, and which are being formed also with the Committee for Security, must, however, be solved correctly. We are aware of the situation of the Army here, the practical, actual one. We are aware how great are the practical opportunities, what are the practical opportunities. But, nevertheless, we can also clearly declare that these relations in future must be (?formed) correctly and toward reducing this Army here, and toward ensuring that the Army is restricted to the bases, and those bases are established by competent treaties.

The same applies to the Committee for Security. Yes, the Committee for Security is at present in practice being financed [words indistinct] I already said that.

Now the question, if we are entering the transitional period, are we capable of correctly, and with the assistance of commissions, of gradually changing the functions of this Committee for Security, turning them more or less into a direct [word indistinct] of citizens. Are we able to do that?

We can take two roads. We could absolutely, in such an instance, exclude this organization, as well as the chairman of the organization, from the composition of the government. In such an instance, we shall arrive at the following system: The government will not have that specific information which is at the disposal of Committee for Security. It can of course be doubted to what extent this information is objective, considering that the subordination at present is very, so to say, symbolic. No, this is [a process] of time, this is the correct process. It must be tackled in Moscow, and it must be tackled also here. And I think that the deputies should seriously consider to what extent this information is essentially (?necessary), to what extent it is essential. Therefore, concerning this question, I leave it; of course, my proposal has been expressed here; the deputies will be able to decide about the essence of this proposal. [passage omitted]

Riga Plant Workers Appeal to Suppliers

PM1005121790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 May 90 p 1

[Article under the general heading "The Baltic: The Choice Has Been Made, But...": "Appeal From 'RAF' to Labor Collectives in USSR Republics, Oblasts, and Krays Supplying the Motor Vehicles Plant With Materials, Components, and Parts"]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! On 4 May, the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted a Declaration on the Restoration of the Independent Latvian Republic.

We realize that, in the immediate future, we will have to work in the difficult conditions of a possible economic blockade of the republic by other regions in our country. Our plant is an enterprise under Union jurisdiction and will remain so, supplying its output, which enjoys high demand, to all Union republics. Even now deliveries have not been suspended. We understand that the USSR Ministry of Health and Union republic health ministries especially need our products to guarantee efficient medical assistance to the population. There is a great demand for our vehicles by children's homes, homes for the elderly, internationalist servicemen's councils, and large families....

The plant's labor collective consistently fulfills its minibus production plan, working in difficult conditions created by political and economic pressure. We intend to complete all planned deliveries, including those under direct contracts, regardless of how relations between the republic and the Union may change. But in order to achieve this, the plant needs uninterrupted deliveries of all materials and components by its suppliers, of whom there are approximately 400 in the Union. Shortfalls or delays in deliveries of materials by even a single enterprise would create the threat of the plant coming to a standstill. Therefore, on behalf of the thousands-strong collective, we appeal to all suppliers of the "RAF" [Riga Bus Plant] minibus plant to adopt urgent measures to prevent any breakdowns in our joint work. Together we must prove that only joint work, based on mutual economic interests, will lead us out of the economic crisis and toward a better life for Soviet people.

On instructions by the collective—V. Bossert, plant director; I. Gusev, chairman of the labor collective council; K. Kuznetsov, secretary of the party committee; T. Pulyak, chairman of the trade union committee; and

T. Kutyavin, secretary of the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] committee.

Latvian Party Leaders' Biographies Reported

90UN1578B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed biographical data on Latvian Communist Party leaders]

[Text] **Vladimir Frantsevich Rymashevskiy, Second Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party**

Vladimir Frantsevich Rymashevskiy was born in 1938. He is a Belorussian and has been a member of the CPSU since 1960. He has a higher education and is a graduate of the Latvian Agricultural Academy and the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. He is an honored agricultural worker of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

He started work in 1956 at the Mogilev Dairy. After service in the Soviet Army he worked as a machine operator on refrigeration equipment, and was elected party organization secretary at the "Yauna dzive" kolkhoz [collective farm] in Ayzputskiy Rayon. From 1964 to 1967 he was an instructor with the Latvian Communist Party Rezeknenskiy Raykom [rayon party committee], chief agronomist at the "Makonkalns" soviet, director of the "Komyaniyetis" sovkhoz [state farm], chairman of the planning commission in the Rezeknenskiy Rayispolkom [rayon executive committee], and deputy chief of the rayon agricultural administration.

From 1976 he worked in the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus as an instructor, section chief, and deputy chief of the Agricultural and Food Industry Department. From 1983 to 1987 he was first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Saldusskiy Raykom.

In April 1987 he was appointed first deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee and a Latvian SSR minister.

From 1988 he has been first deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers.

He is a member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. He was elected deputy to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation.

Inart Yulyevich Skuin, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary

Inart Yulyevich Skuin was born in 1936. He is a Latvian. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1961. He has a higher education, having graduated from the Latvian State University Faculty of History and Philology and the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School.

He started work in 1959 as a history teacher at the Riga Electromechanical Technical School. He then worked as chief of the correspondence department at the school.

From 1962 he was chief of the lecture group in the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee.

From 1963 to 1969 he was editor of the newspaper SPORTS.

From 1969 to 1976 he worked in the Latvian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

From 1971 to 1973 he was a CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School student.

From 1976 to 1979 he worked in the Riga Gorkom [city party committee] apparatus as a deputy chief and later chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department.

From 1979 to 1989 he worked in the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus as a lecturer and deputy chief of the press, radio, and television section in the Propaganda and Agitation Department.

Since April 1989 he has been chief of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press.

Arnold Petrovich Klautsen, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary and First Secretary of the Riga Party Gorkom

Arnold Petrovich Klautsen was born in 1937. He is a Latvian. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1960. he has a higher education, having graduated from the Riga Polytechnical Institute and the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School. He is an honored industrial worker of the Latvian SSR.

He started work in 1957 as a foreman in the "Stalmontazh-3" Trust in Sverdlovsk City, and he then worked at the Riga "Montazhniki" Plant as a fitter, brigade leader, and foreman.

Since 1965 he has been doing party work: instructor, chief of the industrial transport department, and secretary in the Oktyabrskiy Raykom in Riga City. From 1970 he was chief of the Construction and Municipal Economy Department in the Riga Gorkom, and in 1973 he was elected first secretary of the Moskovskiy Raykom in Riga City.

From 1978 he was a Riga Gorkom secretary. From 1980 he was first secretary of the Liyepaya Gorkom.

From 1984 he was chief of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Light Industry and Consumer Goods Department.

From 1985 he was first secretary of the Riga Gorkom.

He is a member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. He was elected deputy to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, 9th, 10th and 11th convocations, and has been elected USSR people's deputy.

Stepan Stepanovich Palyora, Chairman of the Latvian Communist Party Central Control-and Auditing Commission

Stepan Stepanovich Palyora was born in 1934. He is a Ukrainian. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1963. He has a higher education, having graduated from the Odessa Institute of Merchant Navy Engineers and the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School.

He started work in 1957 in Aralskiy Port, working as an engineer in the labor and equipment safety department and as chief of a cargo section. He later worked in various posts at enterprises in the country's river fleet.

From 1964 he was in the Riga Maritime Trading Port, working as a longshoreman, dispatcher, chief of the marine buildings, and deputy chief of the export rayon in charge of operations.

From 1966 to 1984 he was involved in party work: party committee secretary at the Riga Maritime Trading Port and party committee deputy secretary and secretary in the Latvian Maritime Steamship Line.

From 1984 he worked as first deputy chairman of the Riga Gorispolkom [city executive committee].

Since 1986 he has been chairman of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Committee.

He was elected deputy to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation.

Latvian Party Congress Resolution Published

90UN1575C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 3

[Resolution of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress: "The Political Report of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The congress notes that the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, which has supported perestroyka, has during the period since the 24th congress been unable to devise in good time a concept for perestroyka in the republic or to take the lead in the process of renewal in the party itself.

The situation in the party organizations is deteriorating because of ideological vacillation and loss of faith in communist ideals among some communists.

In fact, forces are operating within the Latvian Communist Party that are trying to destroy its ideological-political and organizational unity and to form factions and other parties.

The lack of principle in the work of the Central Committee in defending positions on key issues and the divorce of the party from the masses have become the main brake in achieving positive results in the process of perestroyka.

The congress resolves as follows:

1. To agree in the main with the conclusions and assessments of the Latvian Communist Party political report to the congress.

2. To deem the work of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee during the period since the 24th Latvian Communist Party Congress unsatisfactory.

3. To assign the newly elected Latvian Communist Party Central Committee the task of working out, on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform and giving due consideration to the bases for the Latvian Communist Party Program drawn up by the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and proposals from delegates, a draft Program for the Latvian Communist Party to extricate the republic from crisis and to submit the program for consideration by the congress.

To this end to call a recess in the work of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress until the 28th CPSU Congress is over, and to extend for this period the powers of congress delegates; and during the course of the recess to debate the draft Latvian Communist Party Program in the primary party organizations with the active involvement of the members of the newly elected Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and congress delegates in this work.

4. To take under advisement the Latvian Communist Party Rules submitted to the congress.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will generalize and do further work on proposals on organizational-regulatory matters and submit them to the 28th CPSU Congress. The final decision on its own Rules will be made when the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress completes its work.

5. Within two months the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will work on and consider the structure and staffs of elected organs and the apparatuses of the Central Committee and party gorkoms and raykoms, paying particular attention to strengthening cadres in the ideological formations of the party.

6. To assign the new Latvian Communist Party Central Committee before 1 June 1990 to discuss matters relating to the activity of all party mass media, and to draw up a program of measures to renew the ideological activity of the party.

7. To assign the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee the task of forming a commission to make a political assessment of the historical path of the Latvian Communist Party and to prepare materials on this question for examination at one of the sessions during the second part of the congress.

RSFSR

Election of Russian President Discussed

LD0505112190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0700 GMT on 5 May broadcasts the 60-minute fourth and final program in a series entitled "The Sovereignty of Russia," introduced by V.V. Novikov, chief editor of the Chief Editorial Office of television programs for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics [RSFSR]. Novikov says that Abalkin and Yeltsin had promised to participate but they were unable to attend for objective reasons. The participants in the program are S.D. Valentey, candidate of economics at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economics; G.P. Luzin, doctor of economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Kola Scientific Center; V.P. Chichkanov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the commission for economic reform; S.M. Shakhray, RSFSR people's deputy and a specialist on the work of parliaments.

In reply to a question asking about the idea of a united states of Russia, Luzin says that he favors the idea, as does Chichkanov.

Should the USSR be a federation or a confederation? Shakhray says it is necessary to work out the theory of these terms. He adds that a confederation is unstable.

Chichkanov replies to a question as to why the Russian Government is not working on the sovereignty of Russia. He says that work is under way on the various components, and adds that the matter will be discussed at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Asked how the RSFSR parliament should act in order to be effective, Shakhray says that it could just concern itself with organizational aspects, but another and better approach is to change the RSFSR Constitution and to have professional parliamentarians.

Viewers then ask when Russia will get out of its present crisis. Valentey says it will take a long time—10 to 15 years. Denationalization of property must be accomplished and there must be moves toward freely convertible currency. Luzin says that there must be an increase in the production of goods for the population in order to make the change over to a market economy effective. Industrial ministries are the worst monopolists at present. Little is being done by the RSFSR to improve these matters. Chichkanov speaks in defense of the ministries; they are necessary but their functions must be changed, he says.

Shakhray refuses to forecast how long it will take to improve the economy but returns to his theme of the future role of people's deputies. He says that the presidium and the government must present a report on their activities to the congress. A new Union treaty must be drawn up.

Novikov replies to a question as to why Abalkin is not present. He is busy, he says.

Valentey then gives figures on imports into Russia of foodstuffs. He says this should be determined by the market.

Luzin reads out a question about the RSFSR budget and the possible role of a peasants' political party in improving this.

Luzin goes on to reply to people's queries about possible rises in the prices of foodstuffs.

Shakhray then gives brief replies to viewers' questions, including questions from Novikov on the possibility of a RSFSR president. He says that such a president should be elected by all the people and not just deputies. Shakhray also talks about the RSFSR parliament protecting Russians wherever they live, saying:

"There are very many questions on the situation of Russian people, citizens of Russia, in other republics, in particular in the Baltic republics. A question which generalizes the subject a bit: Is it being planned to introduce in Russia a law on citizenship? If yes, can Russian people from other regions of the country obtain it? A law on the citizenship of Russia is indispensible, and it will be adopted by the parliament of Russia. This law will not only enshrine the right of Russians to obtain Russian citizenship, but also it will also enshrine the duty of the Russian state to protect its citizens, irrespective of where they are located.

"One of the permanent commissions we are intending to set up is a commission on the rights of refugees, including one on the rights of Russian refugees from other republics. This is a very serious and acute problem, and we will be specifically tackling this at the RSFSR congress and at the Supreme Soviet.

[Novikov] "Since the subject of candidatures for the post of the chairman of the presidium—or the Supreme Soviet in this case—of the Russian Federation has been touched on, many are asking what are the chances for Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin to become president. What do you reckon?

[Shakhray] "I think that People's Deputy Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has, in my view, a good chance to become chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. As for my personal attitude, I would like to choose not just between the personalities of various contenders to this post, but also between the programs of the contenders. I repeat, I would like the powers of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet before his election to be restricted. In the absence of a multi-party system, an independent press, and an elementary legislative culture, it is unacceptable to confer such powers on one person".

Primakov Responds to Workers' Questions

LD1005210290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The arrival in North Ossetia of Comrade Primakov, Presidential Council member, has attracted the attention of the public at large.

[Correspondent I. Tabolova] The program for Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov's stay in the autonomous republic has proved to be very busy. From the very first day there have been numerous meetings in work collectives, with the creative intelligentsia and with the party aktiv. People have been showing sincere interests in these meetings, because there are currently very many problems of concern to us all. One of these problems is interethnic relations. Therefore, a considerable number of the mass of questions put to the member of the Presidential Council concerned the problems of harmonizing interethnic relations. [video shows Primakov addressing an indoor meeting]

[Primakov] The situation has been, so to speak, also quite impaired by certain informal organizations that thoughtlessly support these tendencies, which are hampering us from really, fully adjusting matters in the Soviet Union at the interethnic level. We want to do this. We want to do it and will do so. So, there is a need to be engaged on this too. [video shows Primakov reading a question from paper]

How is the process of depolitizing and de-ideologizing the administrative structures and the state going? What do you expect from the 28th CPSU Congress? Well, you know, de-ideologization and depolitization are not the same thing. That is the first point. I do not think we need to depolitize the administrative structures, because politics remain politics, do they not? Now, if one is speaking of the de-ideologization of the administrative structures, the very fact of the transfer of power from the party at the various levels to the soviets is after all already de-ideologization. It is already de-ideologization.

[Tabolova] Evidently, Comrade Primakov's forthright replies to all the questions put to him helped the fact that his get-togethers in Ossetia have been marked by an atmosphere of trust and warmth. [video shows interview with Primakov]

[Primakov] There is, of course, a mass of questions and many unresolved problems, but here in Ossetia I have sensed that people understand firstly that these problems are in no way easy to solve and that they need to resolved not by proceeding in just one area but by proceeding indeed in all areas including a strengthening of labor discipline, democratization of our society and law and order.

Much is being done to solve these problems. I have had occasion here today to have meetings. Many people have been saying: Well, we will be patient for a while but give us real prospects. One needs to ponder this and ponder it very seriously so that there may be stages of solution and there may be an ordering of issues and a better thought-out plan for the transition to market relations with all the guarantees of course that are essential, I mean social guarantees for the population.

Prokofyev Interviewed on Plenum, Elections

90UN1467A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by Zh. Avyazova under the rubric "At the Press Center of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom": "The City Needs Realists"]

[Text] **As VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA has already reported, yesterday in the party's city committee a press conference took place dedicated to the results of the last plenum of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom [city committee] and the elections to the soviets of people's deputies. Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom, answered the journalists' questions.**

Not one press conference, perhaps, has ever ended with the last question from the audience. Such is their nature—to give food for thought and discussion. And such is the nature of the journalists—to immediately want to share their opinions with their colleagues and to "circulate" their own opinions and listen to others.... What did the participants of yesterdays meeting talk about afterwards? What "stuck" this time more than the rest? The representatives of the various publications had their own opinions on this count, but interest focused for the most part on one point—the strategy and tactics the party gorkom chooses in cooperation with the new soviets.

During the meeting a journalist from MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI asked, "Which faction in the current Moscow Soviet can the party gorkom count on?"

"We will rely on the realists," Yu.A. Prokofyev answered. And he mentioned that the gorkom's position at the elections has been the following: "It is not important who nominated a candidate for deputy. What is important is who was nominated."

All of us—communists and nonparty people—have an interest in seeing that the organs of the people's sovereignty contain people who are genuinely able to work for perestroyka. Yu.A. Prokofyev cited the following figures: Members of the CPSU make up 68 percent of those who were elected RSFSR people's deputies, 58 percent of those elected to the Moscow Soviet, and about 64 percent of those elected to the rayon soviets. What does that say? It should not be judged in just one way. On the whole, the leading role of the CPSU has been maintained in the elective organs. But it is a paradox that Yuriy Anatolyevich declared at first glance, "It will be more difficult to work." Why? There is no more unity of ideas. "And that is praiseworthy," noted the first secretary,

stressing that problems and their solutions will be evaluated more realistically as a result.

So WHO is nominated is important.... At this press conference, as, by the way, at previous meetings, the first secretary of the party gorkom did not try to hide behind popular, formerly "common" opinions, but rather expressed his own opinion candidly.

"I am an advocate of consolidation. If the Moscow Soviet breaks into factions and groups, it will be difficult to expect concrete achievements from it."

A question was raised: "Judging by everything, no slogans or theoretical findings can raise the authority of the party now. What kind of concrete measures do the city party organizations intend to take in order to get out of the crisis?" And here is the answer of Yu.A. Prokofyev: "It is impossible for a single region or for Moscow alone to pull itself out of the crisis just as it is impossible to build socialism, communism, or even capitalism in a single country taken by itself." At the same time social programs are needed which will be able to help Moscow. The Law on the Status of the Capital City must play its role. It is also necessary to improve the material situation of the poor—and in our city there are two million pensioners and many invalids and needy people.

But.... "It is impossible to make people happy 'from above.'" And there is no denying that such a tendency has existed: The housing problem must be solved—but settlements are torn down in order to put up multistory boxes without taking account of the residents' opinions, etc.

"You say that it is impossible to make people happy 'from above,' that it must come from the person. But what kept the leaders of the Moscow Soviet from doing things that way earlier?" sounded a question from the audience microphone. And the answer was frank: "Apparently, the government's general way of thinking formed the model for the thoughts of these people as well." He personally collided with this approach—that the government could do much good—when he agreed to run in the microrayon of Butovo where consumer and service problems are critical and there is no hospital or decent school. And all this was justified by its "bright future."

Indeed, our future always looked so attractive. The drama of our history was that unacceptable methods were used to achieve a positive goal. And it is truly long past time to come down to earth and think about how we can guarantee people a dignified life today without destroying their way of life....

What must be renounced? An oversimplified approach opposed to human values, everything that estranges people, and a primitive view of economic innovations must be renounced. ("I have a very negative attitude toward the rationing system: We struggle with privileges, and then we ourselves create them in individual regions.") The party dictate in any form must be renounced ("The CPSU Moscow Gorkom Plenum is allowing the local party organizations and raykoms to fix the dates for conducting reports and elections themselves"). Dogmatic stereotypes in relation to other formations of workers and platforms in the CPSU must be renounced ("The most varied representatives—including the authors of 'The Democratic Platform'—were called to work on the creation of the city party organization's draft position for the 28th CPSU Congress").

The idea of creating an all-Russian preparatory committee received support inasmuch as opinion is increasingly crystallizing on the inevitability of creating a Russian Communist Party. It was decided to conduct the city party conference in two stages: Before the congress and immediately upon its conclusion. The need for party discipline was emphasized.

"Of course there are differences even among united communists. But are these various approaches so incompatible that the question should be raised of creating a faction and consequently turning it into an individual party?" This thought could be heard repeatedly.

"Let us once more consider, think, and consult".... No, these words were not pronounced aloud, but they did indeed hover in the air. The feeling did not leave that the person conducting the press conference was himself posing the questions for the audience. He took an active, involved, friendly position, giving food not only for thought, but for the soul as well.

'Reforma' Foundation Constituted in Moscow

90US0873A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by I. Demchenko: "'Reforma' Fund Constituted"]

[Text] A constituent conference of the "Reforma" Fund—a social and economic initiatives fund—was held in Moscow on 28 April.

Recently, IZVESTIYA (No. 116) published an appeal for its establishment signed by Academician S. Shatalin, the Metropolitan of Volokolamsk, Yuryev Pitirim, USSR people's artist M. Ulyanov, and B. Fomin, general director of the Production Association "Elektrosila." After this, the telephone in the organizational committee did not quiet down for a minute—there were so many who wanted to participate in the new undertaking. And so—the fund is already a reality.

More than 80 enterprises and organizations announced their desire to become its founders.

On the assurances of B. Bagoryatskiy, a member of the organizational committee that is preparing the constituent conference, alluring positions with high salaries will not be set up in the fund's organizational structure. It is planned that it will be a self-developing and self-supporting organization whose structure will be formed

depending on need and that it will respond versatilely to change. But it is not even money that should be the main capital of the fund, according to the concept of the creators, but the opportunity to make contacts and an atmosphere of quasi-club relations.

Both organizations and individual persons, regardless of place of residence and citizenship, can become members of the "Reforma" Fund.

The telephone of the organizational committee of the "Reforma" Fund in Moscow is 166-20-85.

Moscow, Leningrad Letters Support Lithuania

90UN1635A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, Apr 90 p 7

[Letter to UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA from N. Makeyev and response]

[Text] The mass media for some reason only casually reported information to the effect that a group of deputies of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies and the Leningrad Soviet of People's Deputies submitted a statement to the President of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet in which they allegedly expressed support for the actions of the Lithuanian leadership. It would be interesting to learn what this statement was and which of the deputies signed it?
[Signed] N. Makeyev. Tula.

The answer from the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Seventy-three deputies of the Moscow City Soviet sent a letter to V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. It says in particular: "We consider the forced retention of your people and state within the framework of the USSR to be intolerable. Realizing that a people who oppress other peoples cannot be free, we condemn the interference of the president of the USSR and the Government of the USSR in the internal affairs of your republic."

This letter was published in all Lithuanian newspapers, and it caused an ambiguous reaction among the residents of Lithuania.

A group of Leningrad residents—people's deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the Leningrad Soviet (78 signatures all told)—addressed the president of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

"Today, 17 March, we received information about the employment of military force in Lithuania. We are convinced of the intolerability of force in the resolution of the question of the sovereignty of Lithuania and other republics. We insist on the resolution of this problem only by means of negotiations. We demand that you rule out the employment of military force and immediately begin direct negotiations with the authorized representatives of the legally elected leadership of the republic."

Further on Moscow Supreme Soviet Elections

90UN1686B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by V. Nechayev and M. Polyatykin: The Mossovet Session Continues"]

[Text] The results of the secret vote for Mossovet [Moscow City Soviet) chairman became known late Friday night. The ballots had five names on them and after the vote count these were the results: Of the deputies that took part in the election, 280 voted for G. Popov, 82 for I. Preobrazhenskiy, 44 for A. Bryachikhin, 12 for O. Kachalin, and N. Kaburneyev received two votes. [begin bold] Thus USSR and Mossovet People's Deputy Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov was elected chairman of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies. [end bold]

While the vote counting commission was still at work it became necessary to outline the future agenda of the session. There were different opinions pronounced. Some people offered to begin the Saturday meeting at the same time, 1000. Others wanted to participate in the subbotnik. By a majority vote they adopted a compromise solution not to stop work and begin on Saturday with a four-hour delay.

The next question on the agenda was the main one—election of the Mossovet deputy chairman. Mossovet Chairman G. Popov proposed to elect USSR and Mossovet Deputy S. Stankevich to this post. No other persons were nominated and the discussion took much less time than the day before.

While the vote counting commission members were preparing the ballots for the secret vote, the head of the Mosgorispolkom [Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee] GUVD [Main Administration for Internal Affairs], P. Bogdanov, took the floor. He said that legal proceedings had begun in connection with the assault on Deputy E. Miroshina on 4 April.

After the break and the secret vote the deputies began discussing the second item on the agenda—"other".

Some deputies have already protested the "biased" coverage of the session by city newspapers, mainly MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. They even offered to take such a harsh measure as canceling the journalists' accreditation.

We think that full TV coverage of the meetings would not leave any room for misstatements, but opinions on one or another event do not have to coincide.

After the final count the commission announced that 376 deputies took part in the election, and of them 332 voted for the candidate. **As a result, USSR and Mossovet People's Deputy Sergey Borisovich Stankevich was elected Mossovet deputy chairman.**

G. Kh. Popov Is the Mossovet Chairman

Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov has been elected chairman of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies.

An ethnic Greek, he was born in Moscow in 1936. He graduated from the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov; he is a member of the CPSU.

G.Kh. Popov is a doctor of economics and a professor. He is the editor in chief of VOPROSY EKONOMIKI magazine. Last year he was elected USSR people's deputy from the Union of Science and Engineering Societies of the USSR. He serves on the subcommission for plans of economic and social development in the USSR in the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission of the Soviet of the Union; he is also a member of the commission on the new USSR Constitution and the Commission on Privileges for certain categories of the people. G.Kh. Popov is also one of the leaders of the interregional group of deputies.

He was elected Mossovet deputy from the Fifth Electoral District in Leninskiy Rayon.

Gorkiy Deputies on New Name, Open Status

LD1105123190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0943 GMT 11 May 90

[Excerpt] Gorkiy, 11 May. (TASS)—Gorkiy Soviet of People's Deputies of the new convocation has decided to restore the town's historic name: Nizhniy Novgorod. The soviet recognized that it is no longer expedient to retain its status as a closed town. It is true that the last word here belongs to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the country's government, but that is only a matter of time in the town peoples view, because the main thing is the decision of the local authorities.

It has been decided to revive the Nizhniy Novgorod market in the town which is 800 years old. The market was famous throughout the world at the start of the 19th and 20th centuries. It will open on 14 May on its old site, where the rivers Oka and Volga merge, and will last until 27 May. [passage omitted]

Leningrad TV, Radio Chairman Reportedly Fired

PM2704145290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 16, 17-23 Apr 90 p 3

[Mikhail Chulaki article: "Invasion And Invaders"]

[Text] Myths are being born right before our eyes. A fresh April myth: the "invasion of the Leningrad TV station". Contemporaries are being scared with ghosts from the freshest history: sailors crisscrossed with machine-gun cartridge belts assaulting telephone and telegraph offices. Only this time they are deputies to the Leningrad City Soviet (Lensoviet), and they are now crisscrossed with bunches of resolutions.

But here are the facts.

It was announced that on April 5, Nikolay Ivanov, USSR people's deputy elected by the whole city of Leningrad, would appear live on TV. But the day before, the telecast was cancelled by B. Petrov, Chairman of the Leningrad Committee for Radio and TV Broadcasting. The morning of April 5, Lensoviet passed a resolution requesting that Ivanov be permitted to meet those TV viewers who had elected him. Half an hour Ivanov was supposed to go on the air, the telecast was banned by the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting in a cable from Moscow. Petrov preferred to comply with the order from Moscow. On April 6 Lensoviet removed Petrov from his post. V. Senin, Petrov's deputy in charge of television and also a deputy to Lensoviet, arrived at the TV station with a group of deputies, presented the decision on Petrov's dismissal and, with his new powers as acting chairman, ordered the station to put Ivanov on the air live.

There was no violence nor could there be because both the door keepers and the studio's technical personnel were fulfulling an order from their direct superior.

What could be considered an invasion? Petrov's dismissal? The reinstatement of the canceled programme by the new acting chairman?

What happened at the Leningrad TV station mirrored the organization of our power structure. The Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting is triply subordinate: to the Leningrad City Soviet, to the Leningrad Regional Soviet and to the USSR State committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. Who issues orders in real terms? Until recently orders were issued by a fourth authority: the Regional Committee of the CPSU. It is the Regional Party Committee that, late last year, appointed B. Petrov, a member of its own apparat, as chairman of the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting—and this appointment was never approved by either the Leningrad City Soviet or the Leningrad City Executive Committee. It was the CPSU Regional Committee that performed the real invasion. And not the first one. Recently it declared Leningradskaya Pravda to be its personal organ without even consulting the Leningrad Regional Soviet, although previously they had been considered to be co-publishers. Even before this the same Regional Party Committee sealed the fate of the Leningrad magazine though it didn't at all belong to the Regional Committee.

It is perfectly obvious that what huappened is one of the first examples of the real struggle to give All Power to the Soviets. The City Soviet decided to take this power and the local Regional Party Committee balked, as did the Moscow government department and the Procurator's Office, which hastily instituted criminal proceedings under Article 200 for arbitrary action. (But wasn't the Regional Party Committee's unlawful appointment of Petrov, and Petrov's unlawful rule arbitrary action?)

Does a boss, no matter how high up, have the right to take a broadcast off the air? The chair which Comrade

Nenashev occupied at the State Committee on the Press is not yet cold, but when sitting in that chair he understood, I believe, that he had no right to cut out an article in a newspaper or magazine. He was a boss, but he had no right. He could evidently act behind the scenes, but he could not use an official order. But at the TV station he considers such actions to be legitimate.

Television has retained a sham unity. Journalists can now at last choose to write for the publication most sympathetic to them. But among TV journalists, too, there exist the same differences in views. It would be ideal for them to go to different channels, at least to appear under the signboard of different editorial offices. For viewers and even for superiors it would be easier to understand the impermissibility of direct interference.

Critics will argue that Lensoviet interfered in TV affairs by insisting on Ivanov's appearing live on the air. The fundamental difference is that putting a broadcast on the air and its prohibition are asymmetrical. Everyone has a right to bear a child, no one has a right to kill it. Both Lensoviet and the chairman of the Television and Radio committee have a right to help in the birth of information, but neither is entitled to kill information.

The killing of information directly violates my right—and that of millions of other TV viewers, citizens and voters like me, to have free access to inbformation: one of the fundamental human rights.

What can the Chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting do if he can't even ban a telecast? A lot of constructive work. He can establish technical policies, build new TV stations, distribute the channels. All of which his predecessors should have done but didn't.

If he does what he should, he won't have time to do what he shouldn't: to infringe on my right to information.

Oblast Party Criticizes Agrarian Union Promoters

PM0905091590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 90 p 1

[Report by I. Yaskevich, member of a voters' association council, and correspondent S. Smirnov: "Has the 'Purge' Begun?"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk—"A purge is imminent!"—that was how members of the Leningrad delegation to the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Congress assessed the situation following the publication of the CPSU Central Committee open letter. "Senior comrades" advised us not to get excited and asked us to name just one communist deprived of his party card for "dissidence." It was hard to object....

But the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA issues carrying reports of the congress debates had hardly had time to turn yellow before we were able to see for ourselves that the Leningraders' misgivings were not empty.

VECHERNIY CHELYABINSK published an interview 12 April with A. Sviridov, cochairman of the voters' union. He described the intention of a group of people, including two USSR people's deputies and an oblast soviet deputy, to set up a Russian or USSR Agrarian Union (Party). The union's main task would be to defend the peasants' legitimate rights and interests.

The organizational committee comprised 12 people. Sviridov named six of them in the interview. The obkom [oblast party committee] immediately took aim at all of them. After examining the action group's documents, the Party Control Commission acknowledged that "there are political forces within the oblast, along with the corresponding socioeconomic and political atmosphere in the countryside, for a new organizational structure to emerge to reflect and uphold the interests of the oblast's peasants." At the same time a note from the commission indicates that "the aforementioned aims and tasks elaborated by the action group for the union of agrarian workers and communists are designed for a political course separate from the oblast's party organizations and will help to ideologically and organizationally undermine them from within."

As a result two "subversives"—A. Sviridov and B. Cherepanov, party committee secretary at the sovkhoz named for the 60th anniversary of the USSR—were expelled from the party. V. Rudchenko, secretary of Sosnovskaya poultry farm party committee, was told that "the comrade is mistaken." It was decided to postpone the question of the role of People's Deputies M. Lezhnev and I. Shundeyev and of oblast soviet deputy N. Borodin until they return to Chelyabinsk from a duty tour.

The obkom bureau has instructed party committees "to investigate those communists who are taking concrete actions to split the party ranks both from within by creating factions and groupings and by organizing alternative parties."

Will the party obkom bureau's decision not act as the signal for the beginning of the "witch'-hunt" season?

Regional Science Academy Formed in Leningrad

LD1005143690 Moscow TASS in English 1421 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Krupenik]

[Text] Leningrad May 10 TASS—A regional branch of Russia's Academy of Sciences has been instituted in Leningrad. The new state-public organisation affiliates scientists of leading academic institutions, educational establishments and workers in culture and art.

"The branch has been formed on a voluntary principle," its co-chairman Andrey Yezuitov told TASS. "It will be part of Russia's would-be academy as a regional centre.

"Leningraders believe that a constituent congress of Russia's scientists in summer 1990 will be the first step

towards the establishment of a Russian academy. The members of our branch of the academy will not get any benefits or privileges, as is usually the case in the USSR Academy of Sciences. They are rewarded only for specific research and applied developments. This way of science management is well established in foreign academies," he said.

More on Secretary Zaykov Visit to Tula Region

PM3004153790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report under the general heading: "Meetings With Working People"]

[Text] Tula, 29 Apr—People are the focus of the party's policy. This was specially mentioned in the course of numerous meetings and conversations with people during the 26-29 April sojourn in Tula Oblast by L.N. Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the party Central Committee. He visited the city of Donskoy, where there are enterprises of the electronics, aviation, coal, and other industrial sectors.

At the electrical machine building plant, the "Alund" and "Elektrolit" production associations, the footwear and leather accessories factories, and large panel and ferroconcrete structure plants in Donskoy there was a discussion with leaders of ministries and departments of questions connected with accelerating the solution of this major industrial center's acute social problems.

It was stressed that, when it embarked on perestroyka, the party set as its chief task concern for people and for their spiritual development and material well-being. In the current five-year period all plans have undergone an abrupt shift in the direction of social needs. This is typical of industry in the Tula region. In particular, a great deal of work is being done to improve the ecological situation in Novomoskovskiy Rayon.

But there is still a great number of acute problems in the social sphere. The shortsighted, narrow departmental approach to the development of the Donskoy infrastructure has led to an exacerbation of social problems, a deterioration in the state of municipal services, and environmental pollution. Hundreds of families are living in dilapidated homes without basic amenities. The development of water and heat supply, drains, and other vital services falls short of the city's needs.

The USSR Coal Industry Ministry's debts to the region's working people are particularly great. An unbiased and exacting analysis of the situation and discussion of ways of improving the populace's living and working conditions took place at meetings of communists and leaders of oblast soviet and economic organs and ministries and departments held at all the enterprises visited by the CPSU Central Committee secretary.

Specific ways of unraveling the tight knot of social problems in each sector and in the municipal economy were mapped out.

The new body of deputies has a big part to play in accelerating the rectification of the situation. This, in particular, was discussed at L.N. Zaykov's meeting with Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies from Tula Oblast.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary addressed a meeting of the Donskoy party aktiv, setting out the party's policy at the present stage of perestroyka and highlighting tasks connected with preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Platform, and answered numerous questions.

There was a meeting at the Donskoy CPSU City Committee with party, war, and labor veterans.

Flowers were laid at the monument to V.I. Lenin in the city's central square.

Potapov Elected New Irkutsk Oblast Chairman

PM0405141990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Own correspondent N. Fokina report: "Chairman Elected"]

[Text] Irkutsk—The oblast soviet of people's deputies chairman has been elected in Irkutsk. He is Vladimir Ivanovich Potapov, first secretary of Irkutsk CPSU Obkom [Oblast Party Committee]. It took the deputies participating in the first session of the newly convened soviet two days to discuss the candidacies. At first there were five but, after three withdrawals, the contenders were V.I. Potapov, first secretary of Irkutsk Party Obkom; and Professor V.V. Lomtadze, party chief at the "Irkutskgeofizika" Association. The deputies heard the candidates' programs before discussing their candidacies.

The soviet must be prepared to defend the needy strata of the population, pensioners, and students. Social policy will depend on the soviet's work.

It was possibly this part of Deputy Potapov's program that determined the final choice.

Saransk Workers Support Expelled Communist

PM0205085990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[A. Papeta report: "Nonparty Delegate Nominated?"]

[Text] Saransk—The Saransk No. 2 Party District Electoral Commission found itself in a difficult situation with respect to the election of a delegate for the 28th CPSU Congress. Communists at an instrument-making plant nominated as their candidate delegate RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's

Deputy N. Medvedev, secretary of this enterprise's party committee. But as ill-luck would have it, some time earlier, 12 April, the gorkom [city party committee] bureau had expelled him from the CPSU, while a subsequent plant party meeting took the deputy under its protection and resolved to reject the bureau's decision.

So what now: Should the candidacy be registered or not?

"The situation is unusual, and at the moment I cannot say what we will do," O. Bobkin, chairman of the electoral commission, told your TASS correspondent. "We will have to carry out a thorough comparison with the existing CPSU Statutes and party organ instructions, but this will only be done after the May Day holiday. In addition, the expelled party member has appealed for reinstatement. Are we right not to take this into account?"

In spite of these words, V. Savvin, head of the gorkom organizational department, expresses the conviction that the commission will not allow the registration:

"When Medvedev's personal question was being resolved, we did not take into consideration one important circumstance. As a people's deputy, by law he can only be removed from his post by nothing other than a Supreme Soviet session or a Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. And so it happened—a nonparty party committee secretary. Of course, he deserved to be expelled; the plant workers were mistaken in refusing to acknowledge the gorkom bureau's decision."

This is an extraordinary conflict. But what led to it? And what is the truth?

Setting out the essence of the gorkom bureau's decision in an official article, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MORDOVIYA writes, in particular, that Medvedev "is an active supporter and propagandist of the ideological-political views of the 'democratic platform in the CPSU.' He has embarked on the practical formation of a grouping opposed to the city and oblast party organizations." The people's deputy is charged with participating in the creation of a party club "with hidden intentions," violating moral and ethical norms, circulating false information, ignoring the party statutes....

As we can see, a great deal. But the plant workers doubted that it was all true. It turned out that they see many things differently. They know Medvedev well; he is persistent in carrying out the CPSU Central Committee line on democratization, he is honest, during the last election campaign he presented a bold and realistic electoral platform, and, with the electorate's approval, criticized the local leadership, thus gaining their disapproval and hostility. Naturally—according to communists at the plant—he has his faults, but they are not considerable enough to raise the issue of his expulsion. He is not encroaching on the party's unity; on the contrary, he remains on the CPSU Central Committee platform.

Therefore the gorkom bureau's decision has been assessed as an attempt to persecute a people's deputy who proved to be inconvenient. It was also pointed out at the party meeting that unconcealed persecution of a party committee secretary with the aim of preventing his election as a delegate to the upcoming congress has been perpetrated.

Two views, two stances. Both arose from the processes of perestroyka in society and in the party. Of course, one way or another a decision will have to be made. But will the commission be able to avoid a mistake? After all, time is short. And will the verdict be to the benefit of party consolidation or the reverse?

Congress Candidates in Omsk Oblast Profiled

LD0405200490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] The nomination of candidates for delegates for the 28th CPSU congress in the 34 constituencies of Omsk Oblast is coming to an end. A typical feature of the current campaign, which is being conducted in democratic conditions, is that an extremely low percentage of those who have registered to take part in the preelection fight to be candidates come from the workers and peasants. Thus, of the 106 people who will have to fight for the delegates' mandates, there are only six representatives of the workers and the same number from the collective farmers, but then party and local soviet officials make up more than half. One cannot help asking oneself why rank and file communists are displaying passiveness and indifference in nominating the most worthy comrades from among them.

Ivanovo City Soviet Elects Nonparty Chairman

90UN1807A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 8 May 90 p 1

[Interview with S. Kruglov, newly elected chairman of the Ivanovo City Soviet of People's Deputies, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent N. Chulikhin, Ivanovo; date and place not given: "A Nonparty Member Heading the Soviet"]

[Text] **Is this a long-awaited division of functions or simply an accident? Nonparty member S. Kruglov has been elected chairman of the Ivanovo City Soviet of People's Deputies.**

[Chulikhin] Sergey Vyacheslavovich, over the entire "soviet history" of the city of the first soviet, you are the first chairman of a local organ of authority not to be a CPSU member. Might this fact be interpreted as a transfer of real power from the party nomenklatura into the hands of the people?

[Kruglov] I remember that Avenir Nozdrii, chairman of the first soviet, was also not a party member. True, this was 85 years ago, prior to the establishment of Soviet power. But the fact is—even back then there was the idea that the soviets do not constitute a privilege of the party.

We have again arrived at such an understanding during the course of today's perestroyka. I think this is a very important and principal fact.

[Chulikhin] What can you tell us about your path to the chairmanship? What played a decisive role?

[Kruglov] I won't hide the fact that I hesitated a long time before deciding to become a deputy. After all, I had a successful business career overall. Educated as a production engineer, I finished my postgraduate work and was appointed department chairman at a local textile institute 20 days prior to being elected chairman of the city soviet. Would it be worth it to devote myself to other pursuits? After listening to what other candidates to deputy posts were saying, I suddenly felt that I would be able to offer the city more. And so I introduced my own program.

[Chulikhin] What innovative aspect is there in your concept of perestroyka?

[Kruglov] If we are speaking in general terms, the entire criticality of the discussion today can be reduced to a single question—what kind of soviet should we have? Representatives of the "old guard" assert that "we have struggled with this—you won't get anything out of it either. We have assessed the enterprise to be a quitrent—you will stoop to this as well."

My principled position is that we should be thinking not about taking money away, but about making it. Because today there is simply no one on whom to impose tribute. Any branch you choose is wearing clothes full of holes. And any attempt to divide equally the remaining piece of the pie will not lead to anything good, if only by virtue of the fact that we would be dividing up destitute capital. Still more dangerous, I believe, are the statements of deputies who propose to rob the enterprises as they gather up the first crop, in essence, of independence still in its embryonic stage.

I see the path for earning money to lie in affording complete economic independence to enterprises and organizations, in the widespread introduction of leasing and contracting in city services. The soviet should act as a mediator in this regard, to whom, I am certain, successfully operating collectives will gladly give a stipulated percentage of withholdings.

One example. To this day complaints come in from the population to the city soviet ispolkom [executive committee] to the effect that consumers who come here from neighboring oblasts are buying off all the ready-made garments. How can this be? Ivanovo Oblast is a textile region—things have always been fine more or less with regard to these kinds of products. But now the problem has come to us. Should we lock the gates as some hotheads have proposed? I believe this is not the right way to go about it. It would be far more prudent to try to develop these spheres on a voluntary basis so that they might completely satisfy demand.

[Chulikhin] Will it be easier or more difficult for you to function as an individual who is independent of party organs?

[Kruglov] On the one hand, things will be easier, no question. It will be difficult to pressure me. But on the other hand, I will have to seek contact with that very party—it carries a great deal of weight, after all. And about 80 percent of our deputies are CPSU members.

New German-Language Paper Supports Autonomy

LD0505112390 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 5 May 90

[Text] The first edition of the German-language newspaper NACHRICHTEN has appeared in the Volga town of Ulyanovsk. It publishes the decision of the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies to promote the restoration in the Volga area of an autonomous republic of Soviet Germans.

In 1941, in connection with the attack on the USSR by fascist Germany, they were deported by Stalin from the Volga region to the eastern part of the country. The Vozrozhdeniye [Rebirth] organization of Soviet Germans is seeking the restoration of autonomy and opposes the emigration of Soviet Germans to the West.

By decision of the authorities, German settlements, schools, and cultural centers will be created in Ulyanovsk Oblast.

Western Republics

Nuclear Monitoring Directorate Warns Chernobyl

LD1005145290 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] The Council of the Southwestern Area of the State Nuclear Power Monitoring Directorate has decided to stop the use of the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station if by 11 May the breaches of rules, norms, and instructons on safety maintenance at nuclear power plants are not ended. The commission has detected the violation of over 150 safety rules.

Second Donbass Mine Suffers Chlorobenzene Leak

LD1005161390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Misfortune has come to the Donbass once again. Following the accident at the (Aleksandr-Zapad) pit when, as the result of a chlorobenzene leak at the Gorlovka chemical plant, three miners died and 800 were affected to various degrees, signs of mass poisoning also began to be discovered at the end of April at the neighboring pit, Uglegorskaya. The mine has been brought to a halt to avert more dangerous consequences.

Miners Threaten Strike

LD1005192190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] It seems only quite recently that alarming reports about miners' strikes disappeared from the front pages of newspapers and from radio bulletins. But alarming news is once again coming in from mining areas. Several mines have stopped working in the center of the Donbass as a result of an ecological disaster. Thousands of people are attending protest meetings there. The losses incurred already run into millions of rubles. The Gorlovka chemical works is to blame for this. Substances which are poisoning miners have been detected in mining shafts running under this enterprise. [video shows chemical plant and pipelines, rail tankers, and storage tanks; shot of stagnant pool of water; distant view of chimneys]

[Begin recording] [Correspondent G. Kondaurov] Industrial explosives are manufactured here. We visited the works and, for the first time, were able to film here, but only after obtaining permission from the deputy minister of the Defense Industry. A store of inflammable liquids and a tip for production waste pose a special threat to the health of inhabitants of Gorlovka and Yenakiyevo. The veil of secrecy over this works made people think that toxic substances are kept there.

[N.G. Puzyrev—deputy minister of Defense Industry] I can state authoritatively that this plant has never manufactured toxic substances and is not doing so now. This is not our business.

[Kondaurov] So, what did get into the soil and seep so far down, up to 600 meters?

[Puzyrev] A pipe burst and some 30-40 tons of chlorobenzene escaped as a result of negligence on the part of an operator. However, I do not think the escape of chlorobenzene was the only reason for the poisoning of the miners. It is not sufficiently toxic to poison people quickly.

[Kondaurov] What poisonous substances did seep into the mine and start spreading through the coal seams—and in what quantities? Since December last year nobody has been able to give the miners an answer to this question. Different departments continue to argue with each other, but meanwhile cases of poisoning are increasing in the shafts. People are worried about their health and asking whether they will have to evacuate the mining settlements. The union of Gorlovka workers has presented the government of the republic with its demands. [camera shows workers meeting, man reading statement to the crowd]

[V.N. Krivenka, chairman of the Workers' Union] At the moment the main demands of the miners of Gorlovka and Yenakiyevo are for these towns to be declared a zone of ecological disaster and for the inhabitants to be told what the toxic substances are in the atmosphere of the town and the mine shafts. The authorities have been given until 15 May to answer this demand. If the demand is not answered, the mines will stop working and a strike will be called. The miners will then call on the inhabitants of the towns to support them. [end recording]

[Announcer] That sounds like an ultimatum. That is what it is in fact. Although the language of ultimata was condemned publicly a long time ago by work collectives, in this case one can understand the miners. By all accounts, nobody wants to talk to them in a different language—the language of truth and openness. That plainly is not being fair to them. Well, four days remain until 15 May.

New Customs Office Established in Ukraine

LD1005092790 Moscow TASS in English 0858 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Kiev May 10 TASS—A local branch of the USSR Customs Control Directorate has been set up in the Soviet Ukraine.

Commenting on this fact, Head of the Soviet Customs Control Directorate Vitaliy boyarov said: "Perestroyka in the Soviet Union is changing the role of the customs service. Intensively growing foreign ties call for expanding the staff of the customs service.

"The number of people working in it has increased to more than 8,000 as against 2,500 people four years ago. The figure is due to double in three years. It is no longer possible to control all the branches from Moscow."

Boyarov emphasized that the Soviet Union should have a single customs service like most industrially developed nations. At the same time, it is necessary to increase the role of republican customs services that have already been set up in the Ukraine, Belorussia and Georgia. They will be profitable for these republics. A considerable part of the newly-imposed import tax will go to their budgets. Local taxes will also be introduced. New customs points will open, and the service and technical retooling of the existing points will also improve.

Moldavian Soviet Abolishes Single Party Rule

LD1005160590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1545 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Kishinev, 10 May (ATEM-TASS)—The session of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet resumed today after a break. The deputies have been discussing a draft law on amendments and addenda to the Constitution of the Moldavian SSR concerning Articles 6, 7, and 49.

In accordance with a decision adopted, the provision about the leading role of the republic's Communist Party has been abolished in those articles. Henceforth, all

political parties, public organizations, and mass movements in the republic may participate in state administration on an equal footing through their representatives in the bodies of power. All citizens of the republic have the right to join together in various political and public organizations acting within the framework of the Constitution of the Moldavian SSR, and of existing legislation.

The session is continuing.

TASS Views Emerging Parties in Moldavia

LD1005195790 Moscow TASS in English 1923 GMT 10 May 90

[By TASS Correspondents Anatoliy Golya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev May 10 (TASS)—At their session here today, which resumed after a recess, deputies of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet discussed a bill on changes and amendments to several articles of the Constitution of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The law passed by the parliament strikes from the republican Constitution the provision about the leading role of the Republican Communist Party. From now on, all political parties, public organisations and mass movements will participate on a par in the administration of the state through their representatives in government bodies.

All citizens of the republic have the right to form various political and public organisations operating within the framework of the Moldavian Constitution and the existing legislation.

Although no new parties have officially registered in Moldavia as yet, they are already widely represented in parliament in the form of political and public movements.

The Moldavian Popular Front is the most mass-based organisation. Its representatives and supporters make up more than a half of the new parliament members.

Although the Moldavian Communist Party commands official majority in the Supreme Soviet, many communist MPs [members of parliament] in deed defend the interests of the Popular Front.

The platforms of the emerging parties—Republican Social-Democratic, Women's Christian-Democratic League and several others—are close to the Popular Front programme.

Some of them do not conceal their intentions to secede Moldavia from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in future. The international movement "Yedinstvo" (Unity), the Gagauz Popular Movement "Gagauz Khalky" and the organisations of the working people in the cities of Tiraspol, Rybnitsa and Bendery express their disagreement in principle on this all-important issue.

Caucasus

Attack on Leninakan Garrison Reported

NC1105101690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 11 May 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] An appeal from the military commandant of the garrison [not further identified] has been published on the third page of the paper. The appeal states: [Words indistinct] persons armed with (?rifles and pistols) launched an attack on one of the [word indistinct] of Leninakan Garrison at 1500 on (?8) May. The attack was [words indistinct]. Unfortunately, the exchange of fire (?resulted in casualties) on both sides. [passage indistinct] We call on everyone to uphold law and order and reestablish cooperation between the Army and the people, the appeal concludes.

A report issued by the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry advises that attacks on the citizens' houses by dangerous elements armed with rifles have lately become increasingly frequent [words indistinct]. A particularly critical situation has developed in Artashatskiy Rayon. The [words indistinct] of a member of the local section of the so-called Republican Party in Azatavan village in Artashatskiy Rayon was murdered at around 1430 on 9 May.

The procurator and the Internal Affairs Ministry organs have instituted criminal proceedings in connection with this and other crimes committed [word indistinct]. Measures are being taken to apprend the criminals.

Presidium Proposes Post of Azerbaijan President

LD1105111690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0202 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium examined the question of establishing the post of the president of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Taking into account maintaining the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR and its security and territorial integrity; implementing political and economic changes fruitfully in the republic, strengthening the legislative and legal regime of the constitutional structure, protecting rights, liberties, and safety of citizens, harmonizing the interethnic relations, and benefits of improving [word indistinct] activity of the Azerbaijan SSR's supreme state power and its administrative bodies, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic deemed it necessary to establish the post of the president of the Azerbaijan SSR and to submit this question to the Supreme Soviet for discussion.

In this connection, the commission for legislative observations under the Supreme Soviet (?has decided) to take into consideration the relevant provisions of establishing the post of the president of the Azerbaijan SSR in the draft law on amendments and additions to the Azerbaijan SSR's Constitution.

Azerbaijan Greens Hold Founding Congress

LD1105081290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] The founding conference of the republican greens' movement has taken place in the capital of Azerbaijan. Among those who decided to dedicate themselves to the battle for the cleanliness of the environment and man's health were teachers and scientists, employees of the State Committee for the Protection of Nature, and medical and epidemiological stations as well as students. The aim of the new social movement is the normalization of the ecological situation in the republic and the improvement of nature protection legislation, bringing it into line with international conventions.

Georgian Attitude to Meskheti Turks Viewed

PM1005154990 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 18, 1-7 May 90 pp 14-15

[Marina Shakina article: "A Second Exile; The Problem of the Meskheti Turks Has Not Yet Been Solved" carried under the "Ethnic Problems" rubric]

[Text] The editorial office received a cable from a group of Meskheti Turks in Tashkent concerning the "Tbilisi calendar. A chronicle of Georgia's political affairs," published in issue 15 of NEW TIMES. Among items reprinted from Georgian newspapers was a brief note about a rally in Tbilisi devoted to the problem of Meskheti Turks. The rally, Tbilisi newspapers wrote, opposed the idea of Meskheti Turks returning to Georgia. Calls were made for showing on television a documentary about the violence committed by Meskheti Turks against Georgians in the past.

By quoting the news item about Meskheti Turks our magazine wanted to show its readers the political atmosphere in Georgia, because the relevant information in national newspapers is scarce. For some reason the Meskheti Turks who sent us a cable from Tashkent demanded that our magazine publish a denial. In that case the cable of protest should have been sent to those who held a rally and adopted a resolution. What should be refuted by our magazine? The rally did take place and those gathered did vote against the resettling of Meskheti Turks in Georgia.

Our readers in Tashkent evidently got the impression that the magazine agreed with the claims about the "violence" committed by Meskheti Turks. That is not so. We are sincerely concerned over the destiny of the Meskheti Turks and the attempts to make "enemies" of them.

Before the outbreak of ethnic strife in Fergana, Uzbekistan, the destiny of the Meskheti Turks worried mainly ethnographers. The houses burnt during the bloody events in Fergana reminded us—for a short while—of the fate of the national minority exiled from Georgia to Uzbekistan in 1944. With the help of Army units they were soon driven out of that republic and settled in various villages of Russia. They were left in such a suspended state for almost a year. The sad truth is that a provisional arrangement may last for a long time. Till now Meskheti Turks live in the non-black earth zone of Russia, awaiting a solution of their problem. Some of them have been settled in Azerbaijan. We should be grateful to the people who helped refugees in an hour of need for the country as a whole. But is it a solution of the problem?

Three Turks from Georgia brought to the editorial office a bulky volume—a rough copy of the "History of Meskhetia"—written by their compatriot. The author tries to prove the Meskheti Turks are Georgian Moslems. I read the book faithfully. What could I say if even ethnographers admit that the problem has been studied little and there is not yet a unanimous opinion on the origin of Meskheti Turks?

It is sad that precisely this point became a key one in the approach to the problem. There are several versions disputing one another. Our "democratic" society seems to draw far-reaching conclusions from a purely scientific dispute. It might appear that there is no place for the Meskheti Turks to live in as an ethnic community. Georgia does not consider them Georgians and Turkey—Turks, while our state seems to forget that they are first of all Soviet citizens. No sooner had Russian refugees fled from Baku than several aid funds were set up. It is wonderful, and this is how it should be. But no fund has been raised for the Meskheti Turks till now. How should they regard such a selective sympathy on the part of the state? As indifference to their fate....

Newspapers write about the bloody events in Fergana and the dire plight of the Meskheti Turks. They urge the public to have compassion for them. But that is not the only point. The point is that the human rights guaranteed by the Constitution and international covenants, which have been signed by our covenants, which have been signed by our country too, are still violated flagrantly. The people has been forcibly deprived of its homeland and left to the mercy of fate. Today Meskheti Turks are not allowed to cross the border of Georgia. How to explain that human rights should be enjoyed by all people, that they are a universal democratic value common for Georgians. Turks and Russians? The desire of people to return to their homeland, to the graves of their relatives has been respected at all times, even when the declaration of human rights did not exist.

One of the cornerstones of democracy is that human rights should be given priority over the rights of nations and over any political considerations. Such is an ideal. However, it is impossible to ignore the real state of

affairs. Scholars point out that the possibilities of Meskhetia, a region in Georgia, are limited, whereas the number of Turks who lived there has trebled since 1944. I also heard the opinion that the right to return can be exercised only by those who were exiled from Meskhetia, and their children under 18 years of age, while adults born elsewhere must not claim the right to return. However, even such a possibility is questioned.

In Georgia the idea of a return to Meskheti Turks is rejected out of hand. The newspaper MOLODEZH GRUZII recently carried an appeal to the Georgian people on behalf of a number of public organizations. The main provisions of this document, which is fully devoted to the "Turkish question," are painfully familiar and arouse sad recollections. The appeal says that Georgia is for Georgians only, that the events in Fergana had been provoked by the worst enemies of the Georgian people with the sole purpose of aggravating tensions in the republic, that Turks will never be allowed to return to Meskhetia, and that an exception will be made only for those "deportees" who have a "Georgian orientation": Georgian names, consider themselves Georgians, and are native speakers.

Who will determine the percentage of a "Georgian orientation" and by what methods? Will it be done by some filtering commissions in which a man will have to prove that he is a Georgian? Does it mean that the commissions will examine his genealogical tree, philologists will decide whether his name is basically Georgian, and anthropologists will establish whether he has a Georgian genotype? The world community experienced all this nearly 50 years ago.

The appeal does not denounce the expulsion of Meskheti Turks from the republic in 1944. However, it proclaims the struggle for "the repatriation of ethnic Turks to Turkey." How to do this if the Meskheti Turks do not regard Turkey as their homeland? It is necessary, the appeal says, to conduct work among Meskheti Turks and "explain their national essence to them." One of the signatories of the document is the Helsinki Union of Georgia. Judging by its name, the organization is supposed to monitor how the Helsinki agreements and human rights are observed.

The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet's commission on the problem of Meskheti Turks is faced with an incredibly difficult task. Perhaps it will be able to offer an ingenious solution of the problem. As a matter of fact, the commission is the only hope for the refugees.

In the same issue the Georgian Youth newspaper carried an interview with Catholics-Patriarch of All Georgia Iliya II entitled "Hatred is venomous—only love can uplift man, and the people."

Central Asia

Officials View New Kuybyshev City Soviet

90UN1518A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 15, 14 Apr 90 p 8

[Report by special correspondent A. Prazdnikov: "You Would Do Better To Cool Off for Starters"]

[Text] Kuybyshev—According to the results of the March elections to the Kuybyshev City Soviet of People's Deputies, 151 deputies were elected for 200 electoral districts: communists—94, party workers—seven, soviet workers—three. And 122 people were elected to the city soviet for the first time.

The first organizational session of the city soviet will be held at the end of April. But the struggle for power began even while preparing for the session. The deputies divided into two camps. One cannot rule out the possibility of a split among the communist deputies.

Will the new city soviet be able to effectively solve problems of city self-management?

Here is what A. Simonov, the secretary of the ispolkom [executive committee] which has not yet completed its term, thinks about this:

"Whenever there is a struggle for power the interests of the matter at hand recede into the background. Therefore the new deputies must look for a path to consensus.

"One is alarmed by the lack of competence of the majority of new deputies. Many of them do not know the elementary things. For example, they have no idea how the city budget is formed and expended. The violation of succession is disturbing. Of all the current leaders of the ispolkom only the chairman, A. Rodionov, was elected to the new city soviet."

M. Kozhukhov, who heads the group of deputies called Democratic Platform, a docent at the polytechnical institute and a nonparty member, has his own view of the post-election situation in the city:

"In March we were witnesses to and participants in the first democratic elections. It is gratifying that many of the deputies were elected. They have new ideas.

"All our life the apparatus has squelched initiative and enterprisingness. Is not this one of the reasons the country has ended up in an impasse? The deputies in our group have united not according to party affiliation but according to convictions."

And another opinion comes from B. Zolotarev, first secretary of the CPSU gorkom [city party committee]:

"Many leaders lost the elections to the local soviets because of wholesale discreditation of the administrative and party apparatus. Because the election campaigning on the part of party organs and organizations was not

active enough. Because of the overall deterioration of the economic situation in the country.

"As a result we have ended up with a body of deputies who have a great deal of desire but little experience. It is a clear attempt to take the local management organ out from under party influence. But we do not have a law that prohibits this form of work. And in the CPSU work through communists who are employed at institutions and enterprises is one of the main methods of political leadership.

"Finally, it would not hurt the Democratic Platform and all newly elected deputies of the city soviet to know that it was with the active participation of the CPSU gorkom last year that the city soviet adopted programs directed toward solving the city's main problems—housing, transportation, food, and others. Are these not the problems the new city soviet will have to deal with?"

"The city party committee does not intend to depart from the principle of political leadership of the affairs of the society. We have a whole arsenal of measures and devices. From the study of public opinion and its formation to criticism of the deeds and acts of the council and its ispolkom, campaigning for or against them, and influencing the work of the soviet through the deputy party group.

"This is in the future. But now everyone should cool off from the successes and defeats in the elections, let the dust of confrontation settle, and get down to work together. There are so many problems and so much business in the city economy that there is enough for everyone."

Background of Dushanbe Events Examined

PM1005153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 May 90 Second Edition p 3

[Part one of TASS observer Viktor Ponomarev article: "The Bells Of Hope"]

[Text] Dushanbe-Moscow—How many times have we written from the country's "hot spots" about "certain circles" involved in mass disorder and outrages on ethnic grounds. But, as a rule, neither politicians nor investigators have answered the main question: Who is actually to blame for the wreckage of good-neighborliness, for the bloodshed, for the destruction of homes.

The events in Dushanbe showed that "certain circles" do have names, and official posts...

1. Revolt

Many people, if not all, guessed that something strange was going to happen in the city. From the top people in the republic to primary school children. Fathers would sigh sadly on coming home: Something is going to happen, people say so at work.... Mothers would suddenly discover strange marks on doors: in some cases the Islamic crescent, in other cases crosses, and sometimes the skull and crossbones. Children were suddenly bringing home leaflets made up of letters from newspaper headlines: "You have until 20 March to leave Tajikistan. National Islamic Front." It was as if dark clouds had appeared over the city. Everything was in a state of anxious expectation.

At midday on 11 February, 150 young people appeared outside the government building. The crowd swelled and moved to the Central Committee building. The words "Armenian refugees" were on everyone's lips. Some claimed there were 3,000; others claimed there were 5,000. "Witnesses" appeared, who had seen them brought in by night and hidden in the Varzob Gorge, in Almasakh and Karatag. They claimed that henceforth all new housing would be allocated exclusively to them. But by that time, in fact, only 47 Armenians had arrived in Dushanbe, not refugees at all but Armenians visiting relatives, who gave them shelter. No one gave allocated apartments to them and such questions never arose. Nevertheless, the crowd was howling: Down with them!

It did not disperse until an ultimatum had been adopted: The refugees have one day to leave the republic! And let the spiritual leader of the muslims of Tajikistan, Kazi Akbar Turadzhonzoda, personally supervise this and then tell the people.

Throughout the night, three aircraft at the capital's airport were being prepared for emergency flights. Armenian families hurried to the airport from all parts of the city. Fear had driven them out of their own homes. Many knew that two families had already been slaughtered and their apartments robbed. Some 233 people permanently resident in the republic left Dushanbe: old people, women, and children. But the aircraft left and neither the Kazi-kolon nor the television said a thing! And the next day a crew of many thousands of people was again hollering: Down with them! And not only down with the Armenians, but also down with the top people in the republic, all the members of the Central Committee Bureau, all the members of the government. Many people, high on alcohol and drugs, were screaming death threats.

The assault began, as if a command had been given. Buildings burst into flames, glass shattered. Trolleybuses and cars were set on fire and cobblestones were flying all over the place.... "By bread I swear!"—the Tajiks say. But I saw vans overturned and bread trampled in the dirt.

There was only a small militia force in the city at the time. Repeatedly it sought refuge in the building the mob was trying to break into, and forced it back again using blank cartridges, jets of water, rubber batons, and the "Cheremukha" agent. But does a frenzied elephant feel a mosquito bite? The mob just got meaner. When the republic's leaders arrived they were greeted with another hail of cobblestones.... I saw a guy in a blood-soaked military uniform with a deep gash in his head, and a militia officer with four knife wounds. I saw thugs fighting over something in the midst of the crowd. At the rear, far from the troops, people were being hit in the

back by bullets. Bandit scum firing point-blank. I saw a soldier turned into a flaming torch by a petrol bomb. The bloody toll had begun....

It was then that a call rang out in the teahouses which had been turned into prayerhouses: "Wake up, muslims! The people are rising up!" Speeches by Islamic fundamentalist leaders were distributed on audio and video tape: "It is time to establish an Islamic state!"

"Envoys" from Baku appeared in various districts. Some 20 persons were detained for making inflammatory appeals. They had already loosened the soil in January and sown the seeds of enmity. M. Nizomidinov, engineer at the Baku construction institute; and E. Dzhafarov, who called himself a nonstaff employee of NBC News, were expelled from the republic. As yet fragmented groups of young people began to come into the capital from outlying areas. The old folk said: Don't you dare! But there were also people egging them on: Are they not men? Let them learn democracy....

And they "learned," despite the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of a curfew. They robbed trade outlets, attacked administrative buildings, burned cars, and indiscrimiately beat up people dressed in European clothes. I talked with people who had witnessed the terrible spectacle of a mob of fanatics tearing a Russian boy to bits on the bridge over the Dushanbinka. People saw the same mob throw a Russian woman off the bridge. But I heard from Russians of the gang-rape of a seven-months pregnant Tajik woman. She was also dressed in European style. When she got home the poor woman hanged herself. But you will not find reports of this in militia depositions. According to the laws of Islam, such people are buried quickly and secretly so that no rumor escapes the family home: Allah has given—Allah has taken away.... But local television told people that none of this had happened, so there were no complaints. And certain people had already hinted to the witnesses of these outrages that their stories were slander against the Tajik people. Familiar motives, tried and true methods! There is no limit to the sophistication of people who are committed to concealing the truth. But is it not the basest slander to identify the people with a gang of riffraff?

The outrages sent a shudder through the residential districts. The telephones at the republic's KGB started ringing: Help us, protect us!

Five mobile groups of specially trained officers took to the city streets.

""Fire on the right, commander!...."

A group of 40 or so crazed youths, and a car that had been overturned and was engulfed in flames. And a beaten and bloody human being whom they were trying to push into the burning metal carcass.

The vehicle braked sharply, jolting the suspension. Ten strong guys in fatigues tore through the mob, overcoming frantic resistance and parrying blows on all sides. In a matter of minutes the victim had been taken away by ambulance and the ringleaders, now cowed and subdued, were already lying in a row in the vehicle.

"To the militia station!"

There comes a time when political euphemisms are no longer appropriate. The time to call "hooligan elements" bandits, and "deluded" people nationalist provocateurs!

"Mob on the right, commander!...."

A solid ring of guys with bulging biceps, hollering and slavering. And a little fellow in a kaftan, skullcap, and boots. He was waving his arms, dashing around, cursing—to all appearances, a fanatic. In the ring there were two Tajiks, mother and daughter, beautiful faces bruised and European clothes torn to shreds. While they were being dealt with, the one in the kaftan disappeared. The mother said something, fighting back the tears, her hand lightly touching the sweaty fatigues of the Russian guys around her.

"What is she on about?" the commander asked.

"She is thanking us for saving her...."

The second day ended with a show of force: Robberies, assaults, beatings, and burnings. The republic's leaders were still trying to conduct a direct dialogue with the mob behind the backs and shields of the soldiers who were barely containing it. Their voices were lost in the roar of the crowd. The grim list of deaths and injuries increased by the hour and the organized outrages developed into a political putsch. Groups of militants, charged up by smalltown mullahs, were already hastening to the capital from outlying areas, hollering demands for the establishment of an Islamic republic. The troops were again pushed back to the Central Committee building, while a new authority—"provisional national committee"—was emerging in the square. B. Karimov, deputy chairman of the republican Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Planning Committee, was proclaimed its head. His name was hollered loudest by a well-built man whose acquaintance I was to make.

In the morning I found the following note under the hotel room door: "Brother! We can talk about those who caused the outrages in Dushanbe. Say tomorrow, Monday, at the 'Sapida' Bar, in district 33, at exactly 1000 hours. We know you and will approach you. Be alone. Say nothing to anyone about this note! We guarantee your safety."

Need I say what I thought about at the appointed hour, how I looked for the bar in an unfamiliar city....

Delicately but firmly, the conditions were laid down: Not a word about the motives behind their sudden confidence, nor about the interlocutors themselves. They asked for my dictaphone and returned it to me after the conversation in a wasteland outside the city. I was told that revelations were dangerous.

On returning to the hotel I spent the whole night reconstructing from memory the details of the three-hour conversation: 32 typewritten pages—names, facts, chronology of events. About the Garm, Leninabad, Pamir, Kulyab and other clans waging an exhausting internecine struggle for a place in the sun. About the hollow, hypocritical members of informal associations' aktivs, preaching one thing while believing something quite different. About the close links with the smalltown clergy. And, above all, about the four bosses of the capital's criminal world controlling their own spheres of influence. And about statesmen, the public's favorites, secretly using the criminals, nourishing them and protecting them against the law, keeping them in combat readiness, so to speak, for a specific period.

Let many names remain in the shadows for the moment. Investigations are taking place, but presumption of innocence is too precious a gain for our society to be disregarded even if the purpose is a fine one.

All the material will be handed over to the law enforcement organs. But only into the reliable hands of investigators from Moscow, I was told. I received consent for this. For the time being I can only discuss the way in which daring raids camouflaged by the people's righteous indignation were prepared for almost a year.

Remember the man who shouted louder than anyone else about the "true son of the Tajik people"—Karimov—in the square where the "new authorities" were born? His name is Yakub. He controls the "Kulyab guys"—former villagers who have come to study in the capital. These are not "city kids"—an admixture of Tajiks, Russians, and others. It was the "villagers" and their countrymen who came to help those who comprised the strike detachments in the city center streets during the disturbances. They were the ones given vodka, money, and drugs. Most of the "city kids" were on the other side of the barricades—following their ringleader's orders, they protected stores and establishments controlled by their "international" clan from attacks. So the first act of the scenario enacted in Dushanbe was a clash between Mafia groups.

People in this area are perfectly aware of how the city lives and breathes. And they know about Yakub's links with highly placed patrons, who helped him to get off with a three-year suspended sentence for a "package" of crimes, including robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. They know who gave Yakub the idea of "refugees" and when. They know who prompted his people to demand Karimov as "president" in the square. They also know about the extortion for the "needs of Islam" on the eve of the unrest, and about the bases where the future pogromists met up.

When the KGB snatch squad burst into the winery administration it ran into frenzied resistance from "patriots."

"Beat it!" they shouted at them. "We have new authorities! You're not needed here!"

It turned out that they were needed: Liquor trucks appeared in the city and treated the "village army" to free drinks. Who allowed these trucks out during the state of emergency?

"The troops should not have been sent in," Minister of Culture N. Tabarov would later state from the Central Committee plenum rostrum. "This started annoying people. They are our children, after all!"

"Who was blockading me? The people?" I. Senshov, chief of the garrison, said in reply. "In their stockinged feet, drunk and reeking of tobacco, they were pulled onto our armored cars because they were simply unaware of what they were doing and had been sent to the blockade to lie down in front of the tanks...."

No, it was not the tanks that started annoying people. The "village army" in the volatile square demanded the release of its ringleaders who had been arrested during the unrest. They were again dutifully bussed in to the Central Committee building, demonstrating the authorities' impotence and capitulation. This whipped up people's feelings.

"Who organized this?" people are asking. "Whose idea was it to fan the flames?"

Together with representatives of the informal "Rastokhez" Organization and the "interim national committee" set up in the square by the pogromists, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers—who is very popular in the republic—then carried out an amazing inspection of Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB buildings looking for detainees. He then assured everyone that he had had nothing to do with it.

As for the troops, it was necessary to have seen the city streets on 23 February. I thought I was watching a newsreel from May 1945. The combat vehicles were covered in flowers and surrounded by the citizens of Dushanbe. Families argued among themselves for the right to make pilaf for the servicemen.

Border guards caught a deserter in the Pyandzh River immediately after the events. He was headed for Afghanistan with a report on the events and the disposition of political forces in the republic. But by morning Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] members from border rayons were phoning their first secretary—A. Yakubov—in the capital: A large military bandit formation had appeared on the other side of the river with additional weapons and was offering to help overthrow Soviet power in the republic.

Those were not idle words! Tajikistan's intelligence officers have long been waging a dogged struggle against Pakistan's interdepartmental intelligence service with its sinister "Program M." Developed jointly with the CIA, this program is aimed at whipping up nationalist and separatist sentiments in Soviet Central Asia using militant Islamic positions.

In the deteriorating situation, the "interim committee" headed by Karimov started a dialogue with the republic's leadership. Resignations were called for, and a protocol of resignations was drawn up. Act two of the previously scripted scenario had begun: pressuring the government and out-and-out blackmail.

"I attended all these talks over the course of two days," P. Pulatov, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, recalled. "Every 15 minutes, strange people would come in and issue ultimatums: If a protocol on the resignation of the entire government were not immediately signed, residential area No. 46 would be torched. They said that a major fight was under way at the 'Rokhat' Teahouse, and if the ultimatum was not accepted they would blow the teahouse up. The same threats were also made against a movie theater. Further bloodshed was threatened...."

The republic's leaders now explain that the resignation protocol was signed to avoid an escalation of violence. Karimov flew out of the office, exclaiming: "I'm head of the government!" And he... kissed a militiaman. He was followed by the mincing Minister of Culture N. Tabarov, who immediately set up telephones in Karimov's office and started calling the people needed to draw up a decree on the transfer of power.

Everyone present in Karimov's office that night had to give an explanation to the plenum. "Why did you go there?" M. Mabatshoyev, chief editor of the party organ, was asked. "What job were you offered?" "And what about you?", A. Khibibov, chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Political Department, was asked. The minister of culture was also asked: "Why did you mislead everyone by claiming that the matter had been agreed with Comrades Gorbachev and Pugo?" Evil deeds, like houses of cards, collapse in the fresh breeze. And now the characters are playing out a farce after the tragedy: They are lying, trimming, attacking each other, and complaining of having poor memories. But the peculiarity of the Dushanbe events was that, in addition to extortioners, pogromists, and drug addicts, they also revealed people intoxicated by a different drug—power.

Tajikistan Draft Platform Supports CPSU Ties

LD1005140590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Tajikistan regards itself as an indissoluble part of the Soviet Union and its party organization is inseparable from the CPSU. This main thought permeats the draft platform—published in today's republican communist party newspapers—for its next congress which opens tomorrow. The document, which has been submitted for broad discussion, analyzes both achievements and the deformations which have been allowed. The draft defines the key area of renewal in the republic for the future, bearing in mind the specific features of its historical, national, and spiritual development.